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 The co-creation of new products between firms and customers has been shown to be 
associated with higher new product quality, the development of products that more closely match 
customers' unmet needs, lower development costs, and faster speed-to-market (Hoyer, Chandy, 
Dorotic, Krafft, & Singh, 2010; O'Hern & Rindfleisch, 2010). However, little is known about the 
evaluation and selection process in the co-creation of innovation (Bayus, 2013). To be 
successful, product development teams must identify customer ideas that have the potential to 
both fulfill unmet market needs and be profitable for the firm. This dissertation examines two 
cognitive factors related to team decision-making, a prevention or promotion regulatory focus 
(Higgins, 1998) and team reflexivity (West, 1996) , to examine what drives a development 
team's ability to accurately pick "winners" and "losers" from a pool of customer ideas for new 
products. Data is analyzed from a series of team-based lab experiments, as well as a virtual 
ethnographic analysis of video footage from a firm's evaluation and selection meetings for 186 
co-created product concepts.  In addition to regulatory style and reflexivity, the moderating 
effect of customer expertise is also analyzed in order to further explore development team 
decision-making in the co-creation of innovation. 
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 For marketers, the ability to develop new products and services is a significant source of 
competitive advantage in the marketplace. However, a large percentage of new products fail, and 
the rising cost of innovation, coupled with increasingly short product lifecycles, has created 
challenges for firms wishing to develop and launch new products. In response to this difficult 
innovation landscape, many firms are beginning to adopt an open innovation paradigm in which 
the traditional boundaries of the firm are becoming more and more permeable to external ideas 
(Chesbrough, 2003). One manifestation of this paradigm is that firms are increasingly looking to 
their customers to collaborate with them in the ideation and production processes for new 
products.  Co-creation of new products with customers has been shown to be associated with 
higher new product quality, the development of products that more closely match customers’ 
unmet needs, and greater market success. These initiatives can take the form of crowd-sourced 
innovation contests (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 
2010), the development and curation of user communities (Hienerth, Lettl, & Keinz, 2014; J. 
West & Lakhani, 2008), or the posing of innovation-related problems to groups of lead users 
(Lilien, Morrison, Searls, Sonnack, & Hippel, 2002; Schreier & Prügl, 2008; Urban & Von 
Hippel, 1988). Several streams of research have investigated co-creation from a customer 
perspective (e.g., what motivates customers to collaborate, how customers benefit from co-
creation, firm benefits from co-creation). However, scholars still know relatively little about the 
process of co-creation from a managerial perspective.  
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 Despite its considerable promise to improve the success rate of new products, only about 
50% of co-creation efforts are successful (Verhoef, Beckers, & van Doorn, 2013). Involving 
customers in the co-creation of new products may be a double-edged sword for firms. On one 
hand, customers often have ideas that are on par with, or better than, internally-developed ideas 
(Poetz & Schreier, 2012), and co-created ideas have been shown to dramatically outperform 
internally-developed ideas in both profitability and market longevity (Nishikawa, Schreier, & 
Ogawa, 2013). Therefore, managers who dismiss customer ideas as infeasible or are overly 
restrictive in considering customer input may do so to the detriment of the quality and market 
potential of their new products.  
 On the other hand, inviting customers into the product development process can create 
significant challenges. Managers who are open to a wide variety of customer ideas for new 
products and services may find themselves overwhelmed by the sheer volume of customer input 
(Gloor & Cooper, 2012). They may also find that a large percentage of customer ideas are 
redundant, not attractive to a critical mass of customers, or not feasible to implement (Bayus, 
2013; Hopkins, 2011). In addition, customers are focused on satisfying unmet needs, but do not 
often consider firm capabilities or profit potential when developing new product ideas with firms 
(Poetz & Schreier, 2012). In summary, a major challenge for firms in co-creating innovation is to 
identify customer ideas that have the potential to fulfill unmet market needs and can be 
implemented profitably. 
 
Co-creation of Innovation in Business Practice 
 Examples abound of companies that are increasingly relying on customers to help 
generate new market offerings. Companies like Threadless and Quirky have business models 
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which rely completely on customer-submitted designs and product concepts that they then 
manufacture and sell in their online retail stores (Fuchs, Prandelli, & Schreier, 2010; Kornish & 
Ulrich, 2014). Other companies have developed online communities in which customers can 
interact with the company and with each other, and have the ability to submit ideas for new 
products and improvements to existing products to firms’ product portfolios. Lego, BMW, and 
Fiat have all developed online innovation portals where customers can share their designs and 
insights and directly contribute to the development and launch of new products (Antorini, Muniz, 
& Askildsen, 2012; Dell, 2015; Füller, Hutter, & Fries, 2012). Dell’s IdeaStorm website (Dell, 
2015) combines elements of both to give its customers a forum in which they can propose 
radically new products or simply make suggestions as to how to improve existing products and 
services (Bayus, 2013). In all of these cases, firms have begun to realize that inviting customers 
into the new product and service development process, as active and direct contributors, often 
produces superior results (e.g., market offerings that more closely match customer needs) 
compared to traditional market research efforts (Ogawa & Piller, 2006). 
 
Customer Co-creation as an Extension of the Open Innovation Paradigm 
 Synthesizing the definitions that have been given for co-creation in the marketing 
literature (Hoyer et al., 2010; Lusch & Vargo, 2006; O'Hern & Rindfleisch, 2010; Prahalad & 
Ramaswamy, 2004), this dissertation defines customer co-creation of innovation as the 
collaboration between firms and their customers (or potential customers) in the product or 
service development process, which may include customer input into ideation, design, and 
production of new market offerings. 
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 Following the logic of the open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003), customer co-
creation of innovation involves managers looking outside of their firm boundaries for new 
product ideas and viewing customers as collaboration partners in innovation efforts. Many 
successful firms conduct market research to determine the latent needs of their customers when 
developing new products. Co-creation differs from the concept of market research because it 
entails directly involving customers in the new product ideation and/or production process 
(Füller, 2010; Witell, Kristensson, Gustafsson, & Löfgren, 2011), rather than simply learning 
about customers. 
 From a customer perspective, scholars know a good deal about what motivates customers 
to participate in co-creation activities, and the ways that co-creation activities might influence 
customer perceptions of the value of new products and services. Customers are motivated to 
contribute their time and creative energy by social benefits, learning benefits, hedonic benefits 
and benefits related to personal gain (Nambisan & Baron, 2009). For example, Tynan, 
McKechnie, and Chhuon (2010), in their study of the co-creation of luxury goods, found that co-
creation allowed customers to create personalized brand experiences by co-developing products 
that expressed their own sense of style, aesthetics, and relational value. Kristensson, Matthing, 
and Johansson (2008) found that that the process of customer co-creation can help customers to 
understand their own needs more clearly by facilitating deeper thinking about various usage 
situations and roles they may not have encountered before in a particular product domain. In the 
marketing services literature, co-creation efforts have been found to improve customer 
satisfaction during service failure recovery (Dong, Evans, & Zou, 2008), and to encourage 
customers to adopt new services by allowing them to test drive experiences before they commit 
to purchasing them (Edvardsson, Enquist, & Johnston, 2005). 
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 From a firm perspective, scholars know that innovation strategies which involve co-
creation have the potential to bring substantial benefits to companies’ product development 
efforts. Specifically, co-creating innovation with customers helps firms to develop new market 
offerings that more closely mirror customer needs, are of higher quality, and involve less 
development risk (Fang, 2008; Hoyer et al., 2010). Customer co-creation may also be a key 
aspect of customer relationship management, since customers may increasingly prefer to be 
involved in the creative experience of developing products, services, and experiences (Boulding, 
Staelin, Ehret, & Johnston, 2005). Some research has also looked at how co-creation influences 
frontline employees. Chan, Yim, and Lam (2010) found that co-creation creates stronger 
relational bonds with customers and increases the perceived value of products and services, but 
can increase employee job stress and decrease work satisfaction.  
 Taken as a whole, the co-creation literature has extensively explored the outcomes of co-
creation, including benefits to both customers and firms. However, the decision-making process 
of how development teams review, select, and develop customer ideas for new products is still 
underexplored in co-creation research.  
 
Managerial Challenges in Customer Co-creation of Innovation 
 Not all forms of customer involvement in innovation are an inexpensive panacea for 
generating innovative ideas. For example, Campbell’s Soup abandoned its online community 
designed to generate new product ideas because of the lack of participation by customers 
(Phillips, 2011). In a recent Wired Magazine article, the president of TopCoder, a crowdsourcing 
development firm, predicted that 2014 could be the year that crowdsourced innovation initiatives 
experience hyper-growth. He also predicted that a substantial number of firms will subsequently 
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abandon the practice when it fails to engage end users in the NPD process in a way that 
substantially improves firm innovation output (Singh, 2014).  Given the anecdotal evidence from 
industry regarding the mixed track record of co-creation efforts, several challenges in co-creation 
are apparent.  
 Extant research has identified several problematic issues which influence the adoption of 
open innovation in general, but also would likely impact whether firms pursue a co-creation 
strategy with customers.  These challenges include designing appropriate interface mechanisms 
for user innovation (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008), recruiting qualified idea contributors (Jeppesen & 
Lakhani, 2010), managing customer relationships in co-created innovation programs (Füller, 
Hutter, & Faullant, 2011; Singh, 2014), dealing with intellectual property issues related to 
customers’ ideas (Bogers, Afuah, & Bastian, 2010; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Nambisan, 2002), 
and developing radical (versus incremental) innovation in collaboration with customers (Bogers 
et al., 2010; Hoyer et al., 2010). 
 This dissertation focuses specifically on the challenges associated with how development 
teams select the best ideas from customers, and which aspects of group cognition influence 
teams’ ability to recognize and implement innovative ideas from customers. Based on the 
literature on innovation, there are several key challenges which may make customer co-creation 
of innovation uniquely challenging.  
 
Quality and Volume of Customer Ideas 
 First, research in crowdsourcing and soliciting ideas from large groups has argued that 
not all customer ideas are worth pursuing but that the very best customer-generated ideas can be 
as good (or better) than those generated by firms’ own internal development teams (Chesbrough, 
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2003; Magnussen, Matthing, & Kristensson, 2003; Nishikawa et al., 2013; Poetz & Schreier, 
2012). When firms consider customer-generated ideas for new products, they typically look for 
ideas that are novel and valuable in terms of their profit-generating potential (Amabile, 1996; 
Bayus, 2013; Burroughs, Dahl, Moreau, Chattopadhyay, & Gorn, 2011). Researchers have 
argued that a large percentage of customer ideas in such initiatives are either redundant with 
existing firm development projects, overlapping with other customer ideas, or infeasible to 
implement (Bayus, 2013; Hopkins, 2011). As a result, the careful selection and filtering of 
customer ideas is essential to creating value for firms.  
 Second, the sheer volume of ideas can also be a factor in co-creation projects that can be 
challenging for firms to manage (Gloor & Cooper, 2012). Innovation teams that are unprepared 
for idea volume can quickly become overwhelmed to the point of abandoning strategies to 
involve users. Although online innovation communities can play a role in the filtering and 
selection process (e.g., firms only consider ideas that receive a certain level of votes from the 
community), the volume of ideas that managers must evaluate is still higher than is typically 
encountered in internal innovation processes (Hoyer et al., 2010). 
 Third, development teams must look for the best customer ideas that serve the needs of 
their customers, while also creating value for their firms. These dual goals in open innovation are 
what Chesbrough (2003) refers to as value creation and value capture, respectively. Balancing 
value creation and value capture poses a challenge for decision-makers. On one hand, customer 
ideas may contain novel and useful suggestions for tapping into unmet customer needs, offering 
the potential for deeper penetration into existing customer markets or tapping into new customer 
markets (Hoyer et al., 2010). On the other hand, customers are unlikely to have a deep 
understanding of firms’ implementation capabilities (Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Therefore, 
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customer ideas for new products and services, while addressing unmet needs, may not always be 
feasible to implement, or may require considerable adaption to be profitable for the firm. If 
decision makers err too far in either direction (i.e., too restrictive or not discerning enough in 
idea selection), the firm’s ability to capitalize on promising customer ideas may be 
compromised, or firms may develop products that do not meet unmet needs in their respective 
markets. 
 
Team Cognitive Limitations 
 Finally, firms’ new product development teams may not always recognize the most 
promising ideas when they see them. While the variance in the quality and quantity of customer 
ideas can influence selection, decision teams’ ability to interpret and make sense of customer 
ideas also plays a role in which ideas they select. Part of the “black box” surrounding the process 
of managing co-creation from a firm perspective has been an underlying assumption that product 
development professionals almost always recognize the best ideas when they see them. Various 
streams of literature related to organizational behavior and organizational psychology suggest, 
however, that innovation and corporate entrepreneurship teams, like individuals, are subject to 
biases, cognitive inertia, satisficing, and cognitive overload that influence their ability to always 
recognize the most promising ideas (Baron, 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005). In the context of 
customer co-creation, firms must not only recognize good ideas, but be able to adapt good 
customer ideas in a way that fits their implementation capabilities (Poetz & Schreier, 2012). 
Selection and implementation of new product ideas can be a challenging process, particularly if 
customer ideas are radically divergent from the existing mental models that development teams 
hold about the target market, form, and function new market offerings should have. Afuah and 
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Tucci (2012) argue that looking for innovation outside of the firm’s four walls often entails 
“distant” search, as opposed to “local” knowledge domains more closely related to their core 
business. In this case, the selection problem may not only be related to managers’ inability to 
deal with the sheer volume, but it could also be related to having the requisite knowledge and 
cognitive frames to meaningfully interpret divergent ideas that customers might generate. When 
development teams ignore “distant” sources of ideas, they cut themselves off from potentially 
valuable sources of innovation insight. Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010), for example, found in the 
crowdsourcing of innovation that the most promising concepts came from contributors who were 
cognitively distant (e.g., had deep experience in other product domains, or were in the 
demographic minority) from the focal firm. In the case of co-creation, firms that ignore “distant” 
customer ideas may do themselves a greater disservice because of the unique potential of 
customer-generated ideas to address unmet needs in the marketplace. 
 Given the potential challenges associated with managing co-creation, understanding 
teams’ cognitive limitations may add unique insight into how firms successfully manage co-
creation. These limitations might keep development teams from recognizing and pursuing ideas 
that have the greatest potential to be successful in the marketplace. Ideally, co-creation decision 
makers in firms should be cognitively flexible enough to consider new ideas without being 
overwhelmed by immense quantities of data, or slowed down to the point of losing the ability to 
be agile in the implementation of promising innovation concepts. 
 
Research Questions 
 This dissertation focuses on the cognitive factors that drive successful development team 
decisions about customer-generated ideas for new products. Given the challenging nature of 
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interpretation, selection, and perceived ease of implementation that product development teams 
face in the co-creation process, examining this phenomenon from a group cognition perspective 
may yield insights into how successful firms manage the process of customer-co-created 
innovation.  
 
Specifically, this dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
1. How do the team regulatory focus and reflexivity influence the skill of NPD teams in 
evaluating and selecting customer-generated new product ideas? 
2. How does the expertise of customers who submit ideas moderate those relationships? 
 
Contribution to Theory 
 By exploring the topic of how firms manage co-creation though an organizational 
behavior lens, this dissertation contributes to the theoretical understanding of how teams process 
and make decisions about customer co-created ideas for new products. Previous literature has 
argued for the benefits of customer co-creation for firms (Hoyer et al., 2010). However, little, if 
any, research has investigated the decision-making process of how firms review, select, and 
develop customer ideas for new products. There have also been several recent calls in the 
marketing literature to investigate marketing phenomena and innovation practices through the 
lens of organizational behavior and organizational psychology (Hauser, Tellis, & Griffin, 2006; 
Marketing Science Institute, 2014). 
 
Specifically, this dissertation makes the following contributions: 
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 Past research has primarily adopted a customer-centric perspective for studying co-
creation, or has looked only at high-level benefits that firms may realize from co-creating 
new products with customers. This research is among the first to shed light on the “black 
box” that exists in our understanding of the phenomenon of co-creation in the phases 
between involving customers in product development and new product success.  
 Past research applying regulatory style in innovation has explored this topic in the 
context of new products and services developed in-house, but not in the more complex 
evaluation situation of co-creation. This research explores how regulatory style 
influences evaluation and selection when ideas come from outside the firm, which creates 
a more complex decision environment for firms.  
 This research explores how reflexivity assists new product development teams in the co-
creation of innovation, as well as how reflexivity interacts with a prevention or promotion 
regulatory style to influence how skillful teams are in the selection of customers’ ideas 
for new products.  
 Pursuant to a research priority put forth by the Marketing Science Institute (2014), this 
research adopts theories from organizational psychology to help explain how firms adapt 
to changing markets through co-creation activities and the cognitive orientation that firms 
need to successfully manage the co-creation of new products. 
 
Contribution to Practice 
 This program of research also offers several contributions to practice. In a general sense, 
this research offers practical guidance for implementing a co-creation of innovation strategy with 
customers. Given the skepticism expressed by the CEO of TopCoder (Singh, 2014), developing 
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the capability to effectively manage and incorporate customers into the innovation process may 
be an increasingly important source of competitive advantage for firms. This dissertation 
contends that firms that can innovate with customers successfully will be those that effectively 
manage the process and have the flexibility to avoid using a one-size-fits-all approach to co-
creation initiatives. Specifically, this dissertation offers the following insights for the practice of 
managing co-creation: 
 This study offers insights into how managers should conduct their co-created product 
development team evaluation practices, based on whether they have a promotion focus or 
a prevention focus. 
 This study offers insights into what types of team information processing are best for 
pure selection tasks versus tasks that require substantial creative elaboration by 
development team members. 
 This study offers insights into how teams should evaluate customers’ new product ideas, 




Group Cognition and Decision-Making in Innovation Teams. 
 In the strategic management literature (e.g., Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Reger & Huff, 
1993; Schwenk, 1988), social cognition has been a lens through which scholars have studied 
strategic decision-making. In the innovation literature, cognitive variables have been used to 
examine how new product development managers use evaluation criteria, consider latent 
customer needs, and whether or not development teams use democratic leadership styles to make 
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decisions about potential new products (McNally, Durmusoglu, Calantone, & Harmancioglu, 
2009), as well as the degree to which managers pursue risky development projects (Mullins, 
Forlani, & Walker, 1999). McNally et al. (2009) argue that the psychological forces within 
organizations and teams are key components in understanding how managers interpret and make 
successful decisions about innovation strategy and new product development. 
 In a co-creation decision-making context, teams may face considerable cognitive 
complexity in making skillful evaluations about customers’ ideas. Development teams have to 
consider whether or not a given product idea would meet unmet market needs in parallel with 
considering what their firm can profitably commercialize. Customers have been shown to be 
adept at developing highly novel ideas that are attractive to a broader base of consumers. 
However, in the process of generating product concepts, they tend to focus almost exclusively on 
meeting their unmet needs (Poetz & Schreier, 2012) to the exclusion of the profit potential of 
their ideas.  Further, as noted by Bayus (2013) customer ideas are often vague, immature, or 
under-elaborated, which may require substantial effort by firms to evaluate whether or not an 
idea has latent potential. Firm decision-makers must often evaluate under-elaborated ideas that 
may be difficult to implement, and ideas which were not created explicitly with profit-making 
potential in mind. Given this complexity, cognitive flexibility, or the ability to simultaneously 
think across multiple knowledge domains is an important characteristic of teams that can 
skillfully make decisions in the co-creation of innovation. Cognitive flexibility has been shown 
to be related to superior opportunity detection, the ability to think across multiple knowledge 
domains, and the ability to engage in the deliberate processing of information when making 
decisions (Laureiro-Martínez, Brusoni, & Zollo, 2009; Louis & Sutton, 1991).  
 
14 
 At the group level of analysis, two theories related to cognitive flexibility, regulatory 
style and group reflexivity, are particularly relevant to the study of evaluation and selection in 
the complex decision environment that exists in the co-creation of innovation.  Examining these 
variables offers specific insights into how development teams balance the double-edged sword of 
the co-creation of innovation, choosing products that both create value for customers and capture 
value for firms. 
 Regulatory style, the pursuit of achievement versus the avoidance of negative outcomes, 
is associated with how broad or narrow the search efforts are, and what signals innovation 
organizations look for to indicate whether a product idea will be successful (Baron, 2004). It is 
also related to whether or not development teams look toward new product opportunities through 
the lens of achieving market success or avoiding market failure. Reflexivity, or the degree to 
which teams intentionally reflect on their knowledge and decision-making process, is associated 
with how flexible teams are in the process of selecting customer ideas and in the pursuit of co-
creation-related goals (Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, & Nägele, 2007; Hoegl & Parboteeah, 2006). 
 Figure 1 shows the conceptual model for this research. In this model, a development 
team’s level of reflexivity (depth of information processing about decision processes and shared 
knowledge) and regulatory style (prevention or promotion) influences the team’s ability to 
successfully identify innovative ideas from customers and to filter out ideas that have little 
market promise. The moderators shown, discussed in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, 
represent contextual factors related to co-creation inputs and firm innovation context which may 




Regulatory Focus in Innovation Teams. 
 Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT) is a theory of human motivation that explains decision-
making and goal pursuit based on two self-regulation types – a prevention or promotion 
orientation (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998). According to this theory, people make 
decisions using a promotion orientation when their primary focus is on pursuing gain, 
advancement, and accomplishment. 
   
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
 
A prevention orientation occurs when people pursue goals by avoiding losses. Individuals with a 
chronic promotion focus are more creative in problem-solving, more sensitive to the presence or 
absence of rewards, more risk-tolerant, and more concerned with accomplishments and 
aspirations. Conversely, prevention-focused individuals are more sensitive to the absence or 
presence of punishments, and are more concerned with duties, safety, and obligations (Brockner, 
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Higgins, & Low, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Kark & Van Dijk, 
2007). 
 Regulatory focus has been shown to be a chronic individual predisposition (i.e., some 
people have a natural tendency toward prevention or promotion), but can also be situationally 
dependent. Individuals may use both orientations at different times in the pursuit of goals (Crowe 
& Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998).  Support for regulatory focus can also be found by examining 
physiological evidence, as measured by EEG scans. Individuals with a chronic prevention focus 
show more right frontal lobe activity, while individuals with a chronic promotion focus show 
more left frontal lobe activity (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). 
 Regulatory focus also has been demonstrated empirically in group-level decision making. 
Levine, Higgins, and Choi (2000) conducted an experiment in three-person groups and found 
evidence that group members’ responses converged on either a prevention or promotion 
orientation, even when individuals’ chronic orientations were opposite that of the group. In 
studies relating to RFT in a business environment, regulatory focus has been posited to influence 
how successful entrepreneurs, investors, and innovation-focused teams are in interpreting and 
responding to the business environment (Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004; Florack and 
Hartmann, 2007). Innovation researchers have posited that RFT might explain how development 
teams make decisions, although the vast majority of the papers using RFT in innovation contexts 
have not tested their assertions empirically. 
 From a broad perspective, regulatory focus represents two conflicting, but necessary 
human motivations: a preference for change (promotion) and a preference for stability 
(prevention) (Kark and Van Dijk, 2007). In an organizational context, these motivations exist as 
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motivations to create value through exploration, innovation, and creative thinking, and the 
motivation to capture value through exploitation, routinization, and cost reduction. 
 
Reflexivity in Innovation Teams. 
 Another cognitive component which may influence how innovation teams filter and 
select the best ideas from customers is the concept of reflexivity. Reflexivity is defined as “the 
extent to which team members overtly reflect upon the group’s objectives, strategies, and 
processes and adapt them to current or anticipated endogenous or environmental circumstances” 
(West 1996, p. 559). In the context of this study, reflexivity is the degree to which development 
teams actively reflect on their collective knowledge as they pursue the successful launch of a 
new product. 
 In team decision-making, reflexivity has been shown to increase team learning and team 
performance (DeDreu, 2002; Gurtner et al., 2007). By increasing communication quality and 
creating shared mental models among team members, reflexivity is argued to enhance the 
performance outcomes of group decisions. This relationship is driven by the ability of groups to 
shift strategies mid-project, if needed, to attain desired outcomes (Gurtner et al. 2007). 
 For innovation teams, reflexivity may be positively associated with the quality of new 
products. Hoegl and Parboteeah (2006) found in a cross sectional study that innovation teams 
developing in-house projects that had high levels of reflexivity developed higher quality projects, 
but that reflexivity was not positively associated with teams finishing projects on time and within 
budget. 
 The literature on reflexivity suggests both benefits and drawbacks of team reflexivity. It 
may be beneficial for teams by improving their ability to consider a wide range of alternatives 
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and to engage in more creative problem-solving, which has aspects related to value creation. On 
the other hand, team reflexivity may incur additional costs or cause delays in development times, 
thus reducing the level of value capture attained by development teams. However, when 
considering the development efforts of teams managing customer co-creation, high reflexivity 
may be desirable. Because of its association with greater cognitive flexibility (Gurtner et al. 
2007), reflexivity may be necessary for innovation teams to be able to act on ideas from 
customers that are highly novel and satisfy unmet customer needs, but may need adaptation or 
adjustment to be profitably implemented. Decision teams with high levels of reflexivity may 
consider developing additional capabilities for particularly promising ideas, or refining the scope 
of the project to accommodate ideas with high market and commercialization potential, even if 
they fall outside of the original project scope. 
 
Dissertation Organization 
 The rest of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 includes an in-depth review of 
the literature on user innovation and group cognition, and hypothesis development for studies 1, 
2, and 3. Chapter 3 describes the methodology, measurement approach, and analysis used in each 
study. Chapter 4 describes the results of the data analysis for each study. Chapter 5 has a 
discussion of the findings, including implications for theory and practice, limitations, and future 








 In this chapter, the conceptual background and a review of the relevant literature are 
summarized in order to develop the hypothesis to be tested in Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3. 
First, co-creation is defined in an innovation context, drawing from existing definitions in the 
marketing literature. Second, existing typologies of co-creation are integrated to create a broader 
taxonomy of the various forms that co-creation can take in innovation efforts. Third, the relevant 
literature related to co-creation, regulatory style and reflexivity in innovation are reviewed. 
Based on the relevant literature, several hypotheses are developed which are then tested, 
analyzed, and discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Defining Cocreation in a New Product Development Context 
 The term co-creation has been used in several different ways in the marketing literature. 
In this section, the author presents the various definitions of this term and synthesizes them into a 
working definition as it pertains to innovation for this dissertation research. 
 Two primary research streams have emerged from the work on customer co-creation, and 
definitions of the term co-creation from these streams is shown in Table 1. The first, which has 
its roots in service dominant logic, focuses on co-created value as value-in use. Definitions of co-
creation that fall into this paradigm come from work by Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004), 
Vargo and Lusch (2006), Payne et al. (2008). In this perspective, products have value to the 
extent that they perform a valuable service for consumers. For example, a power tool does not 
necessarily have inherent value for a customer. Its value lies in the extent to which such a 
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product gives customers the ability to drill a hole or cut lumber. As a result, the value of  this 
type of product comes from its use by customers. Another variant in the service dominant logic 
view of co-creation is that customers create their own hedonic experiences. In this view, firms 
provide the raw inputs of materials and/or knowledge, while it is the end customer who 
configures these operant resources to create a customized experience.  
 
Table 1. Definitions of Cocreation in the Marketing Literature 
 
Cocreation is… Citation 
Shifting the process of value creation from a product- and 
firm-centric view to personalized consumer experiences. 
 
Prahalad and Ramaswamy 
(2004) 
Value that is created with and determined by the user in the 
‘consumption’ process and through use (value-in-use). 
 
Vargo and Lusch (2006) 
The notion of marketing as a facilitator and structurer of the 
mutual creation and enjoyment of value [with customers]. 
 
Payne, Storbacka, and Frow, 
2008 
A collaborative new product development activity in which 
consumers actively contribute and/or select various elements 
of a new product offering. 
 
Hoyer et al. (2010);  
O’Hern and Rindfleisch (2010) 
The coproduction of knowledge by customers that is valuable 
for the firm’s innovation process. 
 
Mahr, Lievens, and Blazevic 
(2013) 
Allowing customers to participate in value-creating activities, 
such as brainstorming advertising taglines or product ideas. 
 
Verhoef, Beckers, and van 
Doorn (2013) 
  
 The second perspective, which is the definition used in this dissertation, is labeled here as 
a value-in-creation perspective of co-creation. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004) conceptualize 
co-creation as occurring in one of two ways, customer-to-firm (“create value for yourself”), and 
customers-to-firm (“create value for yourself and others”). The value-in-use perspective relates 
more closely to the customer-to-firm conceptualization, whereas the value-in-creation 
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perspective is related to the customers-to-firm (plural) conceptualization in which firms take 
ideas from customers and leverage them to serve a broader market. This conceptualization of co-
creation has its roots in the new product development and innovation literature, where firms use 
co-creation primarily as a tool for idea generation. While there is substantial overlap with a 
value-in-use perspective, this view of co-creation primarily refers to the direct involvement of 
customers in the ideation process of developing new products and services that appeal to one or 
more market segments. Exemplars of this type of co-creation are companies that crowdsource 
product design, advertising campaigns, and product features. For example, Frito-Lay hosts a 
competition every year for its Doritos brand in which consumers submit short, self-produced 
television commercials, with the winning entry to be aired during the Super Bowl (Edwards, 
2014). The goal of this promotion is not to tailor the product and message to each consumer. 
Rather, it is to leverage the collective power and video production resources of customers to 
develop highly creative ads that appeal to a broad market of consumers.   
 In summary, this dissertation focuses on co-creation as a value-in-creation activity 
whereby firms solicit ideas for new products and services from customers. More concisely 
stated, co-creation of innovation is defined as the collaboration between firms and their 
customers (or potential customers) in the product or service development process, which may 
include customer input into ideation, design, and production of new market offerings. 
 
Literature Review 
 In this section, the literature on the co-creation of new products and services is reviewed 
with emphasis on research gaps and areas where theory is more mature for the purposes of 
generating hypotheses.  The topics covered include customers’ ability to directly contribute to 
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co-creation, customer motivations to contribute to co-creation, effectiveness and efficiency 
outcomes of co-creation, the influence of co-creation on customers, co-creation and brand 
management, and the challenges and research gaps in the current literature. The summary of the 
topics and key findings in the co-creation of innovation literature is outlined in Table 2. 
 
Ability of Customers to Contribute to the Co-creation of Innovation 
 There has been some debate in the literature as to whether customers are truly capable of 
making meaningful contributions to innovation beyond participating in focus groups and market 
research projects (e.g., Bennett and Cooper, 1981; Ogawa and Piller, 2006; Poetz and Schreier, 
2012; Ulrich and Eppinger, 2008). The argument against customers’ ability to directly contribute 
to innovation hinges on the notion that customers may not always be able to articulate their own 
needs, and may have experience with only a few of the product usage situations that the broader 
market of customers is likely to encounter. More recent empirical studies, however, lend strong 
support to the argument that customer-generated new product concepts equal or outperform 
concepts generated by firms’ own development professionals.  
 Magnusson et al. (2003) conducted an experiment to compare the innovativeness of ideas 
for new mobile telephone services created by end-users, professionals, and users who consulted 
with professionals. Their outcome measure was based on three dimensions – originality, user 
value, and producibility. Their findings indicated that users who did not consult with 
professionals had ideas that scored the highest on originality, scored lower than professionals and 
users who consulted with professionals on producibility, and were on par with professional and 
consulting users for user value. When looking at only the highest quartile of submitted ideas, 
they found similar results with the exception that the best-performing ordinary users produced 
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ideas that were on par with professionals in terms of feasibility. The authors conclude that the 
quality of internally-generated ideas may suffer because of the cognitive inertia that develops 
when product development relies too heavily on past successes or current implementation 
capabilities in the idea generation process. 
 Kristensson et al. (2004) also conducted an experiment to directly test the premise that 
customers are better able to develop innovative new product ideas than firms’ development 
teams. They compared ideas created by customers, ideas created by advanced customers who 
had deep product knowledge, and ideas created by professional developers on their levels of 
relevance, novelty, and realizability. They found that novice customers created ideas that were 
superior to both professionals and expert customers on novelty and relevance, while 
professionals and expert customers scored highest on realizability. Their conclusion was that 
customers are better at divergent thinking because they are unconstrained by existing designs, 
capabilities, and past successes that hinder more experienced customers and firm professionals. 
 Ogawa and Piller (2006) directly confront the assertion that customers cannot develop 
innovative product ideas, instead arguing that consumers that co-create innovation are uniquely 
positioned to develop novel ideas that will surprise and delight a firm’s customers. Products 
developed internally often fail because they draw on limited or faulty insight and end up 
developing products for “ideal” customers that don’t actually exist. They also argue that 
traditional market research (e.g., focus groups and forecasting) have failed because they offer 
little realism, are subject to group interaction biases, and cannot do well in forecasting demand 
for radically new products and services. In their view, consumers are best-suited to make direct 
contributions to innovations when firms want to develop really innovative products for which 
there is no market data from which to draw insight, and when developing products for narrow 
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market segments. Despite their general favorable opinion toward the practice of co-creating 
innovation, they caution that firms must maintain the “final word” on product concepts rather 
than adopting an entirely democratic process, since firms are likely to have internal knowledge 
that is not available to the average co-creation collaborator. 
 Similar to the argument presented by Magnusson et al. (2003), and Kristensson et al. 
(2004), Kristensson, Matthing, and Johansson (2008) argue that customer ideas can be inherently 
more valuable because product development experts often exhibit predictable thinking that 
inhibits creativity. In their view, customer ideas do not suffer the experience bias that a 
company’s employees might have. As a result, customers are better able to develop novel ways 
of addressing problems. They also argue that, as a collective, customer ideas for innovation offer 
firms a great deal of insight because they present a cross-section of usage types and roles. 
 Poetz and Schreier (2012) conducted an experiment to determine whether users could 
outperform professionals in developing innovative product ideas. In their study, separate groups 
of users and professionals generated ideas, which were judged by company managers blind to the 
source of each idea on the dimensions of novelty, customer benefit, and feasibility. Their study 
was driven by the assumption that users can be a good source for discovering unmet needs in a 
particular product category, but are less useful for developing concepts for how those needs 
should be met (e.g. what particular technologies and product design should be applied to meet 
customer needs). They found that user-generated ideas were more novel and better addressed 
customer needs, but were more difficult to implement compared to ideas generated by 
professionals. However, like Magnusson et al. (2003), they also analyzed a subset of only the 
best ideas (those with scores above the mid-point on all three dimensions) and found that user 
ideas were highly comparable with professional ideas in feasibility.
 
25 
Table 2. Review of the Literature on Co-creation in New Product Development 
Co-creation Topic Supported Findings Authors 
Ability of Customers to Contribute 
in the Co-creation Innovation 
 
 
 Co-creation creates opportunities for firms to develop new 
products that surprise and delight customers in ways the 
internally-generated product concepts typically cannot. 
 Collectively, customers may be superior to development 
professionals at creating product concepts that are novel and 
meaningful, in part because they are not subject to the cognitive 
biases that come from domain expertise. 
 Collectively, development professionals may be superior to 
customers at creating product concepts that are feasible to 
implement. 
 The potential of consumer-generated ideas may have its limits 
because inventors may not have access to all of the relevant 
information needed to develop a successful product idea. 
 The meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts drives 
market adoption. 
 Customer communities often result in highly innovative ideas 
because they tap into the collective creativity and product 
knowledge of customers. 
 Customers can contribute directly to innovation not just in the 













Magnusson et al., 2003; 
Ogawa and Piller, 2006; 
Fuller et al. 2008; 
Kristensson et al., 2004 
Kristensson et al., 2008; 
Poetz and Schreier, 2012; 
Bayus, 2013; 
Mahr et al., 2014; 




Table 2. Continued. 
 
Co-creation Topic Supported Findings Authors 
Motivations of Customers to 
Participate in the 
Co-creation of Innovation 
 Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms 
because of the perceived learning benefits 
 Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms 
because of the perceived social benefits of interacting with other 
consumer-innovators 
 Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms 
because of the utilitarian benefits of designing effective solutions 
that address value-in-use problems they face 
 Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms 
because of perceived hedonic benefits and the enjoyment they 
receive from the creative process 
 
Nambisan and Baron, 2009; 
Kristensson et al., 2008; 
Fuller et al. 2008 
Co-created Innovation 
Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 
Co-created New Product Effectiveness 
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with 
product quality. 
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with new 
product creativity. 
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with the 
development of products that more closely match unmet market 
needs, and subsequently, lower rates of market failure than 
internally-developed products. 
 Co-creation is positively associated with decreased new product 
development time. 
 User-generated products outperform those designed in-house 
 
Co-created New Product Efficiency 
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with 
decreased development time and costs. 
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with 
lower marketing costs through positive word of mouth and/or 
customer involvement in designing promotional materials. 
 
Antorini et al. 2012; 
Hoyer et al. 2010; 
Nishikawa et al., 2013; 
O’Hern and Rindfleisch 2010; 




Table 2. Continued 
 
Co-creation Topic Supported Findings Authors 
Co-creation of Innovation and 
Customer Metrics 
 
 Co-creation positively influences customer satisfaction with 
products and services. 
 Customers show greater purchase intentions and a greater 
willingness to pay for co-created new products. 
 Customers are more willing to recommend co-created new 





Auh et al., 2007; 
Dong et al., 2008; 
Schreier et al., 2012 
Co-creation of Innovation and 
Brand Management 
 
 Participation in the development of luxury brands, particularly 
with a firm’s head designer positively influences consumer 
perceptions of luxury products and the status they confer. 
 Consumers view firms as more innovative when they promote 
products as user designed. This effect is driven by the perception 
that co-created market offerings are the products of a process that 
includes greater diversity and better attention to customer needs 
than internally-developed products. 
 Labeling a product as “user designed” may backfire in the context 
of luxury brands, causing consumers to view such products as 










Tynan et al. 2010; 
Schreier et al., 2012; 




Table 2. Continued. 
 
Co-creation Topic Supported Findings Authors 
Challenges and Research Gaps in 
the Co-creation of Innovation 
 
 Co-creating often creates challenges for firms to develop 
appropriate incentives to keep customers engaged and motivated 
to freely give of their creative energy, efforts, and time. 
 Co-creating innovations with customers may present challenges in 
managing customer expectations and relationships, particularly 
when firms override popular customer ideas. 
 Co-creating with customers diminishes the amount of control that 
firms have over strategic planning. 
 Firms may find it more difficult to manage the objectives of their 
innovation strategy when the NPD process is opened to 
customers. 
 Co-creating innovation increases the level of complexity in 
evaluating and selecting customer ideas. 
 Firms’ development professionals may struggle in recognizing 
quality ideas from customers, especially when idea volume is 
high. 
 Marketing research has focused on improving customers’ and 
employees’ ability and motivation to generate creative ideas, but 





Gebauer et al., 2013; 
Hoyer et al. 2010; 
O’Hern and Rindfleisch 2010; 
Bayus 2013; 




 Bayus (2013) presents a similar view of customers’ ability to contribute directly to a 
firm’s innovation efforts. He conducted a study of contributors to Dell’s online IdeaStorm 
project in which customers can submit ideas for new products and services, and analyzed the 
characteristics of customers whose ideas were ultimately adopted by Dell. He argues that, while 
consumers do often develop innovative ideas, their potential may have its limits because 
inventors rarely have access to all of the available, pertinent information needed to develop a 
successful innovation concept. On the other hand, customers, especially first-time submitters, do 
often have ideas that are highly promising, which may be because they are less-restricted by the 
cognitive inertia which can be caused by previous wins. His findings suggest that while the 
novelty and meaningfulness of consumer-submitted ideas may be high, feasibility is contingent 
on access to additional information, which these individuals are typically lacking. He also finds 
that serial ideators can overcome these barriers by the level to which they interact in a user 
community and are exposed to other customers’ ideas. 
 Nishikawa et al. (2013) conducted an empirical examination of user-generated products 
and designer-generated products. They followed the products over a course of three years. Their 
findings showed that user-generated products dramatically outperformed those designed in-house 
at one consumer goods firm. After three years, the sales revenues of user-generated products 
were five times higher and the average margins were six times higher than those of products 
designed in-house. In addition, the user-generated products were more likely to still be on the 
market three years after introduction than the in-house products. 
 Mahr et al. (2014) argue that customers may be best-suited for creating concepts that are 
highly relevant, but moderately novel, since highly novel products have lower market adoption 
rates. In their view, optimal customer contributions come from customers with whom a firm has 
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rich and deep communication, such as lead users. Their study included a survey conducted 
among managers who worked with customers in developing new products. They found that 
customers can indeed develop highly novel and highly relevant new product concepts, but that 
relevance may matter more than novelty to successful market adoption of co-created new 
products. They also found that customers with whom the firm had rich and deep communication 
(e.g. lead users) were better-suited to developing innovative ideas for new products. 
 In exploring the potential of customers to make meaningful, direct contributions to firms’ 
innovation efforts, many researchers have investigated the influence of user communities in co-
creation. The notion of user communities in innovation draws largely from recent thinking in the 
crowdsourcing of innovation (Howe, 2006), whereby firms can tap into the collective creative 
and intellectual resources of large groups of people. Although there have been some scholars 
who have investigated innovative user communities unaffiliated with a firm (e.g., an 
investigation of a kite surfing enthusiasts group by Franke et al. (2006), the emphasis in this 
research is on communities that are firm-led as a mechanism for new product idea generation, 
brand management and customer relationship management. Firm-led user communities often 
play an important role in consumers’ direct contribution to firm innovation. First, they often 
serve as an important motivator for individual contributors to participate, as they provide a 
means for social interaction and for consumers to accrue status among other like-minded 
individuals (Nambisan and Baron, 2009).  Second, they often act as a first filter for ideas 
submitted to the online community (Bayus, 2013; Bonabeau, 2009; Fuller, 2010). Using 
communities as a first filter can have both positive and negative consequences for firms. On the 
positive side, using a community to screen ideas can drastically reduce the number of ideas 
internal developers have to review and evaluate (Bonabeau, 2009; Filieri, 2013; Fuller 2010). On 
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the other hand, filtering new products ideas through large crowds may cause average idea quality 
and potential to regress towards the mean (Bonabeau 2009), limiting the attention paid to highly 
novel new product ideas. 
 West and Lakhani (2008, p. 224) define user communities as “a voluntary association of 
actors, typically lacking in a priori common organizational affiliation (i.e., not working for the 
same firm) but united by a shared instrumental goal – in this case, creating, adapting, adopting, 
or disseminating innovations.” They also make an important distinction between communities 
and value chains (e.g., suppliers, employees, industry networks), with the latter including actors 
or groups linked through formal market mechanisms. In a co-creation context, user communities 
are a voluntary association of customer with whom firms interact to develop and/or market ideas 
for products and services. Voluntary association is an important distinction, because, as will be 
discussed in this chapter, the loose affiliation and lack of control that firms have over customers 
can sometimes prove to be problematic (e.g., Verhoef et al., 2013). 
 In their investigation of user communities, Fuller et al. (2008) argue that brand 
communities are an important source of innovation in co-creation because they consist of 
members who are both passionate about the brand and are familiar with its products. Although 
the primary focus of their article is to investigate the motivations of consumers to participate in 
such communities (an in-depth review of customer motivations appears in the following section), 
they conduct their research under the main assumption that communities are a powerful tool 
firms often use to generate insight and concepts for new products and services. 
 Taken together, these studies point toward several conclusions regarding the ability of 
existing and potential customers to generate quality ideas for new products and services. On the 
one hand, these individuals, especially first-time submitters, should be expected to develop ideas 
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that are highly novel and meaningful in the degree to which they address unmet market needs. 
On the other hand, customers simply may not have access to enough pertinent information about 
development costs, market conditions and firm implementation capabilities to compete with 
firms’ development professionals on the dimension of implementation feasibility. Customer 
communities not only provide the social interaction needed to motivate some consumers to 
contribute their creative energies, but they also help to ensure that firms draw insights from a 
wide cross-section of customers who are an adequate representation of the broader market for the 
products and services being developed. 
Customer Motivations for Participating in the Co-creation of Innovation 
 Customers may be highly capable of generating ideas that are novel and meaningful, but 
that does not necessarily mean that they are always motivated to do so. In addition to studying 
customers’ ability to develop promising new product concepts, some marketing scholars have 
investigated the factors that motivate customers to contribute to co-creation efforts. Often, 
contributing ideas to a firm does not result in substantial monetary rewards. Consumer-inventors 
often do so for free, or for only the uncertain possibility of compensation (if their idea is 
selected), while firms reap the rewards of customers’ collective intellectual capital. An important 
subset of the co-creation literature has looked at the factors that motivate customers to give 
freely of their time, creative energy, and, in some cases, finances, to engage in firms’ co-creation 
efforts, while allowing firms to profit from their ideas. 
 Kristensson, Matthing, and Johansson (2008), in their qualitative investigation of the co-
creation of new technology-based services, found that customers were motivated to participate in 
co-creation by several intrinsic factors. Among these motivations was the perceived opportunity 
to learn about new usage situations for products and services that other similar customers 
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encountered. They were also motivated by the perceived opportunity to learn about completely 
new customer roles, such as how technology services might benefit them in their personal lives 
when their previous experience with similar services had only occurred in the workplace. They 
were motivated by the perceived opportunity to learn about future technology trends and to stay 
abreast of the latest technology. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many of these customers 
participated because they were frustrated with the inadequacies of existing servicers and felt co-
creation might be a way to be proactive in generating better solutions. 
 Fuller et al. (2008) identify several factors that motivate consumers to participate in co-
creation. Like other authors (e.g., Kristensson et al., 2008; Nambisan and Baron, 2009), they 
identify the opportunity to learn about a product domain and the opportunity to participate in a 
creative act as significant drivers of participation.  Their findings also support that two 
characteristics of consumers – existing brand trust and domain expertise – motivate customers to 
participate with companies. Customers who trust and feel comfortable with a brand are more 
likely to co-create new products with that brand, and customers who already possess expertise in 
a product domain are more likely to participate in co-creation. 
 Nambisan and Baron (2009) found that customers have a variety of potential motivations 
to participate in collaborate efforts with firms. Customers may be motivated by the opportunity 
to learn new skills or to gain expertise in a particular product domain. They may be motivated by 
the social benefits of participating in user communities and developing ties to others. Similarly, 
they may be motivated by the opportunity to gain prestige, status, and a sense of self-efficacy by 
displaying their creativity and their ideas for others, especially in a user community. Finally, 
many customers receive hedonic benefits from the pleasure and mental stimulation they receive 
through the act of creating something novel. From a resource allocation perspective, the authors 
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argue that firms should be willing to make appropriate investments in building programs that 
offer these benefits (e.g., building and maintaining online user communities), rather than simply 
assuming that customers will participate without being sufficiently motivated. 
 Several observations help to integrate these articles together. From a learning perspective, 
customers are motivated to participate in the co-creation of innovation by the opportunity to 
learn about new trends, usage situations, and roles related to a particular product domain. From a 
social perspective, customers are motivated by opportunities to form social connections with 
other individuals, and build status and reputation through their interaction with other consumers. 
Consumers who are already experts may be particularly inclined to participate for this reason, 
since they can showcase their abilities and build a reputation for themselves. From a utilitarian 
perspective, customers are motivated to participate in co-creation projects because it affords 
them the potential opportunity to enact solutions to problems that they face in their day-to-day 
consumption (e.g., when value-in-use is low for existing market offerings). From a hedonic 
perspective, many customers participate in the co-creation of innovation simply because they 
enjoy the act of creating something that is novel. Finally, customers may be more likely to 
participate in co-creation when they feel a high degree of trust in the brand.  
 
Co-created New Product Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 Customers may be capable and motivated to participate as collaborators in developing 
innovative ideas, but if doing so does not offer significant perceived advantages, firms are not 
likely to engage in co-creating innovation. Before the concept of co-creation was formally 
introduced into the marketing literature, several authors argued that involving customers in the 
NPD process was beneficial (e.g., Business Wire, 2001; Gruner and Homburg, 2000). The co-
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creation literature pertaining to new product development, however, has examined how 
customers’ direct involvement as designers and creative idea generators influences the 
effectiveness and efficiency of co-created innovations relative to traditional, internally-developed 
new products and services. 
 Hoyer et al. (2010) outline several phases of the new product development process in 
which co-creation is effective. In the ideation stage, they argue that co-creation can create 
efficiencies by obtaining low-cost input from customers, which at the same time may result in a 
pool of ideas with the potential to more closely match unmet market needs than ideas generated 
internally. They also contend that, in the commercialization and post-launch stage, co-creation 
can be both more efficient and effective by reducing marketing costs of advertising and 
education, and by receiving early warning that a product may not attractive to consumers, 
reducing the risk that a product destined for failure will be taken to market. 
 Drawing from insights gleaned from previous work done in open source communities 
(e.g. Grewal et al., 2006; Shah, 2006; von Hippel, 2005), O’Hern and Rindfleisch (2010) argue 
that co-creation between firms and their customers results in increased new product creativity, 
mirroring findings by scholars who have challenged the traditional assumption that customers 
cannot directly contribute to the development of new products and services. They also draw on 
this literature to conclude that co-creation is often associated with lower development costs and 
greater speed to market. 
 Antorini et al. (2012) conducted an investigation of Lego’s user community. In their 
analysis of how this community evolved over time, they conclude that Lego has used co-creation 
to increase the number of products they offer without significantly raising long-term fixed costs. 
By allowing customers to collaborate in the design of new offerings and reduce development 
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costs, Lego can tailor offerings to market niches that would be too small to justify pursuing from 
a cost perspective. 
 To summarize these findings, co-creating innovation with customers may provide several 
effectiveness and efficiency advantages for firms, relative to internal development projects. From 
an effectiveness standpoint, co-created new products may be of a higher quality, more creative, 
and match unmet market needs better than internally-generated ideas. Firms may also leverage 
customers to decrease the time to market of new products. From an efficiency perspective, co-
created new products are likely to have lower overall development costs by transferring time and 
resource investment from the firm to the customer. Due to word-of-mouth effects, co-created 
new products may also carry lower marketing communication costs than projects developed 
internally. 
 
Co-creation of Innovation and Customer Metrics 
 There may also be important implications for the effectiveness of co-creation in driving 
customer outcomes. In both goods-based and service-based marketing there is empirical support 
that participating in co-creation and consuming co-created products creates greater customer 
loyalty, satisfaction with the focal firms’ products and services, positive future purchase 
intentions, and positive word-of-mouth benefits to marketers.  
 Auh et al. (2007) explored the effects of customer co-creation in the financial services 
industry. They found that participation with a firm in the creation of a service not only increased 
customer satisfaction, but also increased customers’ attitudinal loyalty toward the focal firm.  
They also found that the perception of procedural justice (i.e., being treated fairly), customers’ 
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level of service domain expertise, and the quality of customers’ existing relationships with the 
firm positively moderated this effect. 
 Chan et al. (2010) conducted an investigation into the customer-related outcomes of co-
creating solutions with customers and frontline service employees. Innovation in this context 
took the form of improvisational creation of new solutions for customers. They found that when 
customers were involved in the generation of solutions, they had greater levels of customer 
satisfaction, and a greater sense of perceived value from the services they consumed. They also 
find a downside. Although these co-creation encounters were a source of relationship-building 
with customers, they decreased employee job satisfaction because they created role stress for 
workers dealing with uncertain service provision environments. 
 In the context of co-created goods-based market offerings, Schreier, Fuchs, and Dahl 
(2012) argue that customers do not have to be active participants in co-creating new products for 
co-creation to drive customer metrics. They found, across a variety of product categories, that 
when products were promoted as “user designed”, customers showed a higher willingness to pay, 
had greater purchase intentions, and were more likely to make positive recommendations to 
others about these products.  
 Taken together these studies support the assertion that co-creating innovation with 
customers can positively influence customer satisfaction, purchase intentions and word-of-mouth 
behaviors. Not only does this seem to apply to customers who participate in co-creation, but also 





Co-creation and Brand Management 
 Co-creation has also been found to play a role in branding and brand management. As 
was discussed in a previous section related to customers’ ability to contribute to innovation, 
Fuller et al. (2008) conceptualize brand communities as an important source of innovation in co-
creation because they create a social forum for a rich exchange of ideas about product 
modifications and new products. In addition to influencing the social aspect of brands (i.e., brand 
communities), several authors have investigated how co-creation influences brand positioning 
with customers. The work in branding a co-creation deals with two main issues. First, the degree 
to which personal participation in co-creation influences consumers’ brand perceptions. Second, 
the degree to which knowing that a particular product was the result of co-creation with other 
customers influences consumers’ brand perceptions. 
 Illustrating the first perspective of the effects of participation on brand management, 
Tynan et al. 2010 develop a model of co-creation for luxury brands based on qualitative 
interviews. They find that participating in the co-creation of luxury brands can bolster the 
perceived status of the resulting products for customers of luxury goods. This is especially 
apparent when customers interact directly with luxury brands’ head designers. In this setting, 
customers’ perceptions of luxury did not come just from product status and product quality, but 
also from the experience itself of interacting with designers and creating a high-end good. 
 In addition to their findings discussed previously about customer purchase intentions, 
willingness to pay, and willingness to recommend to others, Schreier, Fuchs, and Dahl (2012) 
found that labeling products as “user designed” can have positive implications for a firm’s 
branding strategy. In a series of experiments, they found that that customers view firms that co-
create new products with their customers as more innovative than firms that do not engage in this 
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practice, which they label as the “innovation effect of user design.” Despite the fact that that 
customers tend to attribute less expertise to individual ordinary users than they do to firm design 
employees, consumers see firms that co-create with their customers as more innovative for four 
primary reasons. The first is what the authors call the numbers argument, which simply means 
that people are likely to perceive a greater innovation capacity distributed among large numbers 
of people, rather than residing only with a few experts. The second argument, closely related to 
the first, they call the diversity argument. In this view, customers may view firms with a co-
creation strategy as more innovative because they not only draw on more individual innovators, 
but more diversity of thought and insight about consumer needs goes into co-created new 
products. The third reason firms that co-create are seen as more innovative is based on the user 
applicability argument. This mirrors a previous discussion in this literature review about how 
customer-generated ideas outperform those developed internally by firms. Finally, they argue 
that customers view firms that co-create as more innovative because they perceive consumer-
designers as having fewer constraints than firm designers have (e.g., profit margin consideration, 
manufacturing capabilities, etc.), freeing them to focus on optimizing value to customers in their 
creative solutions rather than profit margins. 
 Fuchs et al. (2013) find that, in the context of luxury brands, co-creation is not 
unequivocally effective in generating favorable brand impressions among consumers. Their 
study supports the argument that labeling a brand as “designed by users” may backfire for luxury 
or status goods, like high-end fashion goods, causing consumers to view them as having inferior 
design features, lower quality, and lower value as status symbols. The exception to these findings 
is when firms market user-designed products as having been developed in cooperation with the 
firm’s product designer, or when the product was the result of a celebrity’s creative efforts, as 
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these factors are likely to retain associations with status and luxury in the minds of customers. 
They also found this backfiring effect was not as evident when the co-created good was not 
viewed as a status symbol, for example, designer t-shirts versus dress shirts, etc. 
 In summary, co-creation has been found to be positively associated with customers’ 
favorable brand perceptions of resulting new products. These effects stem both from customer 
participation in the co-creation process and from consuming products known to be “user 
designed.” For luxury brands, however, consumers may view products designed by other 
customers as being of lower quality and having a lower value as status symbols. 
 
Practical Challenges Associated with Cocreation 
 Despite the existing body of knowledge reviewed in this chapter pertaining to co-creation 
in new product development, there remain several significant issues and challenges that present 
opportunities for research, as evidenced in the issues discussed across the co-creation topics in 
this literature review. As Verhoef, Beckers, and Van Dorn (2013) note, co-creation campaigns, 
despite their promise, still fail at a rate of approximately 50%. In addition to highlighting the 
apparent benefits of co-creating innovation with customers, each of the topics discussed in earlier 
sections of this literature review also present potentially challenging issues. 
 First, despite the significant advances in the scholarly understanding of what motivates 
consumers to participate in the co-creation of innovation, firms often struggle with designing 
appropriate mechanisms to effectively provide one or more of those motivations. Nambisan and 
Baron (2009) and Fuller (2010) conclude that firms must be willing to make the required 
investments in infrastructure (i.e., online communities) that facilitates the rich interaction 
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between developers and customers and also the interaction between customers needed to create 
and maintain motivated customer-contributors.  
 Second, related to customer outcomes, there are also substantial challenges in managing 
customers in the co-creation of innovation. Gebauer, Fuller, and Pezzei (2013) investigate the 
dark side of co-creation from a customer perspective. They studied customer contests and found 
that such efforts can inadvertently create ill-will with customers. Online communities in 
innovation contests often develop very specific preferences for which ideas should be adopted by 
the company hosting the contest. When firms chose ideas that are not fan favorites, or when fans 
disagree with the outcomes of these contests, it often results in anger and resentment among 
loyal customers, who are the most likely group to participate in these co-creation initiatives. 
They argue that, while co-creation can indeed create positive customer outcomes, firms should 
understand the risks involved, and that inviting customer participation is not a panacea for 
cultivating positive customer relationships. 
 Finally, co-creation creates unique forms of complexity that firms must be prepared to 
manage. Although in many ways co-creating innovation is less complex than internal product 
development processes (e.g., lower development costs and fewer knowledge resources required 
of firms), the literature suggests that it does present unique complexities not evident in internal 
innovation activities (Hoyer et al., 2010). This unique complexity typically is manifest in the 
partial loss of control over planning and strategy.   
 First, firms must often deal with the questions of ownership and intellectual property that 
are raised when customers are invited into the development process. Successful collaboration 
with customers often requires that firms give up control over their NPD decisions and loosen 
their policies related to intellectual property (Bonabeau, 2009; Hoyer et al., 2010; O’Hern and 
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Rindfleisch, 2010). This creates the risk that customers will take innovative ideas to competitors 
or will themselves seek to commercialize innovative ideas for products and services. 
 Ceding come portion of control to customers can also create challenges in brand 
management. For example, Verhoef et al. (2013) use General Motors to illustrate this point. The 
company allowed customers to create their own ads, but instead of creating helpful, user 
designed promotional tools, some customers used the platform to develop unflattering and 
derogatory ads about the quality of the company’s automobiles. 
 Finally, a significant challenge in the co-creation of innovation is related to the ability of 
firms to evaluate and select the best ideas, particularly when they must filter through hundreds, 
or even thousands of customer-submitted ideas (Bayus, 2013; Hoyer et al., 2010). This issue is 
two-fold. First, as has been previously discussed, managers simply may not have the cognitive 
capacity to meaningfully process hundreds or thousands of submitted new product concepts 
(Hoyer et al., 2010).  Second, the same cognitive inertia that causes internal developers to have 
difficulty thinking past existing solutions and past successes (Kristensson et al. 2008; Magnusson 
et al., 2003) may also influence their ability to recognize co-created new product novelty and 
customer meaningfulness when they encounter it. As such, teams that can develop the ability to 
be cognitively flexible, balancing both the needs of customers and the needs for profitability 
(Chesbrough, 2003), should gain an advantage in managing customer co-created innovation 
programs. 
 Evaluation and selection is an issue that many researchers have noted needs more 
investigation, but for which no empirical research currently exists. As one researcher recently 
noted, “The marketing literature has a long-standing interest in methods for improving idea 
generation, but is generally silent on the ‘best’ approaches for idea selection…next to nothing is 
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known about idea selection in crowdsourcing applications where ideas are publically submitted 
and rated by consumers over time” (Bayus, 2013, p. 241). This challenge in the co-creation of 




Cognitive Theories in Innovation and New Product Development 
 As has been previously discussed, several authors have found that cognitive inertia may 
hinder innovation teams from thinking past their previous success and established methods of 
decision-making. This cognitive inertia may explain why customer-generated new product 
concepts are often superior to those generated by development professionals (Magnusson et al., 
2003; Poetz and Schreier, 2012) on the dimensions of novelty and meaningfulness (i.e., the 
degree to which they satisfy customer needs). Exploring the issue of evaluation and selection 
through the lens of team cognition offers the opportunity to uncover valuable insights related to 
the how firms manage the unique complexities of co-creation. A cognitive approach to exploring 
the issues of selection and evaluation in co-creation rests on the premise that human decision-
makers behave with bounded rationality (Simon 1991) rather than being rational in an entirely 
objective sense. Baron (2004) argues that adopting a cognitive perspective may help explain why 
some individuals and organizations are better able to recognize and exploit innovation 
opportunities in the environment, even when presented with the same objective information.  
 Several researchers in innovation and new product development have explored factors 
related to new product developers’ cognitive habits and styles to explain innovation outcomes. 
(Laureiro-Martínez et al., 2009) argue that cognitive flexibility, or the ability to think broadly 
across domains, is associated with discovery and innovation in organizations. (Dahl & Moreau, 
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2002) find that teams that use analogical thinking have greater success in new product 
development. Likewise, McNally et al. (2009) find that the cognitive styles and dispositional 
traits of managers are related to successful innovation portfolio management.  
 Theories from organizational psychology may be particularly helpful in understanding 
the cognitive underpinning of team decision making about customer ideas for new products and 
services. The focus is on two specific theory bases; regulatory focus theory and the literature on 
team reflexivity. Regulatory focus refers to how firms approach risk, rewards, and achievement, 
from a prevention- or promotion orientation, while reflexivity refers to the degree to which teams 
overtly reflect on their knowledge and decision-making practices. Both of these theories offer 
insight into the underlying causes of cognitive inertia, ways of thinking about opportunities, and 
practices that can help teams to reduce the negative effects of cognitive inertia. They may also 
explain how accurate a development team is in assessing whether or not a customer’s new 
product idea is worth pursuing. 
 
Regulatory Focus Theory 
 Regulatory focus theory (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998) posits that individuals 
self-regulate and make decisions using either a prevention orientation or a promotion orientation. 
When people make decisions motivated by achievement, risk-taking, and pursuing positive 
outcomes, they can be said to have a promotion orientation. Individuals with a promotion 
orientation typically have a strong motivation to enact change, are creative problem solvers, are 
more risk tolerant, and are more sensitive to the presence or absence of rewards. Conversely, a 
prevention orientation occurs when individuals or groups are motivated by avoiding negative 
outcomes and losses. Individuals with a prevention orientation typically have a strong motivation 
 
45 
to follow rules, are concerned with the absence or presence of punishment, with duties and 
obligations, and are considered more risk averse than people with a promotion orientation. 
 Prevention and promotion orientations have also been empirically shown to be manifest 
at the group level of analysis. For example, Levine et al. (2000) conducted an experiment to 
determine how situational factors might change regulatory style. They found that in a group 
decision-making context, groups tended to converge on either a prevention or promotion style, 
even when individual team members had opposite chronic traits. Faddegon, Scheepers, and 
Ellemers (2008) report a similar convergence on a group regulatory style and found that even the 
emotions of individual group members shifted to align with the prevention or promotion 
orientation of the group. 
 Regulatory focus is considered to be both a trait and a state in that individuals typically 
have a stable preference, but different situations can elicit different regulatory styles (Kark & 
Van Dijk, 2007). Among the situational factors that have empirically shown to influence group 
regulatory style are punishment/reward structures (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Florack & 
Hartmann, 2007), time pressure (Florack & Hartmann, 2007), the regulatory style of team 
leaders (Wu, McMullen, Neubert, & Yi, 2008), and explicitly receiving instructions to adopt a 
decision-making style of “eagerness” or “vigilance” (Spanjol, Tam, Qualls, & Bohlmann, 2011).  
 
Regulatory Focus in Innovation 
 In innovation, regulatory focus may present an interesting tradeoff for firms wishing to 
launch new products. On the one hand, conventional wisdom in innovation supports the idea that 
firms must be willing to accept a certain level of risk in the exploration of new knowledge, 
processes, and technologies (March, 1991), which is consistent with a promotion orientation. On 
the other hand, given that there is no guarantee that exploration will yield returns (e.g., the high 
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rate of new product failure), too much exploration could have serious negative consequences for 
a firm or business unit. In innovation, a promotion style represents a motivation to create value 
through exploration, innovation, and creative thinking, while a prevention style represents the 
motivation to capture value through exploitation, routinization, and cost reduction (Chesbrough, 
2003). 
 Despite its potential for explaining team decision-making in innovation, only a few 
articles have used regulatory style to investigate outcomes for entrepreneurship and innovation. 
None of these articles addresses the co-creation of innovation with consumers, but when 
considered with the literature on the co-creation of innovation yield several interesting 
predictions. The key findings of these studies are shown in Table 3. 
 
 Baron (2004) conceptually explores the role of regulatory style in detecting both good 
and bad opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship. He posits that regulatory style may be 
instrumental in determining how accurately innovation- and entrepreneurially-oriented 
individuals and organizations are in detecting signals about the market performance potential of 
new projects. As he points out, successful innovators are not only adept at recognizing good 
opportunities (correct identification), but they can also recognize bad ideas and dead ends when 
they see them (correct rejection). In his view, both regulatory foci may offer advantages to 
successful innovators. Promotion may be associated with identifying good opportunities, while a 




 Brockner et al. (2004), in their conceptual review of regulatory style in entrepreneurship, 
argue that prevention and promotion teams differ fundamentally in how they assess the risk of 
new product concepts. In their view, prevention-oriented teams have the tendency to 
overestimate the risks associated with a new product undertaking, whereas promotion-oriented 
teams tend to underestimate the riskiness of an innovation opportunity or new venture. They 
posit that a promotion style is beneficial in developing new ideas, while a prevention style may 
be more beneficial in the screening and implementation phases of entrepreneurship. One caveat 
they offer, however, is that innovation and entrepreneurship may be incompatible with a 
prevention orientation since they entail a certain level of inherent risk. Therefore, they argue that 
promotion oriented individuals and firms may be successful, in part, because they engage in 
overall higher levels of entrepreneurial and/or innovative activities. 
 Florack and Hartman (2007) investigated team decision making and how they chose to 
invest in certain ventures over others based on perceived risk levels. They conducted a team 
experiment in which a prevention or promotion focus was primed for each group. Teams were 
instructed to act as small business owners analyzing investment opportunities that varied in risk, 
and were asked to decide in which of those options to invest. They found that promotion-oriented 
groups made significantly riskier decisions than prevention-oriented groups who tended to opt 
for “safe” options. An important boundary condition they found was that time pressure seemed 
to erode any disparity in risk aversion between promotion and prevention-oriented groups. Under 
time pressure, prevention-oriented groups became less risk averse and promotion-oriented 
groups became more risk averse.  
 Rietzschel (2011) conducted a survey of 33 teams, including 303 team members and 33 
team leaders in Dutch firms. His findings suggest that a prevention orientation may have benefits 
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in the fuzzy front end of the ideation process, as well as for the process development teams 
which must go through internally to garner resources and managerial support for new product 
development initiatives. Specifically, he found that a collective promotion focus was positively 
associated with the frequency of original idea generation, and idea promotion (e.g., mobilizing 
support internally for innovation projects. However, there were no significant differences 
between prevention and promotion groups on the number of realized ideas (e.g. turned into 
practical applications). An important potential implication of his findings is that, while a 
development team’s promotion may be instrumental in creating original ideas and generating 
organizational excitement and support for a project, it may not influence firms’ ability to develop 
a superior sense of which projects will perform well in the marketplace. 
 Spanjol et al. (2011) analyzed data collected from a marketing simulation completed by 
teams of business students that were assigned to an “eager” (promotion) or a “vigilant” 
(prevention) strategy in their decision-making. Additionally, dyads were either matched on their 
chronic individual regulatory style preferences (prevention matched, promotion matched, or 
mixed). In terms of development team outcomes, they found that groups with a promotion focus 
match introduced a greater volume of new products, were faster in introducing new products, and 
introduced more novel new products (versus product line extensions). Furthermore, prevention 
match and mixed groups assigned an eager (promotion) strategy outperformed groups in the 
vigilance strategy (prevention) groups on the same three outcome measures. The only exception 
was that when both team members were individually promotion oriented, they outperformed 
mixed and prevention groups, even when assigned to a vigilant strategy. The authors conclude 
that promotion-oriented individuals may be less sensitive to situational factors in regulatory 
style, or resistant to perceived outside influences on their regulatory style. 
 
49 
Table 3. Group Regulatory Focus Theory in Entrepreneurship/Innovation 
Author(s) Key Findings Method and Sample 
Baron 
(2004) 
 A promotion focus is associated with situational alertness and the ability to consider a broad range 
of idea and knowledge domains in innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 A promotion focus may be more effective in idea generation, while a prevention focus may be more 






 Prevention-minded decision makers may overestimate the problems and challenges of a new 
entrepreneurial opportunity, while promotion-minded decision makers tend to underestimate the 
problems and challenges of a new entrepreneurial opportunity. 
 Regulatory style may aid in signal detection about entrepreneurial/innovation opportunities; a 
promotion orientation is associated with more positive hits, but more false positives, while a 
prevention orientation should be associated with identifying more “dead ends”, but also more false 
negatives. 
 Prevention oriented teams should have lower overall levels of innovation activities (successful or 






 In the absence of time pressure, prevention-oriented groups showed significantly more risk aversion 
than promotion-oriented groups. 
 Under conditions of extreme time pressure, prevention- and promotion-oriented groups displayed 
similar levels of risk aversion. 
 
Experimental design 
with high school 
student teams as 
subjects 
Spanjol et al. 
(2011) 
 When team members were matched on a promotion focus, the team introduced new products more 
quickly, had a greater quantity of new products launched, and introduced more novel new products. 
 When team members were mismatched on regulatory focus, those that were assigned an eager goal 
pursuit strategy (versus vigilant) introduced new products more quickly, had a greater quantity of 
new products launched, and introduced more novel new products. 
 
Undergraduate business 





 A team promotion focus was positively associated with teams’ level of idea generation and idea 
promotion (e.g. internal selling and resource allocation). 
 Neither a prevention nor a promotion focus was significantly related to teams’ level of innovation 
idea realization. 
Survey of innovation 
team members and 





 Collectively, these studies raise several interesting issues regarding the relationship 
between team regulatory style and innovation outcomes in the co-creation of new products.  A 
firm’s role in co-creation typically involves evaluation, selection, and implementation rather than 
idea generation (Bayus, 2013; Hoyer et al., 2010). Although firms may modify customer ideas 
since they are often under-elaborated or overly general (Bayus, 2013), the amount of creative 
problem solving relative to that required in idea generation may be significantly less. In a co-
creation context, where the originality and utility of customers’ ideas are often inherently high 
relative to internally-generated ideas (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz and Schreier, 2012), the 
benefits of a promotion orientation may be attenuated.  Development teams may feel that factors 
related to value creation (e.g., market appeal, originality) are already “built in” to the 
consideration set of ideas generated by their customers and are free to concentrate on factors 
related to value capture (e.g., determining technological feasibility, costs, etc.). A prevention 
orientation may also be particularly effective given the sheer volume of ideas that firms typically 
have to filter through and evaluate in a co-creation project (Hoyer et al., 2010). Because of their 
risk-aversion, prevention-oriented teams may be less inclined to aggressively pursue ideas that 
don’t rank high on feasibility. 
 On the other hand, promotion may have benefits for teams beyond being associated with 
superior idea generation. As Rietzschel (2011) found, a promotion orientation was associated 
with more effective internal selling and the procurement of resources for new product 
development projects. From an evaluation and selection perspective, promotion-oriented teams 
may simply do a better job at detecting which customer ideas are likely to be achievable, and 
may also be more prone to persist with ideas longer than prevention teams. This is a potentially 




solutions, and may require tinkering, modification, and/or scope redefinition by the firm 
development team in order to be profitably implemented (Bayus, 2013). 
 Second, while there is empirical support for the positive influence on a promotion 
orientation on several aspect of the NPD process, such as idea generation, speed to market and 
product line deviations (Rietzschel, 2011; Spanjol et al., 2011), there is no evidence in these 
studies on the influence of regulatory style on the market performance of new products. While 
speed to market, product originality, and volume of new product introductions may be important 
considerations in a firm’s innovation strategy, these factors alone don’t necessarily ensure 
market success. Ideas that poorly satisfy unmet market needs, even when well implemented 
would be expected to fail on the basis of inferior value creation. Conversely, highly innovative 
ideas that are poorly-implemented would be expected to fail on the basis of inferior value capture 
for the firm.  
 
Team Reflexivity 
 According to De Dreu (2007),  teams can engage in heuristic information processing 
characterized by well-learned associations, scripts, and routines, or they can rely on deeper, more 
effortful processing that help them form more elaborate argument-based decision criteria. 
Reflexive practices may help teams to avoid automatic decision heuristics and to develop the 
ability to make decisions based on deeply processed information. As was previously introduced 
in Chapter 1, group reflexivity in organizations refers to the degree to which a team overtly 
thinks about and reflects on its collective knowledge and the processes it uses in decision-making 
(West, 1996). Reflexivity has been shown to work in several different ways to increase team 




develop shared mental models and integrate their collective tacit and explicit knowledge (Müller, 
Herbig, & Petrovic, 2009). Particularly in cross-functional teams where team members are likely 
to have diverse knowledge stores, reflexivity practices allow for groups to think about 
information, both more broadly and more deeply by drawing on the collective knowledge of 
individual members. Second, reflexivity gives teams the opportunity to assess the way they 
approach decision-making, which may be particularly useful in the dynamic decision 
environments faced by new product development teams (Hoegl & Parboteeah, 2006). Research 
in group decision making has shown that groups often adopt decision-making strategies early 
and then habitually rely on them as they become engrained as a routine, but intentional reflection 
can break groups out of suboptimal decision processes that develop over time (Gurtner et al., 
2007). The ability to break out of decision-making routines may be particularly important in co-
creation where ideas are often not well-specified. 
 Although most studies report positive performance outcomes associated with team 
reflexivity, there are several boundary conditions to its effectiveness. First, reflexivity seems to 
work best for low-performing teams whose knowledge is not well-integrated or whose team 
learning is low (Schippers, Homan, & Knippenberg, 2013). Teams that are already high-
performing would be expected to benefit less from adopting reflexive practices than low-
performing teams. Second, reflexivity is most effective at driving team performance when team 
members perceive that there are interdependent benefits from collaborating with team members 
(DeDreu, 2007), an important consideration given the cross-functional nature of many product 
development teams. Finally, reflexivity may be counterproductive when teams spend too much 
time thinking about and processing irrelevant information, or when teams with low knowledge 




Team Reflexivity in the Innovation Literature 
 Reflexivity is particularly pertinent to innovation decisions because of the tendency for 
firms to develop strong decision-making heuristics, organizational scripts, and work routines 
around the new product development process (Leonard‐Barton, 1992; Madhavan & Grover, 
1998).  For example, the stage gate process has been widely used by firms to try to take a 
disciplined approach to an otherwise chaotic process (Sethi & Iqbal, 2008). 
 However, as several authors point out (e.g., Sethi & Iqbal, 2008; Leonard-Barton 1992), 
adopting rigid decision-making routines may impede organizational learning or cause firms to 
rely on what has been successful in the past rather than what processes are needed to be 
successful in the future. This is particularly true when products are novel, or in a turbulent 
technological landscape. Given that product lifecycles are shortening, and the rate of market 
change is accelerating (Day, 2011), the ability to reflect on and adapt decision-making processes 
may be equally important to the actual knowledge content that firms use in product development.  
The fundamental premise behind the value of reflexivity in innovation teams is not that 
development teams should completely abandon innovation routines and decision heuristics, but 
rather the way a firm thinks about new product development and the way teams evaluate and 
select ideas should be subject to continual evaluation and/or improvement. Indeed, the literature 
in innovation that has explored the role of reflexivity supports the positive connection between 
new product performance and the reflexive practices of NPD teams. As articulated by Hammedi 
et al. (2011), “a reflexive screening committee appears to be more likely to question itself and its 
methods, to tackle challenges produced by a dynamic new product environment and the unique 




 As with regulatory style, there are relatively few works in the literature investigating the 
influence of reflexivity on innovation, and no research to date has examined NPD team 
reflexivity in a co-creation context. An overview of the literature pertaining to reflexivity in 
innovation is presented in Table 4 and discussed in the following sections.  
 DeDreu (2002) conducted a field study involving teams making decisions about 
ambiguously-defined projects for which there was no clear procedure or organizational routine. 
He found that minority dissent was positively associated with team innovation effectiveness, but 
only when reflexivity was high. This finding underscores the knowledge integration aspect of 
reflexivity. His conclusion is that when teams are highly reflexive, minority views and 
information counter to teams’ working hypotheses may be listened to more carefully and 
processed more thoroughly by the group, leading to more effective decision-making. 
 Hoegl and Parboteeah (2006) investigate the influence of team reflexivity on innovation 
effectiveness and innovation efficiency in software development teams. They found that 
reflexivity was positively associated with new product effectiveness (e.g., customer satisfaction 
and technical proficiency with the new product, etc.), but had a non-significant relationship to 
new product efficiency (e.g., within time schedule and within budget). To explain this non-effect, 
they argue that reflexivity likely requires a significant time commitment from teams, since it 
involves levels of exploratory learning, planning and continuous monitoring not present in teams 
with low reflexivity. They also contend that maintaining a high level of  reflexivity may result in 
an external orientation for innovation teams as they seek to collect all the relevant knowledge 
about customer need and the competitive landscaping leaving less time and resources that can be 
dedicated to internally-oriented concerns, such as time and budget constraints. Finally, they 




stages, teams often take on even greater data processing demands, as they refine new product 
concepts, add previously unplanned functionality to new products, and rework product design 
specifications to more closely match customer needs. 
 Müller, Herbig, and Petrovic (2009) conducted an experiment with mechanical 
engineering students. Participants were placed in teams and asked to develop an innovative 
solution for a design task with their ideas judged by independent experts. They found that teams 
that discussed the development of process and task-related goals outperformed teams that spent 
time simply reviewing the individual knowledge base of each team member. They also found a 
distinction between two sources of knowledge that are important in reflexive practices – 
knowledge in teams and knowledge of teams. Knowledge in work teams refers to the explicit 
knowledge each team member possesses (e.g., customers, competitors, technological 
capabilities, etc.) that can contribute to team decision-making. Knowledge of teams refers to the 
cognitive processes and styles that teams use to evaluate data and make decisions. 
 Maccurtain, Flood, Ramamoorty, West, and Dawson (2009) explored the relationship 
between top management teams’ knowledge sharing and reflexivity and performance-based 
innovation outcomes in the Irish software development industry. Their primary findings were 
that reflexivity and knowledge sharing resulted in higher levels of innovation performance. 
Trustworthiness was also found to be an important antecedent to reflexivity and knowledge 
sharing. Developing an atmosphere of trust is important to reflexive practices because it creates 
an environment in which team members can be honest and frank in discussions about product 
development projects. Given other literature in marketing and innovation which describes the 
political nature of innovation and strategy decisions in firms (e.g., Frost & Egri, 1991; Sethi, 




politics in NPD. MacCurtain et al. (2009) argue this is particularly true in uncertain and complex 
environments where people are likely to take advantage of performance causal ambiguities to 
promote political agendas.  
 In addition to establishing antecedents of team reflexivity, their study is an important 
addition to the body of literature because they establish support for a positive relationship 
between team reflexivity and actual market performance (new product revenues as a percentage 
of total revenue). Other studies in this area have either used qualitative measures (e.g., novelty, 
quality, etc.), controlled lab experiments, or have used perceptual measures of innovation 
success. The existence of a positive correlating between reflexivity and market performance 
suggests reflexivity may be an important driver of new product success. 
  Schippers et al. (2010) conducted a survey of 1,156 individuals in 98 primary healthcare 
teams working in community health. They asked respondents to list the major innovations their 
team had introduced into their practices in the past year, and then had an independent panel of 
experts rate each project on magnitude, radicalness, novelty, and impact to determine the mean 
level of innovativeness for each team. They found a significant direct effect between reflexivity 
and innovation. They also found that the influence of reflexivity on innovation is most positive 
when workloads are high, the work is complex in nature, or when environmental conditions are 
not stable. Given the nature of decision heuristics discussed previously, this finding is not 
surprising. In low-complexity or stable conditions, one would expect organizational routines and 
scripts to be favored for efficiency’s sake. When workloads are high, unstable, or complex, it 





Table 4. Literature Review of Team Reflexivity in Innovation 
Author(s) Key Findings Method and Sample 
DeDreu (2002)  Minority dissent was positively associated with team innovation 
and team decision effectiveness when reflexivity was high, but not 
when reflexivity was low.  
 Reflexive teams are more likely to listen to and thoroughly process 
differing opinions and disconfirming information. 
 
Cross-sectional survey of 
Dutch work teams and their 
supervisors 
 
Hoegl and Parboteeah (2006)  Innovation team reflexivity is positively related to innovation 
effectiveness, but not innovation efficiency 
 
Survey of software 
development teams 
 
Müller, Herbig, and Petrovic (2009)  Highly reflexive innovation teams developed ideas with higher 
overall quality, but not higher originality and creativity. 
 
Experimental design with 
engineering student teams 
 
MacCurtain et al. (2010)  Task reflexivity has a direct and positive relationship with new 
product market performance. 
Survey of top executives 
from software firms and 
interviews with firm CEOs 
 
Schippers, West, and Dawson (2010)  Team reflexivity is positively related to team innovation 
performance. 
 The relationship between team reflexivity and innovation 
performance is higher when team workload is high rather than low, 
when the project is complex. 
 
Survey of community 
healthcare teams 
 
Hammedi, van Riel, and Sasovova (2011)  Teams tasked with screening internally-generated ideas can 
improve decision quality by adopting reflexive practices. 
 Reflexivity is positively related to decision-making efficiency and 
effectiveness in innovation teams 
 
Survey of executives in the 







 Hammedi et al. (2011) conducted a survey of international managers to investigate the 
influence of team reflexivity on new product selection decisions, along with manager leadership 
style and cognitive style.  They found positive and significant relationships between team 
reflexivity and new product decision-making effectiveness (i.e., resource allocation and decision 
accuracy), as well as new product decision-making efficiency (i.e., speed of decision-making and 
knowledge utilization). They conclude that “stop-and-think” behaviors rather than following 
more automatic development routines improved the overall quality of team decision-making in 
innovation projects.  
 Based on this literature, several general observations can be made about reflexivity in 
innovation. First, reflexivity seems to be associated with a pragmatic decision-making style 
evidenced by the finding that highly reflexive teams’ ideas were high on quality, but not 
necessarily originality or novelty (Müller et al., 2009). Second, there is strong support for 
innovation effectiveness, but the findings are mixed with regards to how a teams’ reflexivity 
influences the efficiency with which innovations were developed. In other words, reflexivity 
seems to have less influence on reducing costs and efficient manufacturing than it does on 
developing products that meet unmet market needs. Finally, with the exception of one study 
(MacCurtain et al., 2010), there is paucity of empirical research that ties reflexivity directly to 
new product performance. Further, the MacCurtain et al. (2010) study looked at top management 
teams as the unit of analysis. As a result, the effects were most likely based on high level 
strategic factors rather than the tactical decisions new product development teams face on a day-
to-day basis. 
 In the context of co-creation, reflexivity may be particularly important. The argument in 






practices. This is manifest in co-creation in two ways: the nature of customer ideas, and idea 
volume. Customer ideas may add complexity since they may be difficult to evaluate, relative to 
in-house ideas since customers are primarily focused on satisfying unmet needs rather than profit 
potential or economies of scale and scope (Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Particularly in firms that 
have had innovation successes, cognitive inertia and core rigidities related to NPD may make 
accurate evaluation challenging (Leonard-Barton, 1992), since decision makers likely carry a 
decision bias favoring what has worked in the past.  Underdeveloped ideas from customers may 
also require extensive discussion and/or modification in order to determine their true market 
potential (Bayus, 2013; Ogawa & Piller, 2006). As a result, reflexivity would likely have an even 
greater effect in co-creation, as routine decision heuristics could be insufficient to evaluate 
customer ideas, especially if teams are required to evaluate and modify customer ideas.  
 On the other hand, customer idea volume, another complexity factor associated with co-
creation projects, may make reflexivity counterproductive. Even when companies use their 
online innovation communities to help identify promising ideas, they must often deal with 
hundreds or thousands of submissions (Bayus, 2013; Hoyer et al., 2012). The methodical 
analysis, discussion, and evaluation or every idea in such cases potentially carries significant 
efficiency costs in terms of time-to-market and human resources. Teams that deeply evaluate 
thousands of ideas might find themselves never moving past the evaluation stage to take a 
product to market. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 There are several characteristics of co-creation that make selection different from 






previous review of the co-creation literature. First, managers are typically dealing with a higher 
number of ideas (Hoyer et al., 2010). While firms often use communities of users (e.g. online 
peer ratings) to reduce the number of ideas that are reviewed by firm development employees, 
firms must still often review dozens, or hundreds of ideas submitted by customers. Second, 
product ideas submitted by customers have a high potential to meet the unmet needs of the target 
market, relative to internally-generated ideas (Grewal et al., 2006; Hoyer, 2010; Poetz & 
Schreier, 2012; Shah, 2006). While not every customer-submitted idea has the potential to be a 
market success, customers may be more adept at generating new product concepts that are both 
unique and fulfill unmet market needs (Grewal et al., 2006; Poetz and Schreier, 2012). Finally, 
compared to innovation concepts generated by firm insiders, ideas generated by customers often 
represent “distant” sources of knowledge (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Poetz & Schreier, 2012), 
making the selection process more challenging, as firms must weigh distant customer ideas 
against their technological and implantation capabilities (Hoyer et al., 2010). 
  
Innovativeness Selection Skill in Cocreation 
 In the initial stages of product development, firms often rely on subjective assessments of 
the innovativeness of new products. These assessments are based on new product novelty 
(uniqueness compared to existing market offerings), meaningfulness (degree to which a product 
satisfies customer needs), and feasibility (the degree to which a firm can profitably 
commercialize a new product) (Bayus, 2013; Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier). Each of 
these dimensions is discussed below. 
 Novelty. The novelty of a new product is defined as the degree to which to concept is 






competitors (Im & Workman, 2004; Poetz and Schreier, 2012; Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & 
Staw, 2005). The co-creation literature supports that argument that customer ideas are more 
novel than internally-generated ideas (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Even 
when customers’ technical and/or product knowledge is limited, customers can often generate 
highly novel and meaningful ideas for new market offerings because they are less constrained by 
existing solutions and designs (Kristensson et al., 2008). 
 Meaningfulness. Although successful new products are often novel relative to existing 
products in their category, novelty by itself does not translate into new product success (Im & 
Workman, 2004). In addition to novelty, an assessment of the innovativeness of a new product 
should determine the degree to which a product would be appropriate for target consumers. Im 
and Workman (2004) found that the degree to which a new product resonated with unmet market 
needs was significantly associated with financial measures of new product performance, but 
novelty was only associated with qualitative performance assessments, such as customer 
satisfaction and technological learning outcomes. This dimension associated with a product’s 
inherent ability to meet unmet market needs has been labeled as meaningfulness (Im & 
Workman, 2004), user value (Magnusson et al., 2003), valuable (Kristensson et al., 2004) and 
usefulness (Poetz & Schreier, 2012). At the heart of this dimension is the concept of innovation 
value creation (Chesbrough, 2003), or developing market offerings that fulfill an unmet customer 
need. 
 As with novelty, the meaningfulness of new product concepts created by customers has 
been empirically shown to be higher than ideas generated internally by firms (Magnusson et al., 
2003; Poetz and Schreier, 2012). Of the three dimensions of innovativeness described in this 






component of customer value, against which costs are compared when customers assess a market 
offering (Woodruff, 1997). If new products do not fulfill an unmet need in the market, even if 
they are highly novel and feasible, then consumers are unlikely to adopt them. 
 Feasibility. Many assessments of new product innovativeness conceptualize this concept 
based on work in creativity studies (e.g. Amabile et al., 1996; Amabile et al. 2005), which breaks 
creativity into the two dimensions of novelty and meaningfulness. However, several authors have 
also recognized that feasibility, or the degree to which a firm has the manufacturing and 
technological capabilities to launch a new product, is an important factor in new product 
development (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier 2012). Feasibility is included here 
because customers often represent distant sources of knowledge for firms that must be integrated 
into existing capabilities and resource constraints and should have a direct impact on innovation 
success in co-creation. At the heart of this dimension is Chesbrough’s (2003) notion of value 
capture. Although identifying novel and useful ideas may be an ideal starting point for firms in 
developing new products, development teams still have to be able to design, manufacture, 
distribute, and sell products in a way that captures profits for their firm. Firms must not only 
create products and services that fulfill unmet market needs (i.e., value creation), but they must 
do so in a way that minimizes costs and maximizes revenue. Formally defined, feasibility refers 
to the ease with which an idea can be commercialized, considering the technological and 
economic constraints that might limit the development potential of a product (Poetz & Schreier, 
2012). For example, a particle transporter seen in a science fiction movie might rank very high as 
both novel and meaningful to customers, yet technological constraints limit such a product from 






useful, but prohibitively expensive to produce or does not appeal to a large enough market to be 
profitably developed. In such cases, feasibility would rate low because of economic constraints. 
 In co-creation, the feasibility of customer generated ideas for new products may be 
inherently low, compared to ideas developed internally (Bayus, 2013; Magnusson et al., 2003; 
Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Customers who collaborate with companies typically do so to satisfy 
needs arising from actual usage and likely don’t consider profitability potential or firm 
capabilities when generating ideas for new products and services (Poetz and Schreier, 2012). As 
Bayus (2013) notes, ideas generated in communities often show low degrees of elaboration and 
are often vague and immature in their scope. Customers may approach the generation of new 
product solutions from a radically different vantage point than firm professionals do. This creates 
complexity for teams tasked with evaluating these ideas that may not fit neatly into their frame of 
reference created by organizational routines and scripts (Magnusson et al., 2003). Feasibility 
may seem like a fairly straightforward assessment that firms make about customer product 
concepts, but given that they must often modify the concept to tighten the scope or think outside 
their routines and capabilities, accurately assessing feasibility can be a challenging task. 
 
Performance-Based Selection Skill in Co-creation 
 While the ability to detect the creativity and innovativeness of a new product may be a 
valuable skill for selection teams, extant research has found only moderate correlations between 
the innovativeness of a new product concept and actual new product performance. Szymanski, 
Kroff, and Troy (2007) found in a meta-analysis of the influence of product innovativeness on 
market performance that new product innovativeness (measured as novelty and meaningfulness) 






market advantage (r=.25). Therefore, an investigation of how accurate development teams are in 
evaluating and selecting idea quality should also include actual market performance as an 
outcome. 
 The ability to accurately recognize market “winners” and “losers” before making 
significant financial investments in commercializing customers’ new product ideas is imperative. 
When faced with development decisions, team selection decisions can take one of four 
outcomes, based on a 2 x 2 typology of decision outcomes (Baron, 2004), as shown in Figure 2. 
On the first dimension, is the actual market potential of the new product, high or low, and on the 
second dimension is the team’s development decision, accept or reject. 
  In this typology, a positive hit occurs when teams accept a product for commercialization 
that has high actual market potential. Negative hits occur when teams reject projects for 
development that have low actual market potential. False positives occur when teams accept 
projects that have low actual market potential, and false negatives occur when teams reject 
projects that have high actual market potential. 
 
Team Regulatory Focus and Customer Idea Innovativeness 
 In the innovation and new product development literature, regulatory focus has been used 
as a theoretical lens to study how development teams generate and implement new product ideas 
internally (e.g. Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004; Rietzschel, 2011, Spanjol et al., 2011). In 
contrast, this study investigates the influence of regulatory focus on the filtering and selection 








Figure 2. Decision Outcomes in Co-created New Product Development Evaluations 
 
This creates several important differences that should influence which group regulatory style is 
ideal for identifying the best ideas for customers. 
 As discussed in the literature review section, promotion-oriented teams are characterized 
by a tendency to underestimate risk, broad thinking across multiple categories, creative problem 
solving, situational awareness, and a preference for change over stability (Brockner, Higgins, & 
Low, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007). Prevention-
oriented teams are characterized by a tendency to overestimate risk, narrow thinking in fewer 
categories, problem-solving using well-established routines, and a preference for stability over 
change (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007). 
  In a co-creation context, prevention-focused groups may view novelty as a signal of risk, 
since, by definition, it indicates a divergence from established norms and customer preferences.  
One would expect prevention-oriented groups to have a bias in their assessment of novelty, 






stability, promotion-oriented teams may see customer ideas as inherently less risky since 
customer-generated ideas often outperform the firm’s own internally-generated ideas on this 
dimension. Thus, one can predict that promotion-oriented teams will be more accurate in their 
assessment of customer co-created product novelty.  
 Since promotion-focused teams tend to underestimate the risks in involved in a given 
project (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), they may be more 
likely to view the needs, wants, and desires of small, unprofitable market segments as more 
profitable than they really are. On the other hand, prevention-focused teams, with their increased 
sensitivity to risky innovation projects, would be expected to assess meaningfulness with a more 
hawkish decision criteria, rejecting ideas that wouldn’t appeal to a wide segment of customers or 
very profitable smaller segments. 
 Finally, a prevention focus may aid development teams in accurately detecting how 
feasible customers’ new product concepts are.  Based on the risk estimation biases of both 
prevention- and promotion-oriented groups, it is expected that teams with a prevention 
orientation should be more motivated to assess the implementation risks of a new product 
concept. Such risks include factors such as high development costs, challenges in manufacturing, 
technology, and distribution that make a project more risky to pursue. Based on the assertion of 
regulatory focus theory that a prevention orientation is associated with avoiding risk and (Crowe 
& Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), one would expect prevention-focused 
teams to be more attuned to factors that signal economic risk, such as feasibility, as developing 






 As a result, one can predict that a promotion focus is beneficial to assessing new product 
novelty, while a prevention focus is more beneficial to assessing meaningfulness and feasibility. 
Formally stated, 
H1a: Promotion-oriented teams are more accurate than prevention-oriented teams 
in their assessment of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H1b: Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams 
in their assessment of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H1c: Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams 
in their assessment of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
Team Reflexivity and Customer Idea Innovativeness 
 The literature on reflexivity also offers insight to make predictions about the influence of 
a team’s level of reflexivity on assessments of the three dimensions of co-created product 
innovativeness. Reflexive teams are more likely to incorporate the shared knowledge of team 
members, pay attention to a variety of information sources and signals, and deeply process 
information when making a team decision (Müller et al., 2008). DeDreu (2002) found that teams 
which were highly reflexive in their decision-making were more likely to pay attention to 
dissenting opinions and/or disconfirming feedback, and seek a variety of viewpoints before 
making a decision. On the other hand, DeDreu suggests a dark side to reflexivity, that teams 
which are too reflexive might engage in confirmatory information search (i.e., groupthink), 






out of taking risks on a promising product or talk itself into pursuing a customer’s idea that has 
little market potential or would be beyond their firm’s capability to implement. Reflexivity 
researchers have also found that the positive relationship between reflexivity and innovation is 
greater when the decision-making environment is complex (Schippers et al., 2010). The co-
creation evaluation and selection context itself has been characterized by several researchers as 
very complex (Hoyer et al., 2010; Bayus, 2013), since development teams must evaluate ideas 
which are often ambiguous or not well-articulated, and then determine if those ideas are a good 
fit for their firm’s capabilities.  
 The positive relationship between reflexivity and the accurate assessment of novelty, 
meaningfulness, and feasibility is largely driven by the past findings that reflexive teams think 
more broadly, tapping into the individual knowledge and experience of their team members, and 
deeply about innovation decisions (DeDreu 2022; Hammedi et al. 2011).  In assessing co-
created new product novelty, reflexive teams may consider substitutes and alternative across 
categories, not simply within a single category. They should do a better job at tapping into the 
knowledge and experience of each individual team member with respect to how closely an idea 
compares to existing market offerings across a variety of similar product categories, not just a 
single product category.  
 In assessing co-created new product meaningfulness, reflexive teams should think more 
broadly across different market segments to assess whether or not a product has the potential 
meet the needs of a particular customer base. They may also do a better job at assessing niche 







 Finally, for evaluating the feasibility of co-created new product ideas, reflexive teams 
should be superior in assessing their own capabilities and the capabilities of their strategic 
external partners to determine how well a product idea fits with their ability to implement it. 
They should also do a better job at considering alternative technologies that might make a 
product less costly to implement. 
 Given these factors, one would expect a positive relationship between reflexivity and 
selection skill for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility in cocreation evaluation and selection 
decisions. Using this logic, the following hypotheses can be made: 
H2a: Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in 
their assessment of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H2b: Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in 
their assessment of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H2c: Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in 
their assessment of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
Influence of Regulatory Focus x Reflexivity on Novelty, Meaningfulness, and Feasibility 
 For the interaction between reflexivity and regulatory style, it is expected that reflexivity 
will not have the same influence on promotion-oriented teams as it does on prevention-oriented 
teams. Since promotion is associated with broad thinking, situational awareness, and creative 






oriented teams may gain less benefit from reflexivity than prevention-oriented teams. In other 
words, some aspects of reflexivity and awareness may be inherent in a promotion orientation. 
 In addition, promotion-oriented teams may be less susceptible to the influence of 
interventions designed to modify their modes of thinking and decision-making. For example, 
Spanjol et al. (2011) found that, among teams that were explicitly instructed to adopt a “vigilant” 
decision-making style, those that had team members matched on a promotion orientation 
significantly outperformed teams whose members were matched on an individual prevention 
orientation. Their explanation of this observed effect, drawn from reactance theory (Brehm, 
1966), is that promotion-oriented decision makers highly value their freedom in the pursuit of 
goals. They may resist perceived efforts to constrain their thinking and goal pursuit, as could be 
the case when groups participate in intentional reflexivity practices. 
 The mixed empirical findings on the effect of reflexivity on innovation process efficiency 
may also suggest that reflexive promotion-oriented teams do not gain the same benefits as 
reflexive prevention-oriented teams. Although they do not measure teams’ regulatory style, 
Hoegl and Parboteeah (2011) found that reflexivity in innovation teams increased new product 
effectiveness but not efficiency (cf. Hammedi et al., 2011). This suggests that reflexivity 
positively influences a team’s orientation toward achievement and success (the “Achilles heel” 
of a prevention-orientation) more than it positively influences a team’s orientation toward risk-
reduction and security (the “Achilles heel” of a promotion-orientation). Across a variety of 
decision-making contexts besides new product development, the relationship between reflexivity 
and team performance has been shown to be more positive when teams have room to improve, or 
are low-performing (Schippers et al., 2013). Taken together, these studies suggest that the 






 H3a: Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ 
 assessments of co-created new product novelty, but has a negative influence on 
 promotion-focused teams’ assessment accuracy of novelty. 
 
 H3b: Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ 
 assessments of co-created new product meaningfulness, but has a negative influence on 
 promotion-focused teams’ assessment accuracy of meaningfulness. 
 
 H3c: Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ 
 assessments of co-created new product feasibility, but has a negative influence on 
 promotion-focused teams’ assessment accuracy of feasibility. 
 
Team Regulatory Focus and Positive/Negative Hits 
 As discussed previously, the innovativeness of a product is only moderately correlated 
with new product success (Szymanski et al., 2007). A variety of other factors, both inside and 
outside the firm, can influence whether or not a new product is successful. For example, 
implementation issues, NPD processes, and competition can all influence how successful an 
innovative new product idea might be (Henard and Szymanski, 2001).  
 Extant research has empirically supported the finding that promotion-oriented teams are 
more successful in commercializing internally-developed new products because of their ability to 
develop products that are highly creative. In a co-creation context, however, having a promotion 
focus may not be advantageous, as customer ideas are often inherently more novel and 






 Given these findings, one can predict that prevention-oriented teams should be more 
accurate in recognizing ideas that have the most potential to be successful (positive hits) and the 
ideas that are most likely to fail (negative hits). Being prevention-oriented may offer the best of 
both worlds in this context. On the one hand, teams with a prevention orientation are more likely 
to be sensitive to development risks (e.g., manufacturing and development costs that prohibit 
product margins, competitive forces, and implementation capabilities). At the same time, dealing 
with co-created ideas may mean the overall quality of the consideration set (in terms of 
meaningfulness to customers), is higher, meaning the risk of selecting a false negative is lower.  
 Therefore, it is expected that teams with a prevention-focus will make more accurate 
selection decisions related to both positive hits and negative hits. Formally stated, 
 
H4a: Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of positive hits than 
promotion-oriented teams when assessing the market potential of product 
concepts created by customers. 
 
 H4b: Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of negative hits than 
 promotion-oriented team when assessing the market potential of product concepts  created 
 by customers. 
 
Team Reflexivity and Positive/Negative Hits 
 Reflexivity should increase teams’ rates of both correct acceptances and correct 
rejections (i.e., positive hits and negative hits). Since the success of a new product can depend on 






implementation issues, market dynamics, and competitive forces (Henard & Szymanski, 2001), it 
is also expected that highly reflexive teams will outperform low reflexive teams in assessing the 
actual market potential of customer-generated ideas. This is because of their capacity to consider 
products from multiple viewpoints, rather than relying on routine heuristics to assess the 
potential of new product concepts. For example, Müller et al. (2009) found that highly reflexive 
teams developed new product concepts that were of a higher overall quality, but were not 
significantly more creative than ideas developed by teams with low reflexivity. In other words, 
reflexive teams may simply be more pragmatic in their approach to determining what will 
ultimately be successful in the marketplace, rather than focusing on achieving success on a single 
dominant criterion, such as the novelty of the proposed product concept. As such, one can predict 
that reflexivity will positively influence a team’s ability to accurately identify which customer-
created product concepts are likely to be successful and which concepts are likely to fail if taken 
to market. Formally stated, 
 
 H5a: Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of positive hits, compared to 
 teams with low reflexivity. 
 
 H5b: Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of negative hits, compared to 
 teams with low reflexivity. 
 
 Team Regulatory Focus x Team Reflexivity Interaction 
 Regarding the interaction between reflexivity and regulatory style, it is expected that 






prevention-oriented teams. Since promotion is associated with broad thinking, situational 
awareness, and creative problem solving (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Kark & Van 
Dijk, 2007), promotion-oriented teams may gain less benefit from reflexivity than prevention-
oriented teams. In other words, some aspects of reflexivity and awareness may be inherent in a 
promotion orientation. 
 In addition, promotion-oriented teams may be less susceptible to the influence of 
interventions designed to modify their modes of thinking and decision-making. For example, 
Spanjol et al. (2011) found that, among teams that were explicitly instructed to adopt a “vigilant” 
decision-making style, those that had team members matched on a promotion orientation 
significantly outperformed teams whose members were matched on an individual prevention 
orientation. Their explanation of this observed effect, drawn from reactance theory (Brehm, 
1966), is that promotion-oriented decision makers highly value their freedom in the pursuit of 
goals. They may resist perceived efforts to constrain their thinking and goal pursuit, as could be 
the case when groups participate in intentional reflexivity practices. 
 The mixed empirical findings on the effect of reflexivity on innovation process efficiency 
may also suggest that reflexive promotion-oriented teams do not gain the same benefits as 
reflexive prevention-oriented teams. Although they do not measure teams’ regulatory style, 
Hoegl and Parboteeah (2011) found that reflexivity in innovation teams increased new product 
effectiveness but not efficiency (cf. Hammedi et al., 2011). This suggests that reflexivity 
influences a team’s orientation toward achievement and success (the “Achilles heel” of a 
prevention-orientation) more than it influences a team’s orientation toward risk-reduction and 






the benefits of reflexivity may be counter-productive for promotion-oriented teams. Formally 
stated,  
 
 H6a: Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’ 
 decisions that result in positive hits, but negatively influences the number of positive hits 
 resulting from promotion-focused team decisions. 
 
 H6b: Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’ 
 decisions that result in negative hits, but negatively influences the number of negative 
 hits resulting from promotion-focused team decisions. 
 
Moderating Effects of Inventor Expertise 
 In addition to the problem and solution that a new product offers, development teams 
may also assess the characteristics of a product’s inventor to determine if a product concept 
merits additional development investment. Externally-focused firms, such as those that adopt co-
creation strategies in their innovation activities, are expected to have better and more 
sophisticated environmental scanning and information utilization capabilities (Moorman, 1995).  
Therefore, one would expect firms that co-create innovation with customers to attend to 
information about the consumer-inventors themselves in the course of evaluating co-created 
products. 
 When customers submit product ideas to companies, they are often immature, 
incomplete, or under-elaborated (Bayus, 2013). When consumers of end-users have considerable 






expect those ideas to be significantly more refined and well-articulated.  Under-elaborated ideas 
may simply require a higher degree of knowledge processing by development teams to get a 
clear understanding of the form and function of the product, potentially limiting the cognitive 
bandwidth they have to consider higher-level factors, such as marketability and/or profitability. 
Here it is hypothesized that greater customer expertise accentuates the positive effect of 
reflexivity, as teams have more cognitive capacity to consider factors beyond simply the basic 
form and function of the product idea.   Formally stated, 
H7a: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the effect 
of team reflexivity on the likelihood of a team decision that results in a positive hit. 
 
H7b: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the effect 
of team reflexivity on the likelihood of a team decision that results in a negative hit. 
 
 Inventor expertise may also influence prevention-focus and promotion-focused 
teams differently. Because of their proclivity to be motivated by safety (Baron, 2004; 
Levine et al., 2000), prevention-focused teams may view the expertise and experience of 
the inventor as a “safer,” more concrete indication of the positive or negative potential of 
a co-created product idea.  Because of their motivation to pursue success (Baron, 2004; 
Levine et al., 2000), promotion-focus teams may ignore cues from the inventor and focus 
instead on external, but less concrete, indicators of a co-created product’s potential, such 
as marketability and fit with customer needs. Here, it is hypothesized that inventor 






decisions that are positive hits, but negatively when teams have a promotion focus. 
Formally stated,  
H8a: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the 
positive (negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a 
team decision that results in a positive hit. 
 
H8b: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the 
positive (negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a 
team decision that results in a negative hit. 
 
Chapter 2 Summary 
 In this chapter the literature relevant to the co-creation of innovation, regulatory style, 
and reflexivity was reviewed and used to develop the hypotheses tested in this dissertation (see 
Table 5). Specifically, both regulatory style and reflexivity were used to predict how accurate 
development teams are in their assessments of the novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility of 
customer-submitted concepts for new products. These concepts are also used to make predictions 
about how well teams can identify both winners and losers as determined by actual new products 








Table 5. Summary of Hypotheses 
H Hypothesis Wording 
H1a Promotion-oriented teams are more accurate than prevention-oriented teams in their 
assessment of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H1b Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams in their 
assessment of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H1c Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams in their 
assessment of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H2a Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in their assessment 
of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H2b Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in their assessment 
of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H2c Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in their assessment 
of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts. 
 
H3a Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ assessments of 
co-created new product novelty, but has a negative influence on promotion-focused teams’ 
assessment accuracy of novelty. 
 
H3b Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ assessments of 
co-created new product meaningfulness, but has a negative influence on promotion-focused 
teams’ assessment accuracy of meaningfulness. 
 
H3c Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ assessments of 
co-created new product feasibility, but has a negative influence on promotion-focused teams’ 
assessment accuracy of feasibility. 
 
H4a Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of positive hits than promotion-oriented 
teams when assessing the market potential of product concepts created by customers. 
 
H4b Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of negative hits than promotion-oriented 
teams when assessing the market potential of product concepts created by customers. 
 
H5a Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of positive hits, compared to teams with 
low reflexivity. 
 
H5b Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of negative hits, compared to teams with 
low reflexivity. 
 
H6a Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’ decisions that 
result in positive hits, but negatively influences the number of positive hits resulting from 







Table 5. Continued. 
H Hypothesis Wording 
H6b Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’ decisions that 
result in negative hits, but negatively influences the number of negative hits resulting from 
promotion-focused team decisions. 
 
H7a When co-created new product inventor expertise is high, being highly reflexive 
positively influences the number of team decisions that are positive hits. 
 
H7b When co-created new product inventor expertise is high, being highly reflexive positively 
influences the number of team decisions that are negative hits. 
 
H8a The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the positive 
(negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a team 
decision that results in a positive hit. 
 
H8b The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the positive 
(negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a team 



















Overview of Studies 
 Three studies were conducted for this dissertation. The conceptual model on which these 
studies are based is shown in Figure 3. In Study 1, a 2 x 2, between-subjects design was used. 
Two experimental factors were manipulated, collective regulatory focus (prevention/promotion) 
and group reflexivity (high/low). In this experiment, the unit of analysis was the team. Teams 
were asked to rate customer-generated new product concepts using three dimensions of the 
innovativeness of the customer-generated idea – novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility. Their 
decisions were compared against product development experts’ assessments of each product. The 
analysis entailed looking for significant differences between groups from each condition in the 
degree to which they differed from expert evaluations of novelty, meaningfulness, and 
feasibility. 
 







 The design for Study 2 was a 2 x 2 between subjects design, with teams as the unit of 
analysis. As in Study 1, the model consisted of two two-level factors: collective regulatory style 
(prevention and promotion) and group reflexivity (high and low). In Study 2, teams were asked 
to evaluate actual sales performance of the products they saw, and the dependent variable was 
based on how well their choices lined up with the actual market performance of the product ideas 
they reviewed.  
 Finally, Study 3 was a virtual ethnography which entailed conducting a content analysis 
using web video footage from a firm’s product evaluation and selection meetings. These 
meetings are held to decide which customer-generated product concepts should be developed. 
During the meetings, working professionals are engaged in evaluating and selecting consumer-
generated new product concepts to be taken into further development and commercialization. 
Regulatory style and reflexivity are collected based on quantifying several qualitative variables 
from the video footage. By examining the cognitive processes of regulatory style and reflexivity 
among working professionals, Study 3 is designed to apply the experimental work from Studies 
1 and 2 into an actual, dynamic decision environment and offer external validity to the studies 
conducted in the laboratory. Table 6 shows an overview of Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
 As with any program of research, these studies have both strengths and weaknesses in 
measurement, generalizability, and realism (McGrath, 1981).This sequence of studies was 
designed to address this issue so that the empirical results provide a more holistic view of the 






Table 6. Overview of Studies 
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experiment, 














 Controlled setting 
for testing causal 
relationships 
 




 Student sample 
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Study 1 is designed to 
test the main and 
interactive effects of 
regulatory style and 




Study 2 H4, H5, H6 Lab 
experiment, 







 Positive Hits 
 
 Negative Hits 
 Controlled setting 
for testing causal 
relationships 
 
















 Student sample 
 
 Lab experiment 
lacks the external 
validity of a field 
study 
Study 2 replicates and 
extends Study 1 by 
comparing team 








Table 6. Continued. 




























 Positive Hits 
 
 Negative Hits 
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experimental 


















All decisions are 
within a single firm 
 
Study 3 tests the 
influence of regulatory 
focus and reflexivity 
on positive and 
negative hits in a field 
setting with working 
professionals. The 
study also examines 
how the expertise of 
the inventor influences 
the effects of 
regulatory focus and 







 Study 1 provided a tightly-controlled environment in which to test the proposed causal 
relationships, but used a dependent variable that is based on subjective expert ratings rather than 
objective market performance data. 
 Study 2 also provided controlled experimental conditions, but used real-world 
performance data.  Both of these studies, while affording the opportunity to test causal 
relationships in a tightly controlled environment, may lack the degree of external validity of an 
empirical investigation using working professionals. Study 3 addresses this issue by utilizing a 
sample of professional new product managers. 
 In both Study 1 and Study 2, student teams of undergraduate business students were used. 
The theory tested in the experimental studies deals with an underlying psychological process, 
which makes a student sample a more appropriate practice than in some other areas of research. 
As Bono and McNamara (2011) argue in their Academy of Management Journal editor’s 
commentary, “Important questions – especially those that deal with psychological processes – 
can often be answered equally well with university students or organizational employees” (p. 
658). In this research, the primary intent of the experimental studies is to determine if the 
underlying psychological processes associated with regulatory style and reflexivity cause groups 
to be more skillful at recognizing “good” and bad” opportunities, and whether or not there are 
significant differences between the groups in these conditions.  
 Finally, there is a precedent in the innovation literature of using student subjects, 
especially when multiple studies are used that include both students and professionals. For 
example, Spanjol et al. (2011) used a new product simulation with marketing student teams to 
test the effects of a prevention or promotion orientation on speed to market, innovativeness, and 






included both student designers and working design professionals to test the influence of 
analogical thinking styles on new product innovativeness.  Some innovation studies have also 
looked specifically at differences in novices (usually students) and working professionals and 
found novices to by on par with, or better, than professionals in developing ideas for new 
products (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Although these studies have not 
explicitly compared professionals with novices in the evaluation and selection process, there is 
no theoretical reason to believe that differences between professionals and novices would change 
the valence (i.e., flip the sign) of the relationship between regulatory style or reflexivity and 
selection accuracy.  
 
Study 1 and 2 Pretest 
 Prior to conducting the experiments described here for Study 1 and Study 2, the primary 
researcher conducted a pretest in the lab to perform manipulation and confounding checks of the 
two main constructs of interest, check adapted and adopted scale alpha reliabilities for the post-
experiment survey to assess if they fall in an appropriate range (α ≥.70), and assess issues of 
respondent fatigue. The pretest experiment consisted of a 2 (prevention/promotion) x 2 (high/low 
reflexivity) model, as described in the discussion below of Study 1 and Study 2. The results of 
the pretest, including the supporting statistics for manipulation and confound checks, are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Study 1 
 A 2 (prevention/promotion) x 2 (high/low reflexivity) between subjects model was 






assigned to groups of two individuals and asked to perform two exercises in which they 
imagined themselves to be a group of professional product managers tasked with reviewing a list 
of customer ideas for new products. In the first task, a practice exercise, teams viewed several 
design concepts and ranked them in the order they thought the designs would be most popular 
with customers. In the second task, teams were asked to rate each product on three dimensions of 
innovativeness – novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility.  The dependent variable was the 
degree to which team ratings of novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility in the second task match 
those of new product development experts. The experiment was conducted online. 
 
Experimental Manipulations 
 After both members of each team reviewed an informed consent statement and agreed to 
continue, teams were placed into one of four experimental conditions: Promotion-Focus/High 
Reflexivity, Promotion-Focus/Low Reflexivity, Prevention-Focus/High Reflexivity, and 
Prevention-Focus/Low Reflexivity. Teams were first randomly primed for a prevention or 
promotion group regulatory focus then randomly given a second prime for high or low team 
reflexivity. The wording of the experimental manipulations for regulatory focus is shown in 
Table 7 and the wording for the reflexivity manipulations is shown Table 8. Regulatory focus 
was primed in two ways. Teams were first told that they worked for a company that rewarded 
risk-taking and used an “eager strategy” (Spanjol et al., 2011) in new product development, or 
that their firm punished risk-taking and used a “vigilant strategy” (Spanjol et al., 2011) in new 
product development. The compensation for participating in the study was then framed in a way 
to prime a promotion or prevention focus in group decision making. Teams in the prevention 






decision. Teams in the promotion group started with $5, but could earn money (i.e., be rewarded) 
each time they made a good decision. 
  
Practice Scenario  
 As part of the experimental procedure for Study 1 and Study 2, a short practice task was 
devised to familiarize teams with evaluating co-created product concepts, and to give them to 
opportunity to work together in order to develop a working rapport for the main experience 
without gaining or losing study compensation. Teams were primed to be prevention- or 
promotion focused and to practice high or low reflexivity prior to completing the practice 
exercise.  
 In the practice task, shown in Table 9, groups were shown images and descriptions of 
user-submitted graphics to a real-world online t-shirt company that crowdsources its t-shirt 
designs to customers. Blind to the actual market results, groups were asked to rank order five t-
shirt designs in terms of which one they thought would receive the highest rating on the online 
design innovation portal at Threadless.com. Once each team had made their ranking decisions, 
they were shown the actual results based on online voting at Threadless.com. This task was 
designed to familiarize team members with one another, and to promote a product/design 
evaluation team mindset. 
 
Study 1 Main Experimental Procedure 
 For the main experimental task, teams were given a reminder of their regulatory focus 
and reflexivity primes, then told that they would need to rate 5 products on a variety of 






Each team was then shown 5 new product concepts submitted by customers of their fictitious 
company and asked to rate each one on several dimensions that corresponded with novelty, 
meaningfulness, and feasibility. The items used in team ratings are shown in Appendix A. Each 
of the five product concepts was taken from a pool of user-submitted innovation concepts that 
appeared on a real firm’s online innovation portal. 
 The firm manufactures consumer-submitted new product concepts across several 
consumer product categories including electronics, health and fitness, home and garden, kitchen, 
and travel and adventure. In this experiment, each product concept included an illustration of the 
proposed new product, as well as a description of the “problem” and the “solution” the product is 
designed to address. The order in which the five products appeared was randomized to avoid 
ordering effects in team decision-making. The product images and descriptions used are shown 
in Appendix B.  
 Prior to conducting the survey, the principal researcher recruited a panel of 10 new 
product development experts to rate each idea on the dimensions of novelty, meaningfulness, and 
feasibility, following a similar procedure used by Poetz & Schreier (2012). Their aggregate 
scores were used to establish criteria against which to judge team product selections. Similar 
variations of these dependent variables have been used in previous literature regarding both team 
innovativeness (Amabile et al., 2005; Franke et al., 2006; Kristensson et al., 2004; Moreau and 
Dahl, 2005) and comparing user-generated new product ideas with those of professional product 
developers (Poetz and Schreier 2012). The results of the statistical analysis used to determine 







Table 7. Group Regulatory Focus Experimental Manipulations 
Manipulation Wording 
Prevention Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a 
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new 
product ideas directly from customers. 
  
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information 
about your firm: 
 Your company is very vigilant about finding and commercializing new 
ideas, does not like to take risks, and always tries to go with the “safe 
bet” in new product endeavors.  
 People in your firm who have made poor decisions in the past have 
been fired or demoted.  
 In your decision process, you should adopt a vigilant evaluation 
approach, in line with how your company is run. 
 You will be asked to make a series of evaluations and choices about 
new product concepts. Your starting compensation for participating in 
this exercise is $10.  
  
However, for each product you inaccurately evaluate (based on the real market 
performance of these products and/or expert evaluations of each product), you 
will be penalized 50 cents, up to a maximum loss of $5 per person. Your 




Promotion Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a 
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new 
product ideas directly from customers. 
  
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information 
about your firm:  
 Your company is very eager to find and commercialize new ideas, likes to take 
risks, and always tries to be on the “cutting edge” in new product endeavors.  
 People in your firm who have taken risks with new product innovations 
in the past, have been given promotions and/or raises. 
 In your decision process, you should adopt an eager evaluation 
approach, in line with how your company is run.    
 
You will be asked to make a series of evaluations of new product concepts. 
Your starting compensation for participating in this exercise is $5. However, for 
each product you accurately evaluate (based on the real market performance of 
these products and/or expert evaluations), you will earn a 50 cent reward, up to 
a maximum gain of $5 extra per person.   









Table 8. Group Reflexivity Manipulations 
Manipulation Wording 
High Reflexivity As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series of new 
product concepts.  
  
As you go through each product concept, you should spend a good amount of 
time thinking about and discussing each product, making sure you come to a 
solid team consensus before submitting your answer. 
  
Some of the things you might discuss as a group include: 
  
1. Would this product be likely to actually sell? 
 
2. Who is the target market for this product? 
 
3. Would this product be likely to work as advertised? 
 
4. Do either of us have knowledge, experience or expertise with this type 
of product that might help us make a better decision? 
 
5. Does something similar to this product already exist on the market? 
  
 
Low Reflexivity As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series of new 
product concepts.  
  
As you go through each product concept, you should engage in as little 
discussion as possible about each product.  Go with your first instinct and select 
the first answer that comes to your mind. If you don't immediately agree, try to 
arrive at an answer with very minimal discussion, appointing a "decider" for 



















to Study 1 
 
This task is a practice exercise designed to help orient you to evaluating new 
product and design concepts. Your responses in this task will not count 
toward your study compensation. 
 
In this exercise you need to review the design concepts below, taken from a 
real online t-shirt company. Please rank them (1 is the best, 5 is the worst) by 
dragging them in the order you think will be popular with the firm’s 
customers, who are primarily students in the U.S., ages 18-25. 
 
As you complete the task, try to rank the designs in line with your company’s 
approach to new product development. 
 
    
 
 





You have been asked to review concepts for new products submitted by your 
customers to determine which ideas have the most potential to be profitable new 
products for your consumer goods firm. 
 
On the next several screens, your team will see 5 concepts for new products and 
asked to rate each one on several dimensions. 
 
For each product concept, you will see a visual mock-up, along with a brief 
description of the “problem” the product was designed to address and the 
“solution” it offers to that problem. 
 
As you complete this task, try to make decisions in line with your company’s 










 After completing the main exercise for Study 1, groups continued on to a second 
experiment explained below in the description of Study 2. Once the studies were complete, each 
team was asked to complete several questions to check the experimental manipulations, and to 
gather data used as control variables. 
 After completing the group portion of the survey, each group member was asked to 
individually respond to several questions related to demographics, individual chronic regulatory 
style, and positive/negative affect. Individual responses on these measures were averaged (Chan, 
1998) to create an aggregate individual regulatory focus and an affect control variable for each 
team. The teams’ scores were calculated and cash payment was rendered based on their scores 
across Study 1 and Study 2. 
 
Statistical Analysis for Study 1 
 Analysis of the relationships between the independent variables (regulatory style and 
reflexivity) and the dependent variables (skill in assessing novelty, meaningfulness, and 
feasibility) for Study 1 was conducted by first conducting a profile deviation analysis 
(Venkatraman, 1990; Vorhies and Morgan, 2005) using group deviations from the scores of 
novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility rated by the expert evaluators. Team’s assessments were 
compared against expert assessments on each of the products used in the analysis, and a 
Euclidean distance score was assigned for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility. An analysis 
of covariance (ANCOVA) was then be used to determine if there are significant differences 
between groups in each condition based on how far they deviated from expert ratings on each 
dimension. The covariates used included the individuals’ individual regulatory focus scores 






members, how well teams knew one another prior to completing the experiment together, and 




 To be successful, professional new product development teams need to have the ability to 
quickly recognize promising (e.g., ideas that create value for customers and the firm) and non-
promising (i.e., ideas that don’t create value for customers and/or the firm) ideas from customers 
when they see them (Baron, 2004). Based on how regulatory focus has been conceptualized, it 
could be argued that promotion-oriented teams may have higher positive ‘hit’ rates (i.e., 
developing customer ideas for new products that are ultimately successful) because they are 
more risk-tolerant and take more products to market, thus increasing their chances of having at 
least some successful new products. This also implies however, that they may also have higher 
rates of false positive “misses” or developing customer-generated product ideas that are 
ultimately unsuccessful in the marketplace.  
 Conversely, regulatory focus theory also supports the argument that prevention-oriented 
teams have higher negative ‘hit’ rates (i.e., stopping development of customer ideas for new 
products that would have ultimately failed in the market) because they are more risk-averse and 
simply take fewer products to market, overall. This also implies, however, that they may have 
higher rates of false negative misses, or killing customer-generated product ideas that would 
have been successful in the market, had they been fully commercialized. 
 Study 2 addresses these issues by asking teams to make decisions about which customer-






marketplace. By doing so, it is possible to examine the effects of regulatory style and reflexivity 
on a team’s ability to both identify promising ideas from customers and to filter out ideas that 
don’t have strong profit potential. 
 Study 2 extends Study 1 by examining how well teams in the four experimental 
conditions make decisions that match up with actual market performance of the ideas for new 
products they choose, rather than just their novelty, meaningfulness, or feasibility. Study 2 is 
based on a 2 (promotion/prevention) x 2 (high/low reflexivity) between subjects design. The two 
dichotomous dependent variables used are the number of positive hits and number of negative 
hits. In this study, teams were asked to view several sets of three product ideas and rank the ideas 
in each set from best-selling (1) to worst-selling (3). Their choices were then compared to real 
sales data. Teams that correctly chose the best-seller for each set scored a positive hit and team 
that correctly chose the worst-seller for each set scored a negative hit. The dependent variables 
used were the number of positive hits and negative hits summed across each of the product sets. 
  
Study 2 Procedure 
 This experiment was conducted with the same teams as Study 1, using the same 
experimental manipulations as in Study 1 (see Tables 7 and 8 for the wording of the 
manipulations). Once teams had finished the main experimental task in Study 1, they were given 
a reminder to reinforce their priming for regulatory focus and reflexivity, then asked to continue 
on to Study 2.  Group members were blind to the actual market performance of each product 
presented in the experimental product sets they were asked to rank order and the product sets 
were presented in a random order to avoid any ordering effects. The instructions given for Study 






product concept based on the actual performance (units sold) of the product in its first six months 
on the market. Positive hits and negative hits were based on whether or not teams correctly 
ranked the “best-selling” or “worst-selling” products in each idea set. 
 
Table 11. Main Experimental Scenario for Study 2 
Study Wording  
Study 2  
Main Experiment 
In this activity, you will see 4 sets of 3 product concepts that were created 
by end-user customers. For each set, carefully read and evaluate each 
concept, then drag and drop them to rank them in the order which you think 
will be the best-selling (1 = best-selling product, 3 = worst-selling 
product). 
 
As you complete this task, try to make decisions in line with your 
company’s approach to new product development. 
 
  
 Images and descriptions of the products in each idea set are shown in Appendix C. The 
total number of positive hits and negative hits across the choice sets was tallied for each team by 
the experimenter and used as the dependent variables. 
 Once Study 2 was complete, teams responded to several manipulation check questions, as 
well as individual demographic regulatory focus and positive negative affect questions, as 
described above in the discussion of the method for Study 1.  
 
Statistical Analysis for Study 2 
 Since the primary dependent variables in Study 2 are based on actual performance data, 
analysis of Study 2 was conducted using the counts of positive hits and negative hits in two 
separate statistical models. An ANCOVA was used to determine if significant differences exist 
between the groups in each condition for the number of positive hits and the number of negative 






Study 1, the same procedure used in Study 1 was utilized, comparing groups’ deviation from 
expert ratings of novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility, and looking for significant differences 
across conditions. 
 
Study 1 and 2 Scale Reliability 
 Since several of the scales used in Study 1 and Study 2 are adapted from slightly different 
marketing and innovation contexts and entail varying degrees of rewording, a pretest was 
conducted to check that each scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .7 or greater. Based on standard 
scale purification procedures (Churchill Jr, 1979; Hinkin, 1995), items were dropped and/or 
reworded and the scale re-administered in a series of pretests until alpha reliabilities had reached 
or exceeded the .7 threshold. The scale items, including manipulation checks, are shown in 
Appendix A. The statistical properties of the measures used, including statistical results from 
each pretest are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Study 3 
 Study 3 entailed conducting a virtual ethnography using video footage. The footage was 
taken from a firm’s development meetings in which they evaluate and select which ideas 
submitted by customers should be taken into development and commercialization for their 
online, direct-to-consumer retail channel. The video footage used in this analysis included 
content from 27 hours of evaluation and selection meetings in which 186 concepts were 
evaluated. Of those evaluated, 85 resulted in a “yes” development decision. The discussion time 






minutes. The discussion for each product was coded by the principal researcher and an 
independent coder, blind to the purpose of the study. 
 The firm used in this study is designed around a business model in which they only 
manufacture products submitted to the company through their user community. Therefore, very 
accurate evaluation and selection of customers’ new product concepts is a key part of their 
success or failure. The company holds public evaluation and selection meetings on a weekly 
basis to choose which products submitted to their online user community should be taken into 
full development and publicly broadcasts these meetings online. This company is ideal because 
the products they manufacture come exclusively from their user community, and the types of 
products submitted span a variety of product categories (e.g., electronics, health and fitness, 
home and garden, kitchen, and travel and adventure). This firm is also a small company so the 
development process and personnel involved are not likely to vary as much as they would in a 
large company with multiple SBUs, resulting in less noise due to variance in these factors. In 
each meeting, a top company executive, usually the CEO, moderated a discussion among a panel 
of firm employees from sales, marketing, design, IT, operations, engineering, accounting, and 
finance, as well as guest panelists who are subject matter experts. In the audience during this 
meeting were firm employees and members of the development community, who were allowed 
to ask questions and to participate in the final vote after each new product concept was 
discussed. In addition, each product under consideration was assigned an “innovation 
ambassador” who presented a brief overview of the product and its features and benefits, and 
acted as an advocate on behalf of the inventor. Innovation ambassadors often did extensive 
background investigation into the market potential for the products which they advocated. Once 






those in attendance gave a product a “yes” vote, or if the group decided to explore an idea 
further, the product went into the firm’s development and commercialization process. If less than 
half of the participants gave a product a “yes” vote, the product was dropped from further 
consideration.  
 Being accepted in one of these meetings doesn’t ensure a product will ultimately go to 
market, but it does mean that the firm will commit time and financial resources to developing the 
product. As such, they should be highly motivated to be accurate in their selections. This is an 
ideal setting to further test the conceptual model for this research for several reasons. First, it 
represents a variety of functional areas that are likely to be involved in any firm’s development 
teams. Second, from a knowledge diversity perspective, this represents a highly relevant setting 
for investigating development team reflexive practices in co-creation. Because of the functional 
diversity involved in these meetings, as well as individuals who are assigned to collect additional 
data and advocate on behalf of product inventors, the knowledge base is diverse enough that 
teams should benefit from being reflexive. This represents a sufficiently complex process to 
suggest that reflexivity will be beneficial to the quality of their team decisions (Schippers, West, 
& Dawson, 2012). 
 
Study 3 Dependent Variables 
 At the time of this dissertation’s writing, there was not any sales data available for any of 
the products discussed in the video footage, thus an alternative dependent variable was used to 
determine how successful the firm’s choices were for each product. To analyze the accuracy of 
group choices, the entire set of 186 products reviewed was rated by a consumer panel on their 






presented with a description of five of the products discussed in the video footage, and asked to 
rate each concept on a scale of 1 to 7 using the purchase intentions scale created by (Berens, 
Riel, & Bruggen, 2005), shown in Appendix A. To prevent fatigue, each respondent was only 
asked to rate a 5-product subset of the 186 product concepts, and the products were randomly 
and equally displayed to the consumer raters.  
 Using the willingness to consider purchase ratings from a panel of 1,870 respondents, 
positive and negative hits were constructed. Positive hits were measured as a categorical 
variable. If a firm chose to develop a product, and the product was rated in the 51st percentile or 
higher by a consumer panel on a willingness to consider purchase instrument, the value was 
coded as 1, otherwise 0. Negative hits were also measured as a categorical variable. If a firm 
chose not to develop a product, and the product was rated in the 49th percentile or lower by a 
consumer panel on a willingness to consider purchase instrument, the value was coded as 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
Study 3 Independent Variables 
 The IVs in this study include team regulatory style, team reflexivity, and inventor 
expertise. Table 12 shows how these variables were measured. Reflexivity was measured by 
coding the specific discussion topics in the 186 product discussions, and the variable was 
calculated as the number of total comments made divided by the unique topics discussed. For 
example, if three people made a comment about whether a product would actually sell, their 
comments represent three total comments, but only one unique topic. Measured in this way, both 
the depth and the breadth of knowledge processing are captured, which fits with the conceptual 






 Table 12. Operationalization of Main IVs and DVs in Study 3 
Variables Operationalization 
Team Characteristics  
Team Regulatory Style Calculated as a continuous variable by 
dividing the number of promotion-focused 
comments by the number of prevention-
focused comments. Higher values indicate a 








Team Reflexivity Calculated as a continuous variable by 
dividing the total number of comment types 
(depth of discussion) by the number of 
unique comment types (breadth of 
discussion). 
 
Consumer Characteristics  
Inventor Expertise Taken directly from the website screenshots 
in the video footage, this variable is the 
number of followers the inventor of each 
product had at the time of product 
evaluation. 
 





Measured as a categorical variable. If a firm 
chose to develop a product, and the product 
was rated in the 51
st
 percentile or higher by 
a consumer panel on a willingness to 
consider purchase instrument, the value is 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
Negative Hits Measured as a categorical variable. If a firm 
chose not to develop a product, and the 
product was rated in the 49th percentile or 
lower by a consumer panel on a willingness 
to consider purchase instrument, the value is 







 Regulatory style was measured as a continuous variable considering whether the “voice 
of promotion” or “voice of prevention” was more dominant in the discussion of each product. 
Two raters sorted each comment topic category from the coded comments into prevention-
focused topics, promotion-focused topics, or neutral topics. To create the continuous variable, 
the ratio of promotion comments to prevention comments was calculated, with higher values 
representing a promotion focus and lower values a prevention focus. 
 Since end users often submit ideas that are unrefined, ambiguous, or under-elaborated 
(Bayus, 2013), inventor expertise was measured and included as a variable in the analysis. 
Inventors who are experts would be expected to submit ideas that are more clearly articulated, 
making them easier to evaluate. Inventor expertise was measured based on information pulled 
from the firm’s website for each inventor at the time his or her product was evaluated, and was 
measured as the total number of followers an inventor had. 
 
Study 3 Control Variables 
 Several control variables were used in this study. First, the length of time that each 
product was discussed, in seconds, was recorded and used as a control. Second, since past 
research has found hedonic products are often more difficult to judge on quality and functionality 
(Huang, Lurie, & Mitra, 2009) the product type (hedonic or utilitarian) was measured by creating 
a categorical product type variable based on the evaluations of 5 independent judges who viewed 
each product and rated them on a hedonic/utilitarian semantic differential scale. The items for 
this scale are shown in Appendix A and the statistical results of the judges’ evaluations are 
discussed in the next chapter. Third, to account for any evaluation effects resulting from group 






evaluated was recorded. Finally, past research has supported the idea that interacting with ideas 
outside of one’s own might make an inventor better able to develop new product ideas (Bayus, 
2013), so this was controlled for in the current dataset. The community connection of each 
inventor was included as a control and was measured as the number of other inventor’s products 
that each product inventor had interacted with in the online community (e.g., posting comments, 
suggestions, etc.). This variable was based on data available in each inventor’s profile during the 
video discussions. 
 
Statistical Analysis for Study 3 
 Since Study 3 uses binary categorical variables as dependent variables, analysis was 
conducted using binomial logistic regression. Similar studies investigating idea selection 
processes have used a logit model with a binary dependent variable (idea accepted/idea not 
accepted (Bayus, 2013). A concern with using discriminant functions and logistic regression 
equations is that the model may over fit to the data, resulting in model fit that is unstable (Hair, 
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). To address this concern, a training and holdout sample were 
used to validate the results. There are no strict criteria in the literature for what percentage of 
observations should be held out to create a holdout sample. Since there were relatively few 
observations in the data, an 80%/20% split was used. Eighty percent of the observations were 
randomly chosen as a training sample, then the parameter estimates were applied to the 
remaining 20% of the observations which had been left out to validate the training sample. This 
80/20 split is consistent with other logistic regression analyses reported in the marketing strategy 
and strategic management literature (e.g., Mittal, Kamakura, & Govind, 2004; Swamidass, Nair, 






Overview of Chapter 3 
 This chapter presented a review of methodology and analysis for the two experiments and 
the virtual ethnography that were conducted in this dissertation research. Study 1 consists of a 2 
x 2 between subjects lab experiment using college student teams as subjects. Study 2 consists of 
a 2 x 2 between-subjects model that uses positive hits and negative hits, based on actual product 
performance data, as the dependent variable. Finally, Study 3 adds a moderator related to the 
expertise of the inventor of each idea. Study 3 also represents a field investigation of the 







CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS  
Overview of Studies 
 In this chapter, the data collection procedures and results from each of the three studies 
are discussed. Studies 1 and 2 were conducted consecutively using the same sample, and the 
same experimental manipulations (i.e., the teams were primed in one of the four conditions, then 
asked to complete two studies). The combined pretest for Study 1 and Study 2 is presented, 
followed by a discussion of the analysis and results for each study individually. After each study, 
a short summary of the findings is presented before discussing the subsequent study, and the 
findings from all three studies are presented at the end of the chapter. 
 
Study 1 
 Study 1 was a 2 x 2 between subjects design with two two-level factors, Group 
Reflexivity (high/low) and Group Regulatory Focus (prevention/promotion). The unit of analysis 
was the team decision. Teams were primed to exhibit a prevention or promotion decision-making 
orientation and to exhibit high or low reflexivity in their information processing before making a 
team decision. They were presented with five co-created new product concepts and asked to rate 
them on the dimensions on novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility.  Their responses were 
compared against the ratings of experts on the same dimensions for each product. The dependent 
variables were the distance that each team scored from the experts across all of the products on 







Pretesting the Manipulated Variables for Study 1 and Study 2 
 The products that teams were asked to rate in Study 1 were chosen from among several 
hundred products submitted to the ideation portal of Quirky, a firm that manufactures and sells 
products invented by end-users. Five different products were selected based on the fact that they 
were trending as favorable on the ideation portal – a chicken drumstick holder, a body motion 
powered mobile device charger, a video-enabled toy submarine, an under-chair drawer 
attachment, and a smoke detector that silenced the low battery chirp at night or in the absence of 
light. Trending products were chosen to help ensure that each product concept was at least 
moderately challenging to evaluate, and so that evaluation was not easy enough that there were 
no differences in the accuracy of each experimental condition. Prior to conducting a pretest, the 
survey was administered to three pairs of individuals who were blind to the hypotheses being 
tested to get feedback on the logical flow of the experimental exercises, the clarity of the 
directions in the manipulations and exercises and the total time required to complete the studies. 
 The survey was then pretested with a sample of 94 undergraduate and graduate business 
students from marketing and supply chain management courses. The initial manipulation checks 
for the high/low reflexivity condition and the prevention/promotion group regulatory focus 
conditions was not significant. The composite reflexivity manipulation check score of high 
reflexivity condition was not significantly different than the composite score of the low 
reflexivity condition and the composite regulatory focus score for the promotion group was not 
significantly different from the composite score of the prevention group. As a result, the wording 
of the manipulations was modified and the scales were adapted to better fit the context of the lab 
experiment. Specifically, the manipulation for regulatory focus was altered to add a pay for 






focus conducted by (Florack & Hartmann, 2007). For reflexivity, the groups were given specific 
questions to discuss pertaining to the product selection tasks which included thinking about 
target markets, product functionality and market/sales potential.  
 Based on the changes implemented to the experimental survey instrument after Pretest 1, 
a second pretest was administered to check the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations 
and the reliability of the scales used in the manipulation check. A sample of 92 teams of 
undergraduate students in a marketing and supply chain course were used. For the second pretest, 
both of the scales used in the manipulation check showed levels of alpha reliability above the .70 
guideline suggested by Nunnally (1978). The Cronbach’s alpha for the Group Regulatory Focus 
scale in the pretest was .88, and the Cronbach’s alpha for the Reflexivity scale in the pretest was 
.78. The final measures used are shown in Appendix A and discussed later in this chapter. 
 The manipulation check for the second round of pretest data showed that the high and 
low reflexivity conditions differed significantly on the reflexivity manipulation check (t(90) = 
5.24, p < .001). The manipulation check for the prevention and promotion Group Regulatory 
Focus groups also differed significantly form one another on the manipulation check measure of 
regulatory focus (t(90) = 5.29, p < .001). The final wording of the experimental manipulations 
for both regulatory focus and reflexivity are shown in Tables 13 and 14. 
 
Measurement Reliability for Study 1 and Study Main Exercises 
 Based on the main experiment, the scale items for each measured construct were 
examined to ensure that they met the .70 threshold for alpha reliability suggested by Nunnally 
(1978). The Cronbach’s alpha of each measure used is shown in Table 15 and the individual 






Table 13. Group Regulatory Focus Experimental Manipulations 
Manipulation Wording 
Prevention Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a 
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new 
product ideas directly from customers. 
  
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information 
about your firm: 
 Your company is very vigilant about finding and commercializing new 
ideas, does not like to take risks, and always tries to go with the “safe 
bet” in new product endeavors.  
 People in your firm who have made poor decisions in the past have 
been fired or demoted.  
 In your decision process, you should adopt a vigilant evaluation 
approach, in line with how your company is run. 
 You will be asked to make a series of evaluations and choices about 
new product concepts. Your starting compensation for participating in 
this exercise is $10.  
  
However, for each product you inaccurately evaluate (based on the real market 
performance of these products and/or expert evaluations of each product), you 
will be penalized 50 cents, up to a maximum loss of $5 per person. Your 






Promotion Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a 
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new 
product ideas directly from customers. 
  
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information 
about your firm:  
 Your company is very eager to find and commercialize new ideas, likes to take 
risks, and always tries to be on the “cutting edge” in new product endeavors.  
 People in your firm who have taken risks with new product innovations 
in the past, have been given promotions and/or raises. 
 In your decision process, you should adopt an eager evaluation 
approach, in line with how your company is run.    
 
You will be asked to make a series of evaluations of new product concepts. 
Your starting compensation for participating in this exercise is $5. However, for 
each product you accurately evaluate (based on the real market performance of 
these products and/or expert evaluations), you will earn a 50 cent reward, up to 
a maximum gain of $5 extra per person.   






Table 14. Group Reflexivity Manipulations 
 
Manipulation Wording 
High Reflexivity As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series 
of new product concepts. As you go through each product concept, you 
should spend a good amount of time thinking about and discussing each 
product, making sure you come to a solid team consensus before 
submitting your answer. 
  
Some of the things you might discuss as a group include: 
  
1. Would this product be likely to actually sell? 
2. Who is the target market for this product? 
3. Would this product be likely to work as advertised? 
4. Do either of us have knowledge, experience or expertise with this 
type of product that might help us make a better decision? 




Low Reflexivity  
As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series 
of new product concepts.  
  
As you go through each product concept, you should engage in as little 
discussion as possible about each product.  Go with your first instinct and 
select the first answer that comes to your mind.  
 
If you don't immediately agree, try to arrive at an answer with very 





 Group regulatory focus was measured using an adapted three-item semantic differential 
scale from (Van Stekelenburg, 2006), and showed an alpha reliability of .75. Group reflexivity 
was measured using a 7-point Likert scale adapted from Schippers et al., 2007, and showed an 
alpha reliability of .75. The wording of the items, shown in Appendix A, was modified to reflect 






 Product novelty, used in Study 1, was measured using a 4-item scale from (Im and 
Workman, 2004) and the alpha reliability was calculated separately for each of the four products 
used. For each of the four products, the alpha reliability is above .70 (.78, .82, .84, and .73, 
respectively). 
Table 15. Measure Reliability for Study 1 and Study 2 
 
Variable Variable Type α 
Group Reflexivity Manipulation Check  .75 
Group Regulatory Focus Manipulation Check .75 
   
Feasibility Used to calculate distance score DV  
Drumstick Holder  .68 
Video-Enabled Submarine  .83 
Under-Chair Drawer  .80 
Smoke Detector  .82 
Novelty Used to calculate distance score DV  
Drumstick Holder  .78 
Video-Enabled Submarine  .82 
Under-Chair Drawer  .84 
Smoke Detector  .73 
Meaningfulness Used to calculate distance score DV  
Drumstick Holder  .95 
Video-Enabled Submarine  .90 
Under-Chair Drawer  .94 
Smoke Detector  .95 
   
Individual Regulatory Focus Control Variable .77 
Individual Affect Control Variable .77 
 
 Product meaningfulness, used in Study 1, was measured using a 4-item scale from (Im & 
Workman Jr, 2004) and the alpha reliability was calculated separately for each of the four 
products used in the Study 1 experiment. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was above .90 for 
all four of the products used in the main experiment (drumstick holder α = .95, submarine α = 






 Product feasibility, used in Study 1 was measured using a 3-item scale, created for this 
study and based on a single-item measure used by Poetz and Schreier (2012) and Magnussen et 
al. (2003). First, the existing literature in which feasibility (also called realizability) had been 
used in a similar manner (i.e., Poetz & Schreier, 2012; Magnussen et al., 2003) was reviewed and 
five items were generated (Table 16). The five items were then used in the first pretest with a 
sample of 94 teams of two undergraduate students. Based on the first pretest, items 4 and 5 were 
dropped due to very low factor loadings in a factor analysis. The resulting 3-item scale had 
Cronbach’s alphas of between .76 and .90 across the original five products used in the Study 1 
pretest. The refined 3-item scale was then used in the second pretest with a sample of 92 teams 
of two undergraduate students. Based on the second pretest, the Cronbach’s alphas of the 
feasibility measure were .65 for the drumstick holder, .79 for the body charger, .76 for the 
submarine, .78 for the drawer, and .82 for the smoke detector. The scale was then used in the 
main experiment, with the alpha reliabilities reported in Table 15. For three of the four products, 
the Cronbach’s alphas of the feasibility measure were above .70 (submarine, .83; under-chair 
drawer .80; and smoke detector, .82). The drumstick holder showed a reliability for the 
feasibility measures lower than .7, but still within a marginally acceptable range (.68). 
 
Table 16. New Product Concept Feasibility Items 
 
Items for Feasibility Scale 
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product concept… 
1. would be feasible for a company to make 
2. could be developed without difficulty 
3. would be practical to manufacture 
4. would be a complex undertaking to commercialize (R)** 
5. would be a challenge to design for mass production (R)** 







 In addition to these variables, two control variables were included for each team in Study 
1 and Study 2 – individual regulatory focus of team members and individual positive affect of 
team members. Spanjol et al. (2001) found that the chronic regulatory focus of each individual in 
an innovation team influenced their overall decision-making quality. To compute this variable, 
both team members completed a 5-item, 7-point instrument measuring regulatory focus (Haws, 
Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010) and their responses were then averaged to create a single measure. 
Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) found that positive affect positively influences individuals’ 
creativity and problem-solving ability. Therefore, the individual positive affect of each group’s 
team members was measured separately using a 10-item, 7-point scale developed by Watson, 
Clark, and Tellegen (1988).  The responses of each individual were then averaged to create a 
measure of the level of positive affect of the individuals in each team. 
 
Expert Raters 
 To develop baseline scores for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility across the set of 
products used in Study 1, a panel of 10 new product development experts were recruited to 
complete the same rating exercise for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility as the subjects in 
Study 1 (see measures in Appendix A for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility), but without 
the experimental manipulations. To help ensure that the raters had the requisite market 
knowledge to assess the products used in the experiments, the new product development experts 
used in this study were recruited based on their having experience in developing consumer 
goods. All of the raters indicated they had the majority of their professional experience 
developing products in either consumer electronics, consumer packaged goods, or consumer 






sample used had an average of 17.6 years of professional experience in new product 
development. The average time spent in various new product development roles is as follows: 
8.5% in industrial design, 25.5% in engineering, 7.5% in marketing, 5% in sales, 10% in supply 
chain management, 21% in project management, 11% in operations and manufacturing, and 
11.5% in other NPD roles (Director of R&D, prototyping, research, etc.).  
 
Table 17. Expert Rater Professional Experience 
Avg. Time (%) in Various NPD Roles Percent 
New Product Industrial Design 8.5% 
New Product Engineering 25.5% 
New Product Marketing 7.5% 
New Product Sales 5.0% 
New Product Supply Chain Management 10.0% 
NPD Project Management 21.0% 
NPD Operations/Manufacturing 11.0% 




Expert Rater Reliability 
 To assess the level of agreement among the expert raters, the Rwg(j)  measure of interrater 
agreement (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993) was used following the formula:  
Rwg(j) =        (1) 
Where 𝑆̅2x j is the mean of the observed variance among the independent raters, and σ
2 
E is the 
expected variance of the uniform (or random) distribution. 
 Following the recommendation of (LeBreton & Senter, 2007), the following standards 
are used here to interpret interrater agreement estimates: .51 to .70 indicates moderate 














agreement. Based on the results of this calculation, 4 of the 5 products showed moderate or 
strong agreement among the 10 expert judges (see Table 18). The mobile device body charger 
did not show at least moderate agreement among the expert judges and was dropped from 
subsequent analysis in the experiment. 
 After determining which products had moderate or higher agreement among the raters, 
the team rating scores for the novelty, meaningfulness and feasibility dimensions were examined. 
The mean distance scores from the expert ratings, along with the standard deviations of the 




Table 18. Inter-Rater Agreement (Mean Rating) for Experimental Product Set 
 
Product Feasibility Rwg(j) Novelty Rwg(j) Meaningfulness Rwg(j) 
Drumstick Holder .89 (6.70) .57 (3.00) .82 (3.83) 
Body Charger 
a
 .21 (4.70) .49 (4.40) .21 (3.68) 
Video-Enabled Submarine .71 (5.47) .57 (3.95) .55 (4.83) 
Under-Chair Drawer .75 (5.97) .56 (3.10) .76 (3.63) 
Smoke Detector .83 (6.33) .63 (3.58) .57 (4.48) 
a The Mobile Body Charger product was dropped from the analysis due to low agreement among the raters. 
 











Drumstick holder 1.19 (1.09) 1.15 (.81) 1.27 (.83) 
Video-Enabled Submarine 1.89 (1.10) 1.05 (.71) 1.00 (.79) 
Under-Chair Drawer .91 (.72) 1.15 (.80) 1.43 (.88) 
Smoke Detector 1.49 (1.16) 1.04 (.74) 1.37 (.86) 
All (Euclidean Distance) 
b
 9.75 (1.13) 4.87 (.78) 6.13 (.93) 







Study 1 and 2 Team Sample Characteristics 
 The main experimental exercises for Studies 1 and 2 were conducted consecutively using 
the same sample, and the same experimental manipulations (i.e., the teams were primed in one of 
the four conditions, then asked to complete Study 1 followed by Study 2). To reinforce the 
experimental manipulations over the duration of the exercises, the sample manipulations were 
given to each team again between Study 1 and Study 2 (e.g., Barrick & Spilker 2003; Meloy 
2000). The sample consisted of 158 teams of two individuals. Undergraduate students from 
marketing, advertising, and supply chain classes at a public university in the southeast United 
States were recruited for the study. Each team was paid between $10-20 for participating in the 
survey ($5-10 per person), depending on how far their answers deviated from the responses 
aggregated from a panel of 10 new product development experts with experience in developing 
consumer goods and how accurate they were in correctly choosing the best- and worst-selling 
products in the Study 2 choice sets. Team members split their total earnings for their 
performance in the study 50/50, so both partners received the exact same monetary 
compensation. 
 The individuals used in the sample had an average age of 23.5 years with an average of 
3.2 years of full-time work experience.  A total of 52.2% of the participants in the study were 
female. 
 
Manipulation and Confound Checks 
 A manipulation and confound check was conducted for the main experiments to ensure 
that teams were being correctly primed in their respective experimental conditions, and that the 






variance (ANOVA) models were analyzed. The first model used the reflexivity composite as the 
dependent variable and the two-level experimental factors (reflexivity and regulatory focus) as 
independent variables. The second model used the regulatory focus composite as the dependent 
variable and the two-level experimental factors (reflexivity and regulatory focus) as independent 
variables. The results, shown in Table 20, indicate that the experimental conditions were 
manipulated as intended (i.e., the high reflexivity group and promotion groups differed 
significantly from their counterparts) and that they did not significantly influence one another. 
 
 
Table 20. Manipulation and Confound Checks for Study 1 and Study 2 
 
Manipulation Reflexivity Composite Regulatory Focus Composite 
Reflexivity  
(High/Low) 
p < .001, η
2
 = .10 p = .20, η
2
 = .01 
Regulatory Focus 
(Prevention/Promotion) 
p = .63, η
2
 = .001 p <.001, η
2
 = .14 
 
 
Study 1 Procedure 
 As described in the previous chapter, teams were primed to adopt a prevention or a 
promotion group regulatory focus and to be high or low on the degree to which they reflected on 
and processed their knowledge before making a rating decision about five different products – a 
drumstick holder, a body-motion mobile device charger, a video-enabled submarine, and under-
chair drawer attachment and a smoke detector that silenced the low battery chirp at night. The 
image and description profiles for each product that each team saw in the rating exercise are 






 After completing a short practice exercise to acclimate them to the task, teams were 
asked to rate each of the five products on three dimensions – novelty, meaningfulness, and 
feasibility. Team responses for each dimension were then compared to the aggregate expert score 
across all 4 products to develop a distance score dependent variable for novelty, meaningfulness, 
and feasibility. 
 To account for potential confounds, several control variables were collected – individual 
team member affect, individual team member regulatory focus as a chronic personality trait, 
level of familiarity among the team members, and level of product category knowledge for each 
of the products displayed in the experiment. 
 
Study 1 Analysis 
 The data was analyzed using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with regulatory focus 
and reflexivity as independent variables and the Euclidean distance scores across all 4 products 
for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility as dependent variables. The mean distance score for 
novelty across the four products was 4.88 with a standard deviation of .84. The mean distance 
score for meaningfulness across the four products was 5.92 with a standard deviation of .98. The 
mean distance score for feasibility across the four products was 9.93 with a standard deviation of 
1.12. Four covariates were originally included (individual regulatory focus, individual affect, 
team familiarity, and product category knowledge), but two were dropped due to non-







Study 1 Results 
 In Study 1, the teams participating in the experiment were asked to view product 
concepts invented by consumers and rate them on their level of novelty, feasibility and 
meaningfulness. The individual team member affect and team member familiarity covariates 
were not significant in any of the models tested for the three dimensions of innovativeness, and 
were dropped from the analysis. The ANCOVA results for all of the tests in Study 1 are shown 
in Table 21. 
 
Hypothesis Tests for the Main Effect of Group Regulatory Focus 
 Hypothesis 1a states that teams with a promotion focus will be more accurate at assessing 
co-created new product novelty than teams with a prevention focus. The analysis of the main 
effect showed that regulatory focus had no significant effect on novelty (MPrevention= 4.89 vs. 
MPromotion = 4.86; F(1,151) = .03, NS), thus H1a is not supported. 
 Hypotheses 1b states that teams with a prevention focus will be more accurate at 
assessing co-created new product meaningfulness than teams with a promotion focus. The 
analysis showed that teams in the prevention condition rated the products closer to the expert 
ratings of meaningfulness than teams in the promotion condition at the p < .10 level but not the p 
< .05 level (MPrevention= 5.79 vs. MPromotion = 6.06; F(1,151) = 2.98, p= .09, η
2
 = .02), see Figure 4. 











  d.f. 





Model 1:  
Co-created New 
 Product Novelty  
     
 
Model 5 8.382 2.493* 0.08 
Error 151 101.521   
      
 
Regulatory Focus 1 0.023 0.034 
 
 
Reflexivity 1 0.036 0.054 
 
 
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity 1 0.018 0.026 
 
      
 





1 1.356 2.017   
      Model 2:  
Co-created New  
Product Meaningfulness  
     
 
Model 5 15.799 3.160** 0.11 
Error 151 134.614   
      
 
Regulatory Focus 1 2.656 2.980† 
 
 
Reflexivity 1 0.361 0.405 
 
 
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity 1 3.759 4.217* 
 
      
 





1 7.281 8.168**   
      Model 3:  
Cocreated New  
Product Feasibility 
     
 
Model 5 10.335 1.67 0.05 
Error 151 187.302 0.003  
      
 
Regulatory Focus 1 8.155 6.575** 
 
 
Reflexivity 1 0.006 0.005 
 
 
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity 1 0.004 0.003 
 
      
 







1   0.561   
† p < .10 
* p < .05 










Figure 4. Distance from Expert Ratings of Meaningfulness 
 
 Hypothesis 1c states that teams with a prevention focus will be more accurate at assessing 
co-created new product feasibility. The analysis of the main effect of regulatory focus showed 
that teams in the prevention condition rated the products closer to the expert ratings of feasibility 
than teams in the promotion condition (MPrevention= 9.71 vs. MPromotion = 10.17; F(1,151) = 6.58, 
p= .01, η2 = .04), see Figure 5. Based on this result, H1c is supported. 
 
Hypothesis Tests for the Main Effect of Reflexivity 
 Hypothesis 2a states that high reflexivity will positively influence teams’ rating accuracy 
on novelty. Reflexivity did not significantly influence teams’ assessments of co-created new 
product novelty (MHiReflex= 4.89 vs. MLoReflex = 4.86; F(1,151) = .01, NS), thus H2a is not 
supported. 
 Hypothesis 2b states that high reflexivity will positively influence teams’ rating accuracy 






novelty assessment accuracy was also not significant (MHiReflex= 5.97 vs. MLoReflex = 5.87; 
F(1,151) = .01, NS), thus H2b is not supported. 
 
Figure 5. Distance from Expert Ratings of Feasibility 
 
 Hypothesis 2c states that high reflexivity will positively influence teams’ rating accuracy 
on feasibility. The main effect of reflexivity on assessments of co-created new product feasibility 
was not significant (MHiReflex= 9.95 vs. MLoReflex = 9.93; F(1,151) = .01, NS), thus H2c is not 
supported. 
 
Hypothesis Tests for the Regulatory Focus by Reflexivity Interaction 
 Hypothesis 3 states that being highly reflexive will have a negative effect on promotion-
focused team assessment accuracy, but a positive effect on prevention-focused team assessment 
accuracy. This hypothesis was tested separately for the novelty (H3a), meaningfulness (H3b), 
and feasibility (H3c) dimensions. 
 For the novelty dimension, the interaction between group regulatory focus and reflexivity 
was not significant (F(1,151) = .03, NS), thus H3a is not supported. For the meaningfulness 






significant (F(1,151) = 4.22, p= .04, η2 = .03), such that at high levels of reflexivity, prevention-
focused teams were significantly more accurate than promotion-focused teams, while there was 
no difference between the prevention and promotion groups at low levels of reflexivity. As such, 
H3b is supported. The interaction is shown in Figure 6. For the feasibility dimension, the 
interaction between group regulatory focus and reflexivity was not significant (F(1,151) = .003, 
NS), thus H3c is not supported. 
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity on Meaningfulness 
 
Study 1 Summary of Findings 
 Overall, three of the three hypotheses for Study 1 were fully or marginally supported. As 
predicted, a prevention focus resulted in significantly more accurate ratings of product feasibility 
(H1c), and marginally more significant ratings of product meaningfulness (H1b). In addition, the 






dimension such that the prevention focused teams were significantly more accurate than the 
promotion focused teams at high levels of reflexivity. A summary of the hypothesis tests is 
shown in Table 22. 
  
Table 22. Summary of Study 1 Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis Finding 
H1a: Promotion  Novelty not significant 
H1b: Prevention  Meaningfulness supported at p < .10 level 
H1c: Prevention  Feasibility supported at p < .01 level 
H2a: High Reflexivity  Novelty not significant 
H2b: High Reflexivity  Meaningfulness not significant 
H2c: High Reflexivity  Feasibility not significant 
H3a: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Novelty not significant 
H3b: Prevention x High Reflexivity   Meaningfulness supported at p < .05 level 
H3c: Prevention x High Reflexivity   Feasibility not significant 
 
Study 2 
 Study 2 was a 2 x 2 between subject experiments. In Study 1, teams were primed to 
exhibit either a prevention or promotion orientation and to exercise high or low reflexivity in 
their group decision-making. In Study 2, teams were asked to complete a second group decision 
exercise under the same conditions, and given a short reminder to reinforce the priming they 







Study 2 Procedure 
 Teams were asked to view four sets of three products in the same product category and at 
a similar price point, then rank the products from 1 to 3 according what they believed to be the 
best-selling (1) to the worst-selling (3) product in the group. At the start of Study 1, each team 
indicated their familiarity with each of the product categories used in both Study 1 and Study 2.  
 The products sets used in Study 2 were chosen from the retail website of a firm that 
exclusively sells products created by the firm’s online user community. For each product set, 
three products were selected that were in a similar price range, had been on the market at least 
six months and showed significant differences in sales for the first six months, creating a clear 
best-seller and worst-seller in each set. The sets used were mobile phone accessories, kitchen 
gadgets, cleaning products, and cord organization products for small electronic devices. These 
sets were chosen because they were deemed likely to be categories with which undergraduate 
subjects would be at least moderately familiar. The procedure for creating and refining the 
product sets is discussed below in the pretest section for Study 2 and the final set of products 
used in Study 2 is listed in Appendix C. 
 Once the teams had completed their rankings of the four product sets they were asked to 
identify any of the products they had seen for sale prior to participating in the experiment, 
responded to questions measuring group regulatory focus and reflexivity and then answered 
several questions individually to measure the individual affect and chronic regulatory focus of 







Study 2 Dependent Variables and Analysis Procedure 
 To analyze the data, positive and negative hits were summed across the four product sets. 
A positive hit occurred when a team correctly chose the best-selling product and a negative hit 
occurred when team correctly chose the worst-selling product. Since the dependent variable was 
constructed from counts of positive and negative hits, a negative binomial regression model was 
used to test the hypothesis using the total number of positive or negative hits across all three 
product sets as the dependent variable. 
 
Study 2 Pretest 
 Study 2 was pretested using the same sample and experimental manipulations as in Study 
1. Teams were primed in either a prevention or promotion condition, then instructed to be highly 
reflexive or not at all reflexive in their team decision making. After completing Study 1, teams 
were given a reminder to reinforce their original priming for both regulatory focus and 
reflexivity, then asked to complete a choice exercise. Table 23 shows the positive and negative 
hit percentages for each choice set in the pretest.  
  
Table 23. Overall Pretest Sample Hit Rates for Study 2 Product Choice Sets  
Product Set Positive Hit Rate Negative Hit Rate 
Kitchen Gadgets 23.9% 15.2% 
Mobile Phone Accessories
*
 4.3% 45.7% 
Cleaning Supplies
*
 7.6% 78.3% 
Overall   
0 Hits 64.1% 12.0% 
1 Hit 35.9% 42.4% 
2 Hits 0.0% 40.2% 
3 Hits 0.0% 5.4% 







 Based on the pretest sample, product sets with negative hit rates lower than 15% were 
altered for the main experiment in Study 2 to create a more even distribution of hits and misses. 
For the Mobile Phone Accessories and Cleaning Products choice sets, the best-selling product 
was replaced with an alternative product, since it had a very low overall hit rate.  A fourth choice 
set was also added for the main experiment in Study 2, which consisted of three cord 
management products for small electronics. The final product choice sets for Study 2 are shown 
in Appendix B. The actual sales figures used to calculate the best and worst selling products are 
shown in Table 24. 
 
Table 24. Overall Sales (in Units) for Study 2 Main Experiment Product Choice Sets 
 
Product Set Sales (Units) 




Mobile Phone Accessories  
Crossover 24,894 








Cord Organizers  
Cordies 60,443 
Contort 21,508 
Power Curl Mini 5,315 
a This product set was omitted from the analysis  
 
Study 2 Results 
 In the main data collection, the hits and misses were calculated for each product prior to 






product sets). For the cleaning supplies product set, the positive hit percentage was 11.6% and 
the negative hit percentage was 22.6%. Due to the low overall hit success rate for this product 
set, it was dropped from the analysis. As in the previous study, team member familiarity, and the 
regulatory focus and positive affect of individual team members were included as controls.  
 Also included as control variables were the category knowledge (an average of 
knowledge across the three categories used) teams had about the product sets, as well as how 
many products team had previously seen before completing Study 2. The positive and negative 
hits rates of all the product sets are shown in Table 25. 
 
Table 25. Hit Rates for Study 2 Experiment Product Choice Sets  
 
Product Set Positive Hit Rate Negative Hit Rate 
Kitchen Gadgets 35.8% 29.7% 
Mobile Phone Accessories 44.3% 84.0% 
Cleaning Supplies 
a
 11.6% 22.6% 
Cord Organizers 34.9% 28.8% 
All (sum)   
0 Hits 23.2% 2.0% 
1 Hit 36.4% 48.5% 
2 Hits 33.3% 80.8% 
3 Hits 7.1% 18.2% 
a
 Product set was omitted from analysis due to low hit rates 
 
Study 2 Hypothesis Tests  
 Hypothesis 4a, Hypothesis 5a, and Hypothesis 6a were tested using an analysis of 
covariance model with positive hits as the dependent variable. The independent variables group 
reflexivity and group regulatory focus were included as well as the regulatory focus by 







one another, their expertise across the product categories they viewed, an aggregate measure of 
individual regulatory focus and an aggregate measure of individual positive affect. The ANOVA 
models for Study 2 are shown in Table 26. 
 H4a states that prevention-oriented teams will have more positive hits than promotion 
oriented teams. The effect of regulatory focus was not significant (F(1,100) = .225, p = .64). H5a 
states that highly reflexive teams will have more positive hits than teams with low levels of 
reflexivity. The effect of reflexivity was also not significant (F(1,100) = 2.162 , p = .15). H6a 
states that reflexivity will have a more positive effect on prevention-oriented teams than on 
promotion-oriented teams in respect to positive hits. The effect of the interaction was not 
significant (F(1,100) = .007, p = .93). Based on these results, H4a, H5a, and H6a are not 
supported. 
 Hypothesis 4b, Hypothesis 5b, and Hypothesis 6b were also tested using an analysis of 
covariance model, but with negative hits as the dependent variable. The independent variables 
group reflexivity and group regulatory focus were included as well as the regulatory focus by 
reflexivity interaction effect. Covariates in the model included how well team members knew 
one another, their expertise across the product categories they viewed, an aggregate measure of 
individual regulatory focus and an aggregate measure of individual positive affect.  
 H4b states that prevention-oriented teams will have more negative hits than promotion 
oriented teams. The effect of regulatory focus was not significant (F(1,100) = .545, p = .35). H5a 
states that highly reflexive teams will have more positive hits than teams with low levels of 
reflexivity. The effect of reflexivity was also not significant (F(1,100) = .086 , p = .77). As such, 







Table 26. ANCOVA Results for Study 2 
 





Model 1:  
Positive Hits 
     
 
Model 7 4.797 0.892 0.06 
Error 100 76.833   
      
 
Regulatory Focus 1 0.173 0.226 
 
 
Reflexivity 1 1.661 2.162 
 
 
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity 1 0.006 0.007 
 
      
 
Category Knowledge 1 0.144 0.188 
 
 
Individual Regulatory Focus 1 0.001 0.002 
 
 




 Team Affect 1 0.489 0.637   
 
     
Model 2:  
Negative Hits 
     
 
Model 7 6.449 1.484 0.09 
Error 100 62.097   
      
 
Regulatory Focus 1 0.545 0.878 
 
 
Reflexivity 1 0.053 0.086 
 
 




      
 
Category Knowledge 1 1.108 1.785 
 
 
Individual Regulatory Focus 1 0.373 0.601 
 
 
Team Familiarity 1 0.612 0.985 
 
 Team Affect 1 0.738 1.188   
†
 p < .10 
*






 H6a states that reflexivity will have a more positive effect on prevention-oriented teams 






significant in the hypothesized direction (F(1,107) = 4.756, p < .05, η2  = .05). When reflexivity 
was high, prevention-oriented teams scored significantly more negative hits than promotion 




Figure 7. Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity for Negative Hits. 
 
Study 2 Summary of Findings 
 Study 2 consisted of a 2 x 2 between subjects design using group regulatory focus 
(prevention/promotion) and group reflexivity (high/low). There were two dependent variables 
run as a separate models, positive hits across all three choice exercises; and negative hits across 
all three choice exercises. For the positive hits dependent variable, there were no significant 






interaction effect was significant in the hypothesized direction. An overview of the six 
hypotheses and the result of the tests for each hypothesis in Study 2 are shown in Table 27. 
 
 
Table 27. Summary of Study 2 Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Test Result 
H4a: Prevention  Positive Hits not significant 
H4b: Prevention  Negative Hits not significant 
H5a: High Reflexivity  Positive Hits not significant 
H5b: High Reflexivity  Negative Hits not significant 
H6a: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Positive Hits not significant 




 Study 3 was a video ethnography in which video footage from a firm’s discussion of 186 
new product concepts was coded and analyzed in a statistical model. The firm, Quirky, makes 
and sells products invented by consumers, and broadcasts a weekly “Live Eval”
1
 meeting to 
review the products that are trending popular with the online innovation community. The video 
discussion for each product was transcribed, including comments by all of the speakers for each 
product, and the content was coded for regulatory focus and reflexivity. The firm’s “yes” or “no” 
decisions about each product were compared against a consumer panel’s rating for each product 
to determine the success of each product decision. Each product was shown to 50 potential 
consumers on M-Turk, each of whom rated the product on a 3-item, 7-point willingness to 
consider purchase measure developed by Berens et al. (2005). The products were then assigned a 
                                                 






percentile rank based on the consumer ratings for all of the products in the study. When the firm 
chose to develop products ranked in the 51
st
 percentile or higher, the product decision was coded 
as a positive hit, and when the company rejected products ranked in the 49
th
 percentile or lower, 
the product decision was coded as a negative hit. The data was analyzed using logistic 
regression, with hits and misses used as dependent variables in separate models. 
 
Coding Approach 
 The researcher viewed approximately 27 hours of product evaluation meeting video 
footage, in which 186 products were discussed. The video footage was then transcribed line-by-
line and coded for reflexivity and regulatory focus, resulting in 4,471 coded statements from the 
evaluation discussions. Although this study uses a quantitative content analysis approach, the 
coding process used in grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) was 
utilized to generate the codes used in the statistical analysis. The researcher first used a sample of 
30 product transcripts to create a common set of codes through an open coding process (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990).  The codes were then refined as the researcher went through each subsequent 
transcript and the coding categories were merged and or updated to accurately reflect the content 
of the discussion. For example, a statement such as “I think people would buy this product,” and 
a comment by the sales director that he or she could “sell this product” were originally 
categorized using two different codes during the open coding process, but ultimately merged into 
a code called Sellable in the subsequent refinement of the codes and selective coding process. 
 
Reflexivity Coding 
 Reflexivity was coded as a ratio of the total number of topics discussed to the number of 






used to determine the unique topics that were discussed through an open and selective coding 
process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). For example, if three individuals commented on the technical 
feasibility of an idea and one individual commented on how much the same idea would appeal to 
customers, that would count as 4 total topics discussed, but only 2 unique topics discussed; a 
ratio of 4/2. This coding process resulted in a total of 40 coding categories, shown in Table 28. 
 
Regulatory Focus Coding 
 Each of the 40 comment coding categories was sorted into one of three groups: 
prevention-focused, promotion-focused, or neutral, according to the conceptual definitions of the 
two regulatory focus types in past research (Florack & Hartmann, 2007; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007; 
Levine et al., 2000). Comment categories related to avoiding risk and financial losses were 
labeled prevention-focused, and comment categories related to pursuing innovation success were 
labeled promotion-focused. Comment categories which did not clearly fit with a prevention- or 
promotion-focus were labeled as neutral. The regulatory focus variable was created by 
calculating the ratio of promotion to prevention-focused comments. For each product discussion, 
values above 1 indicate a more promotion-focused discussion, while values below 1 are 
indicative of a prevention-focused discussion. The codes labeled as prevention and promotion 
are shown in Table 29. 
 To determine whether or not the regulatory focus of each product discussion was directly 
correlated with the firm’s development decision for that product, a t-test was conducted with 
development decision as a categorical predictor and regulatory focus as the continuous 
dependent variable. Based on this analysis, there is no significant relationship between regulatory 







Coding Reliability Assessment 
 To assess the reliability of the codes, the Weber protocol (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 
2007; Weber, 1990) was followed using an independent rater, blind to the research questions and 
purpose of the study.  
 First, the independent rater was familiarized with the coding units and categories and was 
given a set of 118 of the coded segments to code in order to learn the coding heuristic and the 
code book. In this practice sample, multiple segments for all of the codes were represented. 
Second, this sample of 118 coded segments was checked for agreement with the coding of the 
principal researcher. The initial sample of coded segments produced an agreement of 85%.   
 The 15% of cases in which there was a discrepancy were then discussed, and the coding 
heuristic was refined so that both raters agreed on the coding of the sample segments. Third, the 
independent rater was given a much larger sample of 300 coded segments, again representing 
multiple instances of every code used in the study, and asked to code them based on the training 
provided and the previous round of sample coding. Reliability was measured using a simple 
percent agreement calculation for the subset of coded segments. For this larger subset of coded 
segments, the independent rater and the principal researcher agreed 89% of the time, using a 







Table 28. Study 3 Reflexivity Coding Categories and Examples 
 
Reflexivity Code Description Code % Representative Quote 
Aesthetics 
 
Comment regarding the 
aesthetics/appearance of a product 
 
2.9% 




Comment about potential retail channel 
partners through which a product might 
be sold 
 




Reference to the opinion of the online 
community in real time during the  
evaluation discussions 
 
11.6% “58% of the community likes it. That is a lot.” 
Complexity 
 
Comment about the complexity and or 
“over-engineering” of a product 
 
6.3% “First, I think this thing just has too many features.” 
Cost/Expense 




“I think it would be very costly to make it if you 
want all these different lenses and you want it to be 




An appeal to the credibility/experience of 
the inventor in advocating for a product. 
1.3% 
 
“We know Mark is like an 85-time inventor. He 
invented such wonderful things like Bandits and 
Split Sticks, and some of our most successful 






Table 28. Continued. 
 




Comment regarding whether or not a 
product could injure consumers during 
use 
 




Comment arguing that a product must be 










Comment about how a product might 
enhance an existing product 
 
0.6% 
“This would be a great product to go with other nail 




Making an analogy to an existing product 
to describe the product being reviewed 
 
2.7% 




Soliciting or appealing to the opinion of a 









Suggestion that a product concept needs 




“I think that we could explore this idea, figure out 








Table 28. Continued. 
 
Reflexivity Code Description Code % Representative Quote 
Firm Capability 
 
Comment about whether or not a product 
fits the focal firm’s capabilities and/or 
product development strategy 
 
0.2% “Quirky doesn’t make medical supplies.” 
Functionality 
 
Comment about how a product would 
function (or not function) properly  
 
9.2% 
“I would never put it in my car because I don't care 




Comment that the product idea might be 
viable in the future, but not now 
 
0.3% 
“I think we’re not there yet, because most of our 
phones wouldn’t work with it, but it’s something for 
the future.” 
Innovative 
Comment about the 
innovativeness/creativity of a product 
6.9% 
 
“I think like the battery thing [solved by this 
product] is like the last frontier in electronics. The 
first person who helps solves that, that's like the next 




Comment about whether a product 
generates interest or excitement 
 
3.9% “Even people who are not into yoga seem to love it.” 
Inventor Effort 
Comment about the amount of effort and 
preparation the inventor put into the 
development of a product, regardless of 
the merit of the product idea 
0.8% 
“I appreciate the amount of thought that has 






Table 28. Continued. 
 




Comment regarding whether or not a 
product is legal to sell (non-IP related) 
 
0.6% 
“I’m just saying, we’ve got Department of 
Transportation regulations to think about probably.” 
Market Trend 
 
Reference to market trends related to the 
product being evaluated 
 
2.1% 




Comment about the likelihood consumers 
would want and/or use a product; whether 




“A lot of people are identifying with this problem. 
Its gross, it's something they don't want to do, this 
seems like a great solution.” 
Multiple Uses 
 
Comment about multiple potential uses 




“Perfect for backpacking, for camping, for fishing, a 








“Does anyone dislike this? Do you want to talk 
about why you dislike this?” 
Novelty 
 
Comment about the existence (or lack 
thereof) of the same or similar products 
 
5.5% 
“It’s just not different enough. There are too many 
similar products on the market.” 
Other Firm 
Interest 
Comment about a product having 
development interest from other 
companies 
0.01% 







Table 28. Continued. 
 
Reflexivity Code Description Code % Representative Quote 
Partner 
Comment that a strategic partnership with 
another firm would be needed to develop 
the product idea under review 
0.1% 
“It will be important for Quirky to find a partner in 
the toy space.” 
Patent/IP Issues 
 
Comment regarding whether or not a 




“This is a pretty cool technology but it's really 
protected, it's a pretty heavily protected space. We're 




The CEO/moderator soliciting positive 
comments from the group 
 
0.5% 
“I want to hear from someone who actually really 
loves this and thinks they need it tomorrow. 
Product Extension 
 
Comment about how well a product fits 




“Yeah, I like the idea because it's an extension of 
something that we had out already. I think that's 








“This product would be a great entry into Asia and 
places like that for us.” 
Prototype 
Comment about whether or not the 
inventor has a working prototype 
2.4% 
 
“[The inventor] has a working prototype that he built 
himself, so I definitely think it’s something we 




Comment about whether or not a product 
would sell well 
7.1% 
“I don't how many of these we are going to sell, it’s 






Table 28. Continued. 
 




Comment about substitutes that 




“You could use a rack a on a baking sheet and  




Suggesting a completely different product 
to solve the same problem as the product 
being reviewed 
1.1% 





Comment in which the speaker suggests 




“If you can have some sort of handle on this…so it 
is not extremely hot when you take it out [of the 
oven] to make it easier to handle this thing, that'd be 




Comment arguing why the product being 




“The other brilliant thing about this is the way that it 
pivots in way that a Swiffer does not, so you can 
really clean the surface area.” 
Target Market 
 
Comment about a specific target market 
for the product. 
 
3.7% 
“I can see this being a real premium product for 
people who travel a lot.” 
Technical 
Feasibility 




“I think the technology is here for this product, there 
are some inline semiconductor current meters that 
are the size of a button that will do the measuring on 






Table 28. Continued. 
 
Reflexivity Code Description Code % Representative Quote 
Unclear 
 
Speaker having a hard time understanding 




“I'm really confused, can anyone like clearly 
articulate what this invention is.” 
Word of 
Mouth/Buzz 
Comment about the speculated “buzz” 
that could be generated by a product 
 
0.2% 
“I love it. I think people would talk about it online 






Table 29. Regulatory Focus Coding 
 













Negative Feedback Seeking  























Positive Feedback Seeking 
Product Extension 
Product Growth Potential 
Suggested Enhancement 
Superior to Alternatives 








 To analyze the video for regulatory focus, the principal researcher conducted a card 
sorting exercise, using sample comments for each of the discussion topic codes used for the 
reflexivity measure and sorting them into one of three categories: prevention, promotion, or 
neither. The principal researcher then had a second rater do the same sorting exercise using 
sample comments for each code and sorting them into the same three categories. The two raters 
discussed the few areas of disagreement they had about how each code should be categorized, 
and adjusted how codes were assigned to the three categories until they reached a 100% 
agreement (Antia, Zheng, & Frazier, 2013; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). 
 
Constructing the Dependent Variables: Positive and Negative Hits 
 To construct the dependent variable, all 186 products were grouped into 10 general 
product categories, adapted from the categories assigned each product by Quirky: electronics, 
garage/shop tools, health and wellness, home and garden, kitchen/cooking, toys, pet accessories, 
home safety, travel and leisure, and women and baby. A sample of 1,860 M-Turk users was then 
recruited to rate the products in each category on a willingness to purchase scale (Berens et al., 
2005), such that each product received approximately 50 ratings. Subjects were randomly shown 
five of the products from the categories they selected and were asked to rate them. Participants 
were paid $0.75 for their participation, and the exercise took about 10 minutes to complete.  
 Prior to rating the products on a willingness to purchase scale, respondents were informed 
that in order to qualify for the survey, they needed to have at least moderate product knowledge 
of the category for which they were evaluating products. Further, an initial screening question for 






knowledge to be moderate or above for any given category (3, 4, or 5) were allowed to complete 
the survey, while those who had a low knowledge of any given category (1 or 2) were not 
allowed to complete the survey due to a lack of product category knowledge and asked to choose 
another category for which they had more knowledge. Across all 10 product categories, this 
filtering process excluded 16 total participants due to low category knowledge. The product 
categories and number of respondents for each category are shown in Table 30.  
 The products were randomly and evenly displayed so that each product received ratings 
from approximately 50 different potential consumers who had at least a moderate knowledge of 
each product’s respective product category. An attention filter was included to ensure that the 
questions were being carefully read and understood, and respondents who incorrectly answered 
the attention filter were excluded from the analysis. A total of 3 responses were dropped due to 
failing to answer the reading filter correctly. At the end of the survey, respondents answered a 
few short demographic questions, then were thanked for their participation. 
 The willingness to consider purchase scale consisted of 3 items, which were averaged 
together across all respondents for each product to create a composite willingness to consider 
purchase score. To construct the binomial dependent variable, the willingness to consider 
purchase ratings were sorted from highest to lowest. If, based on the group discussions captured 
in the videos, the firm chose to develop a product that ranked in the 51
st
 percentile or higher of 
the willingness to purchase scores, it was coded as a positive hit (1). If the firm chose to reject a 
project that was ranked in the 49
th
 percentile or lower, it was coded as a negative hit (1). 






firm or ranked low but accepted by the firm) were coded as 0. This categorical variable was then 
used as the dependent variable in a binomial logistic regression model. 
 
 
Table 30. Categories and Responses for Willingness to Purchase Variable 
 
Product Category Products Respondents 
Consumer Electronics Products 36 360 
Garage/Shop Products 21 210 
Health and Wellness Products 7 70 
Home and Garden Products 9 90 
Kitchen/Cooking Products 40 400 
Toys and Novelty Products 26 260 
Pet Accessories 8 80 
Home Safety Products 15 150 
Travel and Leisure Products 17 170 
Women and Baby Products 7 70 
   
Totals 186 1860 
  
Inventor Expertise 
 Inventor expertise was measured as the number of online followers in the innovation 
community the inventor of each product had at the time that his or her product was discussed in 
the Quirky product evaluation. On the Quirky website, users with an account can subscribe to the 
news feeds of other inventors, receiving updates about new submissions, the status of existing 
submissions, development progress of accepted product ideas, etc. Inventors with a high 
following are considered experts because they have developed product ideas which have 
attracted the attention and support of other consumers in the innovation community, or have 






 The information about the inventor’s community connection for each product was 
available on Quirky’s website, and included with information about the inventor on each product 
idea submission webpage. To ensure the information was accurate for the exact date that each 
product was reviewed, this data was pulled from the screenshot shown in each video clip, so the 
inventor follower totals were accurate for the exact day and time of each product evaluation.  
 
Control Variables 
 Several control variables were used: the total time each product was discussed, the order 
in which the product was evaluated, product type (hedonic or utilitarian), and the connection that 
each inventor had to other inventors in the Quirky community. Time was included to account for 
the fact that more discussion could occur the longer a conversation went on, and was measured 
as the duration, in seconds, of each product discussion. The video footage consisted of 27 
approximately hour-long meetings in which 5-12 products were evaluated in a single sitting. 
Evaluation order was included to account for any fatigue factor the group might experience after 
discussion of several products. Indeed, there was a small, but significant negative correlation 
between discussion order and time, a potential indication that the group was less inclined to 
deeply discuss a product the longer the meeting went. For this reason, the evaluation order was 
included. Bayus (2013) found that members of online customer innovation communities who 
actively contributed to other inventors’ ideas (e.g., suggestions for improvement, constructive 
feedback, etc.) had a higher likelihood of submitting high-quality ideas themselves. To account 
for this possibility, the number of other community members’ ideas each product’s inventor had 






 Finally, researchers have found that hedonic, experience-based products are typically 
harder for consumers to objectively evaluate than utilitarian products (Huang et al., 2009). For 
this reason, a categorical measure of product type was used as a control. Five independent raters 
were used to assess whether products were hedonic or utilitarian, using the 3-item, 7-point 
semantic differential scale developed by (Berens, Riel, and Bruggen, 2005). The Rwg formula 
was used to calculate agreement among the five raters. Since the raters showed less than 
moderate agreement on 38 of the 186 products, aggregating the responses by averaging them into 
a continuous variable was not justified. Instead, the responses were averaged and the median 
split was used to create a categorical variable of the product type (1 = hedonic, 0 = utilitarian). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The correlations, means, and standard deviations for the continuous variables in the 
model are shown in Table 31. The product discussions had a mean duration (Time) of 357.87 
seconds, with a mean reflexivity level (Reflex) of 2.16, and a mean regulatory focus (RegFocus) 
level of 2.17. The products themselves had a mean willingness to purchase (W2P) score of 4.35 
on a 7-point scale.  
 Since all of these products were prescreened before being presented to the firm at an 
evaluation meeting, the fact that the mean score is above the midpoint of the scale range is not 
surprising. On average, the inventors of the products had participated in developing 148.90 ideas 
from other inventors (CommtyPart). 
 The descriptive percentages for the categorical variables used in Study 3 are shown in 






correct development decision based on consumer willingness to purchase ratings 51.3% of the 
time. The firm accepted products they should have accepted 46.7% of the time and rejected 
products they should have rejected 58.2% of the time. Of the products that were reviewed, 30.1% 




Table 31. Correlation of Continuous Variables in Study 3 
(Means on the Diagonal) 
 
 
Order Time CommtyPart Reflex RegFocus W2P 
Order (5.01)  
     
Time -.238** (357.87)  
    
CommtyPart -.063 .116 (149.316) 
   
Reflex -.091 .240** .050 (2.16)  
  
RegFocus .085 -.151* -.058 .163
*




 .017 .079 .218** (4.35) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  
 
Table 32. Description of Study 3 Categorical Variables 
 
Variable Descriptives 
Product Type (Hedonic) 56/186 (30.1%) 
Development Decision (Yes) 84/186 (45.2%) 
Positive Hits (Accepted 51
st
 percentile and above) 43/92 (46.7%) 
Negative Hits (Rejected 49
th
 percentile and below) 53/91 (58.2%) 








 Since the dependent variables of interest were binomial (positive hit/miss or negative 
hit/miss), binary logistic regression was used to analyze the data. A concern in logistic 
regression, particularly with small samples, is that the model can over-fit to the data, but be 
significantly less accurate when applied to a new random sample from the population. To help 
safeguard against this over-fitting problem, a training sample of 80% of the total observations 
was used to create a logistic regression function that was applied to the remaining 20% holdout 
sample. If the correct classification percentage of the holdout sample is less than approximately 
10% lower than the training sample, the model was deemed stable. If the model was deemed 
stable, the data was run again using the entire sample, the results of which were used to report 
beta coefficients and significance levels. 
 
Study 3 Results 
 Hypothesis 4a, Hypothesis 5a, and Hypothesis 6a from Study 2 were tested in a field 
context in Study 3. The model used to test these three hypotheses is shown in Table 33. Positive 
Hits is the dependent variable which was used. The model includes group regulatory focus, 
group reflexivity, product type, inventor expertise, and the inventor’s level of community 
connection as independent variables and regulatory focus by reflexivity as an interaction effect.  
 Control variables include the total time of discussion and the order in which each product 
was reviewed compared to other products evaluated in the same evaluation meeting. The model 
was run using a training sample (80%) and a holdout sample (20%). For this model, the training 






accuracy, indicating that the model was not over-fitting to the data. The model was then run 
using the entire sample, which had a classification accuracy of 78%. The Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-Fit test for logistic regression equations was not significant (χ
2
 = 14.459, p = .071), 
indicating that the model had acceptable fit (Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). 
 
 
Table 33. Logistic Regression Model for H4a, H5a, and H6a - Positive Hits 
 
Model Term  Coefficient 
Constant  -4.503** 
Main Effects   
Group Regulatory Focus  2.744* 
Group Reflexivity  1.767* 
Inventor Expertise  .001 
   
Interaction Term   
Regulatory Focus * Reflexivity  -1.223* 
   
Controls   
Discussion Time  -.003 
Evaluation Order  -.037 
Product Type  .270 
Inventor Community Connection  -.002 
   
-2 Log likelihood 186.702 









 H4a states that prevention-oriented teams will have more positive hits than promotion 






promotion-oriented during the firm’s development discussions was positively associated with the 
likelihood of achieving a positive hit, or accepting a product that was rated by consumers in the 
51
st
 percentile or higher on the willingness to purchase measure. As such, Hypothesis 4a is not 
supported.  
 H5a states that highly reflexive teams will have more positive hits than team with low 
levels of reflexivity. The result was positive and significant in the hypothesized direction (β = 
1.77, p <.05). Being more reflexive during the firm’s development discussions was positively 
associated with the likelihood of achieving a positive hit, or accepting a product that was rated 
by consumers in the 51
st
 percentile or higher on the willingness to purchase measure. Based on 
this result, Hypothesis 5a is supported. 
 H6a states that reflexivity will have a more positive effect on prevention-oriented teams 
than on promotion-oriented teams with respect to positive hit rates. The result of the interaction 
was negative and significant (β = -1.22, p <.05). When reflexivity is low, promotion-oriented 
teams have a higher probability of making a positive hit decision than prevention-oriented teams. 
However, when reflexivity is high, prevention-oriented teams have a higher probability of 
making a positive hit decision. As such, Hypothesis 6a is supported. The graph of the interaction 
is shown in Figure 8. 
 Hypothesis 4b, Hypothesis 5b, and Hypothesis 6b from Study 2 were also tested in a field 
setting in Study 3.  Negative Hits is the dependent variable in this model. The model (shown in 
Table 34) includes group regulatory focus, group reflexivity, product type, inventor expertise, 
and the inventor’s level of community connection as independent variables, and the interaction 






in which each product was reviewed compared to other products evaluated in the same meeting. 
The training sample correct classification rate was 74.8% and the holdout sample rate was 60%, 
indicating the logistic regression equation likely over-fit to the training sample. The correct 
classification rate of the entire sample was 72.6%. 
 
Figure 8. Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity 
    
 H4b states that prevention-oriented teams will have more negative hits than promotion 
oriented teams. The result was not significant (β = -.715, p = .368), indicating Hypothesis 4b is 
not supported. H5b states that highly reflexive teams will have more negative hits than teams 
with low levels of reflexivity. The result was not significant (β = -.282, p = .630). Based on this 
finding, Hypothesis 5b is not supported. H6b states that reflexivity will have a more positive 






hits. The result of the interaction was not significant (β = .340, p = .296). Given this finding, 




Table 34. Logistic Regression Model for H4a, H5a, and H6a - Negative Hits 
 
Model Term  Coefficient* 
Constant  -.942 
Main Effects   
Group Regulatory Focus  -.715 
Group Reflexivity  -.282 
Inventor Expertise  .000 
   
Interaction Term   
Regulatory Focus * Reflexivity  .340 
   
Controls   
Discussion Time  .001 
Evaluation Order  .068 
Product Type  -.242 
Inventor Community Connection  .000 
   
-2 Log likelihood 217.956 




Classification Percentage 72.6% 
*None of the coefficients in this Negative Hits model were significant 
   
Inventor Expertise Interactions 
 Hypothesis 7a and Hypothesis 8a test the interaction between regulatory focus and 
product inventor expertise, as well as reflexivity and inventor expertise, respectively. In this 
model, positive hit rate was used as the dependent variable.  As with the previous tests, a training 
and holdout sample was used. The holdout sample classification rate was 80.0% and the training 






the training sample. The classification rate of the entire sample was 78.0%. The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test was not significant, indicating the model had acceptable fit 
(Hosmer Jr et al., 2013). The model used to test H7a and H8a is shown in Table 35. 
 
Table 35. Logistic Regression Model for H7a and H8a – Positive Hits 
 




Main Effects   
Group Regulatory Focus  .739* 
Group Reflexivity  .325 
Inventor Expertise  .002
*
 
Interaction Terms   
Regulatory Focus * Inventor Expertise  -.001* 
Reflexivity * Inventor Expertise  .000 
   
Controls   
Discussion Time  -.003 
Evaluation Order  -.011 
Product Type  .307 
Inventor Community Connection  -.001 
   
-2 Log likelihood 187.808 









 H7a states that inventor expertise positively moderates the relationship between a 
prevention orientation and inventor expertise. The term was significant in the predicted direction 
(β = -.001, p < .05). When regulatory focus tended toward prevention and inventor expertise was 






focus tended toward promotion and inventor expertise was high, the firm’s decisions were less 
accurate. A graph of the interaction effect is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Regulatory Focus x Inventor Expertise Interaction for Positive Hits 
 
 H8a predicts that inventor expertise will positively moderate the relationship between 
group reflexivity and positive hits. In the model, the interaction between reflexivity and inventor 
expertise is not significant (β = .000, p = .64). As a result, H8a is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 7b and Hypothesis 8b, respectively, test the interaction between regulatory 
focus and product inventor expertise, as well as reflexivity and inventor expertise. In this model, 
negative hits is the dependent variable.  As with the previous tests, a training and holdout sample 
was used, and the holdout sample (57.1% classification accuracy) showed a deviation from the 






training sample. Using the entire sample showed a correct classification rate of 71.5%. The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test was not significant, indicating the model had 
acceptable fit. The model used to test H7b and H8b is shown in Table 36. 
  
Table 36. Logistic Regression Model for H7a and H8a – Negative Hits 
 




Main Effects   
Group Regulatory Focus  .107 
Group Reflexivity  .277 
Inventor Expertise  .000 
   
Interaction Terms   
Regulatory Focus * Inventor Expertise  .000 
Reflexivity * Inventor Expertise  .000 
   
Controls   
Discussion Time  .001 
Evaluation Order  .061 
Product Type  -.257 
Inventor Community Connection  .000 
   
-2 Log likelihood 219.034 








 H7b which predicts a positive interaction between a prevention focus and inventor 
expertise on negative hits was not supported (β = .00, p = .97). H8b which predicts a positive 







Study 3 Summary 
 In Study 3, both the direct and interaction effects of group regulatory focus were tested, 
as well as the interaction effects between regulatory focus and inventor expertise and reflexivity 
and inventor expertise. Three of the 10 hypotheses (H5a, H6a, and H7a) were supported. One 
hypothesis test (H4a) was not supported, but was significant in the opposite direction. A 
summary of the hypothesis tests and results is shown in Table 37. 
 
Table 37. Summary of Study 3 Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis Results 
H4a: Prevention Positive Hits opposite direction 
H4b: Prevention  Negative Hits not supported 
H5a: Reflexivity  Positive Hits supported 
H5b: Reflexivity  Negative Hits not supported 
H6a: Prevention x Reflexivity  Positive Hits supported 
H6b: Prevention x Reflexivity  Negative Hits not supported 
H7a: Regulatory Focus x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits supported 
H7b: Regulatory Focus x Inventor Expertise  Negative Hits not supported 
H8a: Reflexivity x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits not supported 
H8b: Reflexivity x Inventor Expertise  Negative Hits not supported 
 
Summary of Results across Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 
 In Study 1, the results showed that a group prevention focus was positively associated 
with how accurate teams were in assessing both the feasibility and meaningfulness of a co-
created new product concept. The study also showed a significant interaction between group 






 In Study 2, there were no significant results for the model using either positive hits or 
negative hits as a dependent variable. Several reasons as to why Study 2 failed to yield 
significant results are addressed in the discussion in the next chapter. When reflexivity was high, 
prevention-focused groups were more accurate in their assessment of meaningfulness. 
Conversely, when group reflexivity was low, promotion-focused groups were more accurate in 
their assessment of meaningfulness. 
 In Study 3, the results showed that a promotion focus and high reflexivity were positively 
related to the probability of positive hits, or correctly accepting products which were highly rated 
by consumers on a willingness to purchase measure. The results also showed a significant 
interaction between regulatory focus and reflexivity. When reflexivity was high, a prevention-
oriented focus was associated with a higher probability of positive hits. When reflexivity was 
low, a promotion focus was associated with a higher probability of positive hits. 
 Past research has shown that, out of the three dimensions of innovativeness examined in 
Study 1, meaningfulness has the highest correlation with new product success (Szymanski, 
Kroff, and Troy, 2007). Although the results across the three studies were largely non-
significant, the primary point of convergence is in the significant interaction between regulatory 
focus and reflexivity and its influence on assessment of products with the most potential, 
meaningfulness in Study 1 and positive hits in Study 3. The supported hypotheses for each of the 








Table 38. Summary of Hypothesis Tests across Studies 1, 2, and 3 
 
Hypothesis Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
H1a: Promotion  Novelty not sig. . . 




H1c: Prevention  Feasibility supported . . 
H2a: High Reflexivity  Novelty not sig. . . 
H2b: High Reflexivity  Meaningfulness not sig. . . 
H2c: High Reflexivity  Feasibility not sig. . . 
H3a: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Novelty not sig. . . 
H3b: Prevention x High Reflexivity   Meaningfulness supported . . 
H3c: Prevention x High Reflexivity   Feasibility not sig. . . 
H4a: Prevention Positive Hits . not sig. opp.dir. 
H4b: Prevention  Negative Hits . not sig. not sig. 
H5a: Reflexivity  Positive Hits . not sig. supported 
H5b: Reflexivity  Negative Hits . not sig. not sig. 
H6a: Prevention x Reflexivity  Positive Hits . not sig. supported 
H6b: Prevention x Reflexivity  Negative Hits . supported opp.dir. 
H7a: Prevention x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits . . supported 
H7b: Prevention x Inventor Expertise  Negative Hits . . not sig. 
H8a: Reflexivity x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits . . not sig. 









Chapter 4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, the methodology, applicable pretests, and main results were presented for 
Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3. Studies 1 and 2 were experiments, while Study 3 was a video 
ethnography in which content from a firm’s evaluation and selection meetings were analyzed. 
The details of each study were described, as well as a summary of findings across the three 
studies. In the next chapter, these findings are discussed in depth, including implications for both 






CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION 
 
 This dissertation began by presenting for consideration research questions which asked 
how group regulatory focus and group reflexivity operate, individually and in interaction with 
each other, to influence the quality of co-created new product evaluation and selection decisions. 
These research questions were addressed over the course of three studies, for which the 
conceptual model is shown in Figure 10. Study 1 was a lab experiment that investigated the 
influence of regulatory focus and reflexivity on group assessments of the novelty, 
meaningfulness, and feasibility of co-created new product ideas. Study 2 was a second 
experiment conducted in the lab that looked at how regulatory focus and reflexivity influence 
teams’ ability to accurately identify the market potential of co-created product ideas. Study 3 
investigated these same constructs in a field setting to determine how regulatory focus and 
reflexivity influenced professional product development teams’ judgements of co-created new 
product concepts. In this chapter, the findings from these three studies are discussed, including 
insights from each study, implications for theory, implications for managers, limitations, and 
future research directions. 
 
Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity in Evaluating Co-created New Product Concepts 
 The main effects investigated in these three studies were group regulatory focus 
(prevention/promotion) and reflexivity (high/low). Group regulatory focus (Baron, 2004; 






decision-making – either by avoiding punishment and negative consequences (prevention focus) 
or pursuing achievement and success (promotion focus). Reflexivity describes the degree to 
which teams reflect on their shared knowledge and the decision-making process they use to 




Figure 10. Conceptual Model for Studies 1, 2, and 3 
 
 
Main Effects of Regulatory Focus: Overview and Insights 
 All three studies examined the main effects of regulatory focus on decision making in a 
co-creation of innovation context. The decision context in Study 1 involved rating a series of 
product concepts in the lab, such that all of the co-created product concepts were rated 
independently of one another. All of the teams were primed for either a prevention focus or a 






seller and the perceived worst-seller from several sets of three product ideas. As was done in 
Study 1, all of the teams were primed for either a prevention or a promotion focus. Study 3 was 
conducted in the context of real co-creation decisions by working professionals, and discussants 
evaluated and voted on each product idea independently of the other ideas that they saw. They 
could have potentially chosen to adopt all or none of the 186 products rather than rating them in 
comparison to one another as in Study 2. Since regulatory focus could not be manipulated in this 
context, it was measured as a continuous variable, as described in the previous chapters. 
   
Study 1 
 In Study 1, the results showed a significant main effect of regulatory focus on the 
meaningfulness and the feasibility of co-created new product concepts. Specifically, groups in 
the prevention condition were more accurate in their assessments of both of these dimensions of 
new product innovativeness. The study did not show, however, any significant effect of 
regulatory focus on co-created new product novelty.   
 The explanatory power of the Novelty model in Study 1 was modest (R
2
 = .08), so the 
results should be interpreted with caution. However, there are several potential insights which 
emerge from Study 1. First, the lack of relationship between regulatory focus and accurate 
assessment of novelty may be due to the fact that that accurately evaluating novelty is simply a 
function of product category expertise. The more knowledge that a team has about a particular 
product category, the more the team may be able to make accurate judgements about how novel 
products in that category are. There is empirical evidence for this assertion in the findings for 








 = .05), in the model predicting the teams’ accuracy of co-created new product novelty. 
Novelty, in effect, is always relative to other products, and without at least a moderate 
understanding of a product category novelty, is a difficult dimension to judge accurately.  
 Following the hypothesized direction, a prevention focus was associated with greater 
accuracy in assessing co-created new product meaningfulness and co-created new product 
feasibility. For the feasibility dimension, the explanatory power of the model was modest (R
2
 = 
.05), so inferences about this dimension should be made with caution. In assessing these 
dimensions, a promotion orientation may operate on a more abstract level of construal (White, 
MacDonnell, & Dahl, 2011; Ziamou & Veryzer, 2005), which can be a double-edged sword. On 
one hand, it would allow evaluators in a promotion-focused team to visualize the technical 
feasibility and customer need fulfillment potential of a new product idea, even when the idea is 
not clearly-articulated. On the other hand, it may cause teams to underestimate the risks involved 
in a given product idea by being less attentive to the specific details of how a product would need 
to be designed, and how well it would fulfill customer needs. This finding fits with how a 
promotion focus has been conceptualized at the group level in regulatory focus theory. 
Promotion-focused groups tend to underestimate the actual amount of risk involved in any given 
decision, while prevention-focused groups are more aware of inherent risks (Brockner et al., 
2004). 
 
Study 2  
 In Study 2, the main effects of both reflexivity and regulatory focus were not significant. 






in the way of insight due to non-significant results (only one significant interaction was found). 
These non-findings could be due to several possible reasons. First, the product set categories 
used in Study 2 may simply not have been products with which the sample of undergraduate 
student teams were highly familiar. For example, looking at the product category knowledge 
scores shows phone accessories had the highest mean level of self-reported product category 
knowledge (Mphone = 4.11 vs. Mkitchen = 3.81 vs. Mcord = 2.93). In looking at positive and negative 
hits for the only phone accessories category, which had the highest level of category knowledge, 
prevention was approaching significance as a predictor of  positive hits (F(1,124) = 2.518, p = 
.115, η2 = .02) and a prevention focus was very significantly related to negative hits (F(1,124) = 
12.148, p < .001, η2 = .09). This finding suggests that differences in prevention and promotion 
orientations in predicting evaluation and selection quality for co-created product ideas may only 
be manifest when the raters’ product category knowledge is relatively high. 
 A second issue which may have been a factor in the non-significant findings of Study 2 
was the relative inexperience of the sample used (i.e., undergraduate students) in the area of new 
product development. This could have presented itself in two ways. First, the teams may have 
used inappropriate heuristics in assessing each of the products in each product set. Spence and 
Brucks (1997) found that when tasks were highly structured or when tasks were highly 
ambiguous, experts were only slightly superior to novices in the quality of their decision-making. 
In highly structured tasks, the decision heuristic is often obvious, and in tasks with no structure, 
there may be no optimal decision criteria. In both of these extreme cases novices and experts 
were found to perform similarly. Significant differences emerged, however, when a task had only 






novices because novices tended to use heuristics that were not-well-suited to the decision task, 
whereas experts applied existing schemas to adequately structure the problem and arrive at a 
solution.  
 In the case of the product sets used in Study 2, novices were being asked to evaluate 
product ideas and predict sales. This could be categorized as a moderately structured task, since 
the task itself was relatively straightforward and structured (rank a limited choice set of products 
from best-seller to worst-seller), but the knowledge and insight needed to determine what might 
make one product a best-seller compared to others created a moderate degree of ambiguity. What 
may have been lacking for the majority of the teams involved in the experiment was a lack of 
understanding of the implementation, environmental, and cultural issues involved in taking a 
good idea to market. Several scholars have noted that all of these factors have significant 
correlations with ultimate new product performance over and above the influence of the quality 
of the idea (Cooper, 1999; Henard & Szymanski, 2001; Szymanski et al., 2007).  Cooper (1999) 
emphasizes the difference between “doing the right projects” (i.e., selecting products that have 
inherent potential) and “doing projects right” (i.e., focusing on the optimal actions of the firm in 
the process of developing new products). In his conceptualization, firms not only have to start 
with good ideas, but they also must implement them efficiently in order to be profitable. This 
implementation factor knowledge may not have played a role in the decision-making heuristics 
of novices. The professionals in Study 3, on the other hand, frequently discussed technical 
feasibility, supply chain issues, and production costs. Novices seem capable of accurately 
assessing idea potential (as in Study 1), but not necessarily idea performance (as in Study 2) 






Study 3 and Integration of Insights across Studies 
 In Study 3, the main effect of regulatory focus was significant. Specifically a promotion-
focused discussion was positively associated with positive hits (i.e., accepting products rated in 
the 51
st
 percentile or higher by the panel of consumers). For negative hits (i.e., rejecting products 
rated in the 49
th
 percentile or lower), a prevention-focused discussion was a significant predictor.  
 In Study 1, a prevention focus was significantly and positively related to accurate 
assessments of meaningfulness and feasibility. In Study 3, a promotion focus was significantly 
and positively related to the probability of positive hits, while a prevention focus was a 
significant predictor of negative hits. Although the dependent variables used in Study 1 and 
Study 3 were different, the results of the main effect of regulatory focus seem somewhat 
conflicting, particularly given past research which has shown a significant correlation between 
meaningfulness and NPD performance (Szymanski et al., 2007). 
 Aside from the sample type and context differences in Study 1 and Study 3, there was a 
significant difference that might explain the opposite findings. In Study 1, the task teams were 
asked to perform was a pure evaluation decision; teams simply reviewed the product concepts 
and rated them on a numerical scale. In Study 3, however, the discussants did not merely review 
the products and choose them or reject them based on their concrete attributes. Instead, many of 
the product discussions revolved around determining what features and technologies could be 
applied to make the product better, what alternative uses might be ideal for the product over and 
above the inventor’s original intent, and to which new markets the products might be attractive. 
In this sense, the evaluation of the products in Study 3 was not merely a problem of selection, but 






domains (e.g., engineering, customer insights, design, etc.) was required.  This fits with the 
observation of one scholar that, “Ideas from the crowd often show a low degree of elaboration 
and thus can sometimes be vague and immature” (Bayus, 2013, p. 227). Essentially, when ideas 
are under-elaborated, they may require a degree of creativity on the part of firm managers to 
determine if they are viable development options.   
 Given that promotion-focused teams are considered to be superior in these types of 
activities (Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004), it fits with the logic of regulatory focus theory 
that a promotion focus should be superior in the evaluation and selection process when creative, 
additive thinking is necessary. The managerial challenges inherent in co-creating innovation with 
customers are, at their root, evaluation and selection problems (i.e., firms make concrete 
decisions to pursue some ideas and not others), but a good deal of creativity goes into evaluation 
and selection as teams often think abstractly about the potential of a consumer-invented new 
product concept (e.g., improvements, design, form and function). It would seem obvious that this 
type of creative evaluation would occur in co-creation. However, given that many firms are 
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of new product ideas submitted by their customers (Gloor & 
Cooper, 2012), this may not always be the case. 
 In support of this assertion, an examination of the coded product discussions from Study 
3 shows
2
 that almost 10% of the coded comments involved some form of abstract, creative, or 
future-looking evaluation over and above a straightforward assessment of the products exactly as 
they were presented by the inventor. Furthermore, comments that involved a creative 
                                                 
2 The codes that indicated a willingness to evaluate a product beyond what was explicitly stated in the product 







contribution to the product under review (e.g., ideas for enhancement and product improvisation) 
were present in nearly half the 186 product discussions, indicating that a good deal of creative 
problem-solving was involved. 
 
Main Effects of Reflexivity: Overview and Insights 
 Reflexivity, as conceptualized here in the literature, refers to the degree to which teams 
reflect on their shared knowledge and decision process, and deeply process the information 
available to them in order to arrive at a decision (West, 1996).  Each of the three studies also 
examined the direct influence of reflexivity on the accuracy and quality of team decisions about 
co-created new product ideas. In Study 1 and Study 2, reflexivity was operationalized by 
instructing participants to either have extensive discussions about the innovativeness and market 
potential of the products they saw (high-reflexivity), or to make decisions with little discussion 
or deliberation (low reflexivity). Since Study 3 involved field data from real co-created new 
product evaluation and selection decisions, reflexivity wasn’t manipulated, but measured based 
on the number of unique topics discussed in each product evaluation discussion, and how deeply 
those topics were discussed. 
 In Study 1 and Study 2, the main effect of reflexivity was not significant, but there was a 
significant and positive effect of reflexivity in Study 3. The setting in which reflexivity was 
tested may help explain why the same effect was not found in the experiments. In coding for 
reflexivity, 40 unique topics were identified across all of the Quirky product evaluations.  The 
average product discussion included 23.9 total comments and discussion of 11.2 unique topics. 






information to process and what information to ignore is a critical part of the relationship 
between reflexivity and the quality of team decision-making (DeDreu, 2002; Müller et al., 2009). 
While the exact content of the team discussions in the two experiments was not captured as a 
part of this research, it seems unlikely that undergraduate teams reflected as deeply or broadly on 
relevant information as the participants in the sample of working product development 
professionals. 
 Reflexivity may also be more significant when teams have a larger shared base of 
knowledge and experiences on which to reflect. In the first two studies, team members were 
familiar with one another, but likely had or no experience making product decisions together. In 
contrast, the teams in Study 3 that worked in the same firm were accustomed to the evaluation 
and subsequent development process. The implication is that reflexivity may be a practice that 
pays dividends over longer periods of time, as teams develop heuristics for processing 
information based on shared understandings or mental models, which was likely not present in 
the lab-based teams. It may also be that teams need to include individuals who have a minimum 
threshold of relevant domain knowledge (e.g., engineering, marketing, supply chain 
management, design, etc.), which may not have been present in teams who self-selected and 
were brought together for a relatively brief lab experiment (as opposed to working in the same 
firm over a weeks, months, or years). For example, while engineers were not called upon to 
comment on every product evaluated in the Quirky-based study, they were frequently deferred to 
when a particularly challenging technical question arose. This diversity of the information and 







Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity: Overview and Insights 
 All three studies also examined the interaction between regulatory focus and reflexivity.  
In Study 1, there was a significant interaction between regulatory focus and reflexivity on teams’ 
assessment accuracy of co-created new product meaningfulness, but not for feasibility or 
novelty. Prevention-focused teams were most accurate on the meaningfulness dimension when 
reflexivity was high; promotion-focused teams were most accurate when reflexivity was low. 
 The analysis of Study 2 showed no significant effects of the regulatory focus by 
reflexivity interaction for positive hits, but it did show a significant effect for negative hits. 
Specifically, when reflexivity was low, a promotion focus was positively associated with a 
negative hit (i.e., correctly choosing the worst-selling product in the sets). When reflexivity was 
high, a prevention focus was positively associated with negative hits. 
 In Study 3, there was a significant interaction effect between reflexivity and regulatory 
focus for positive hits, but not for negative hits. For positive hits, prevention focused teams had a 
higher probability of making a positive hit when reflexivity was high, while promotion-focused 
discussions had a higher probability of positive hits when reflexivity was low. 
 Although the dependent variables which were predicted by the regulatory focus by 
reflexivity interaction were slightly different from study-to-study (meaningfulness in Study 1, 
negative hits in Study 2, and positive hits in Study 3), all three studies showed results that 
suggest promotion-focused teams make more accurate decisions when reflexivity is low and 
prevention-focused teams make more accurate decisions when reflexivity is high. One possible 
explanation for this paradox could be that being highly reflexive may move promotion-focused 






accurately assess the pros and the cons of a given product idea. When reflexivity is high and 
teams are able to process information more broadly and more deeply, those same tendencies 
toward creative problem-solving and abstract thinking may be counterproductive. Reflexivity 
may move promotion-focused teams so far away from economic constraints, technical realities, 
and consumer preferences for a given co-created product idea that abstract thinking becomes a 
hindrance to decision-making. They may simply suffer from information overload as they seek to 
process an ever-widening field of knowledge, or they may get fixated on thinking creatively 
about issues that have little bearing on product performance. 
 
Moderating Effects of Inventor Expertise 
 Study 3 also tested for the interaction effects of inventor expertise with both reflexivity 
and regulatory focus. Neither the reflexivity/expertise interaction, nor the regulatory 
focus/expertise interaction significantly influenced the negative hit probability. While there was 
no significant interaction between reflexivity and inventor expertise on positive hits, there was a 
significant effect of the interaction between regulatory focus and expertise on positive hits. 
Specifically, prevention-focused discussions had a higher probability of resulting in a positive hit 
when inventor expertise was high, but promotion-focused discussions had a higher probability of 
resulting in a positive hit when inventor expertise was low. 
 These results make sense given the previous discussion about the role of creativity and 
problem-solving in the evaluation and selection of co-created product ideas. When inventor 
expertise is high, ideas are likely to be better-articulated and well-developed, whereas inventors 






Product ideas developed by expert inventors may simply need less creative evaluation and are 
better-suited for a more straightforward assessment of the pros and cons involved in developing 
the product idea, for which prevention-focused groups should be better-suited (Baron, 2004; 
Brockner et al., 2004). 
 
Contributions to Theory 
 The results of these studies have several important implications for theory. First, past 
research has looked at co-creation primarily from a consumer perspective (e.g., Nambisan & 
Baron, 2009; Tynan et al., 2010; Schreier et al., 2012), and from high-level strategy perspective 
(e.g., Antorini et al., 2012; Nishikawa et al., 2013; Verhoef et al., 2013). This research is among 
the first to examine the complex decision-making process involved when managers evaluate and 
select customers’ co-created new product ideas, and shed light on the black box of decision 
making in this increasingly common innovation practice. Addressing the decision-making 
process itself can help to explain the disconnect between competing research findings about the 
effectiveness of the practice of co-creation. On the one hand, researchers have found that co-
creation initiatives fail 50% of the time (Verhoef et al., 2013), while on the other hand, 
researchers have also found that co-created new products that do survive are several times more 
profitable than internally-developed new products (Nishikawa et al., 2013). 
 Second, past research has explored regulatory focus in the context of new product idea 
generation, but not in the context of evaluating and selecting customers’ new product ideas. In 
these studies, the data show that regulatory focus operates somewhat differently across these 






groups appear to be more accurate in their assessments. However, when a co-creation decision 
task involves not just selection, but requires participants to also be creative in envisioning how a 
customer’s product idea might need to be changed, altered, or positioned differently, a promotion 
focus appears to be a more accurate regulatory orientation. 
 Third, the interaction between group regulatory focus and group reflexivity has not 
previously been explored in the academic literature. The data, specifically from Study 1 and 
Study 3 support the idea that prevention-focused teams work best when they are able to engage 
in careful deliberation and deep information processing. In contrast, promotion-focused teams 
appear to work best when they engage in less group processing and deliberation before making a 
decision. 
 Fourth, social cognition researchers who study innovation have suggested that a team 
promotion focus may be better-suited for idea generation and a team prevention focus better 
suited for idea selection (Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004). In these studies, we empirically 
test that assertion. The answer, it seems, is not as straightforward as has been conceptualized in 
the existing literature. Whether prevention or promotion orientation is better-suited for choosing 
co-created new products depends on several factors. First, the degree to which teams deeply 
process information and shared knowledge (i.e., reflexivity) influences whether a prevention or 
promotion focus is more beneficial to the quality of team selection decisions. Second, the results 
of these studies suggest that the degree of creativity and abstract thinking involved in the 
evaluation process of co-created new product ideas influences how regulatory focus is related to 
decision-making.  In Study 1, where the task did not require teams to make any creative 






When teams made a creative contribution as part of the evaluation process, as in Study 3, a 
promotion-orientation was superior in choosing the best co-created products. 
 
Implications for Practice 
 These studies also offer insights for managers overseeing co-creation innovation efforts 
with consumers. Customer co-creation of innovation is a growing trend, and many firms that 
previously would not have considered opening the development process to their customers, may 
find themselves considering this strategy as a way to develop higher-quality and/or more 
profitable new market offerings. 
 First, managers should be aware of the regulatory focus motivating the decisions of their 
innovation teams when evaluating co-created new product ideas.  For teams that show a more 
conservative, cautious approach to new product development (i.e., a prevention focus), deep 
discussion, knowledge sharing and extensive development team information processing may 
help them reach better decisions about which customer-generated new product ideas to pursue. 
On the other hand, for firms that are more proactive in the pursuit of innovation and new product 
success (i.e., a promotion focus), deep deliberation and information processing may be 
counterproductive. 
 Second, managers should be aware of how the management of idea flow may influence 
their ability to make quality evaluations of customers’ product ideas. In their study of team 
regulatory focus, Florack and Hartmann (2007) found that extreme time pressure causes 
promotion-focused groups to adopt the motivation and cognitive style of prevention-focused 






overwhelmed with the volume of ideas that need to be evaluated in a given time period (Gloor & 
Cooper, 2012; Hoyer et al., 2010), development teams that would normally be considered 
promotion-focused may find themselves adopting a prevention focus. In these circumstances, 
managers should consider ways to lengthen the amount of time that development teams spend 
processing information. For example, Quirky, LEGO, and Dell all use customer co-creation to 
develop new innovation, but rely on the innovation community itself to prescreen ideas, resulting 
in fewer submissions that company managers evaluate. To do so, these firms all maintain an 
innovation platform online where end-consumers can both submit their ideas, but also vote on 
others’ ideas. At LEGO, only ideas that receive 10,000 votes go up for formal company 
evaluation, and Dell has created a sophisticated scoring system to identify only those ideas with 
the most potential. 
 Third, managers should also consider the nature of the selection task at hand, and adapt 
their team decision-making practices accordingly. When the task is selection-based only, without 
the expectation that ideas can be modified or change, these studies suggest a more hawkish, 
prevention-focused approach would be more appropriate. However, when managers are faced 
with under-elaborated ideas that require teams to creatively evaluate the potential of a product 
that isn’t well-articulated, a promotion focus may be more appropriate. 
 Fourth, managers should be cognizant of the expertise of the inventors who submit new 
product ideas. When customers have high degrees of expertise, development teams may find it 
advantageous to take a “pure selection,” prevention approach since these ideas are less likely to 
require substantial adaptation and/or elaboration to be viable market offerings. Likewise, 






evaluation style to determine whether or not novice inventors’ product ideas have the potential to 
be profitable new products. 
 Fifth, given the findings from Study 1 related to assessing new product novelty, firms 
should be aware of their own limitations when evaluating products outside of their normal areas 
of expertise. Without a moderately high knowledge of a particular product category, 
development teams may not recognize how novel a customer’s new product idea really is or 
isn’t. In cases where firms receive ideas that fall outside their areas of expertise, managers may 
need to consider recruiting subject matter experts, or even customer inventors themselves to help 
assess the novelty aspect of how innovate a new product idea is. 
 Finally, there is a growing body of literature which has found group brainstorming to 
often be counterproductive, and instead prescribes that team members submit their evaluations 
individually without processing the information as a group (Diehl & Strobe, 1987; Larey & 
Paulus, 1999; West, 2002). In these studies, it is argued that group information processing may 
serve to silence minority dissent, create a groupthink environment in which the opinions of 
dominant group members disproportionally drive decisions, or create a type of cognitive inertia 
that causes groups to fixate on particular solutions to the exclusion of others. In this study, that 
seems to be the case for promotion-focused teams, since their decisions typically were less 
accurate the more reflexive they were. Prevention-focused teams, on the other hand, seemed to 
benefit from this practice. Therefore, for prevention-focused innovation teams, warnings about 







Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 These studies have several limitations, which point toward opportunities for future 
research. First, Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted in the laboratory using undergraduate 
students. While this sample and study setting may help researchers understand the underlying 
psychological processes that occur when groups make decisions (Bono & McNamara, 2011), 
they also may not represent the contextual dynamics that occur in the field, when professional 
product development teams are faced with the same choices. Future research should further 
investigate the choices of working professionals, in teams that represent a wider spectrum of 
reflexivity and regulatory focus  
 Although the measures used to evaluate the potential of new products in Study 1 and 
Study 3 were collected from independent third parties, they still relied on subjective assessments 
from a panel of experts in Study 1 and a panel of potential consumers in Study 3. Future research 
could take a more longitudinal approach, following products from inception to 
commercialization, using objective performance data as the independent variable. 
 For Study 3, data was collected from a single firm. Quirky makes products across several 
different product categories (e.g., simple kitchen gadgets and whole-home electronic monitoring 
systems), and the meeting participants varied, so the findings can be considered generalizable. 
However, firm-level variables, such as culture, leadership, and working norm were unlikely to 
vary greatly from product-to-product. Future research should investigate a wider cross-section of 
firms to develop even more generalizable insights about managing the co-creation of innovation.  
 Related to this, Quirky, the firm used in Study 3, would likely be categorized as 






tendency toward both a promotion-focus and high reflexivity in their group discussions. Future 
research should investigate group regulatory focus and group reflexivity across firms that vary in 
the degree to which a promotion or prevention focus is embedded in their corporate culture, and 
the degree to which they deliberate about co-created new product ideas. 
 There are also several logical extensions of this work that may prove to be fruitful 
directions for future studies. First, these studies focused on co-creation of new product ideas, but, 
as mentioned in the literature review of this dissertation, many companies are using co-creation 
for initiatives other than new product development. For example, for the past several years, 
Doritos has hosted an open contest for its customers to produce their own Doritos Super Bowl 
commercials, with the winning submission earning a substantial prize and being aired during the 
game. Compared to the co-creation of new product concepts, firms’ evaluation and selection of 
user-generated content may influence outcomes differently since end-users are typically echoing 
messages and value propositions that have already been established by the firm rather than 
creating completely new sources of value. 
 Second, future studies should look at a more longitudinal view of the process of 
developing co-created product ideas, from ideation to commercialization. This would allow 
researchers to potentially draw connections between evaluation and selection during the front 
end of innovation and the ultimate market potential of these types of products. Although Study 3 
was collected over the course of several months, the ultimate market outcomes of the 186 
products evaluated in the video footage is unknown at the time of this dissertation’s writing. 
Although many of the products that were evaluated will eventually make it to market, many of 






Determining how team evaluations are related to eventual survival rates of co-created new 
product concepts would be an important contribution to both new product development theory 
and new product development practice. 
 Third, this study looked exclusively at co-created new product ideas, but many firms 
have begun to transition to developing new services or goods-services hybrid offerings (Fang, 
Palmatier, & Steenkamp, 2008; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Promotion-focused teams may be 
better suited to evaluating services than prevention-focused teams, given that services typically 
are more abstract and ambiguous in how they are designed and delivered than goods (Bitner, 
Ostrom, & Morgan, 2008; Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985). Future research should 
empirically examine the cognitive differences which may lead to superior evaluation of customer 
co-created service innovations.  
 Finally, other variables related to team cognition remain unexplored in the context of 
managing co-creation. Team leadership, team member intelligence, transactive memory systems, 
and other group characteristics in organizations may play a significant role in how accurate 
teams are in their evaluation and selection of co-created product ideas. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although the practice of co-creation has shown considerable promise in terms of its 
potential to result in profitable products that survive on the market over the long-term 
(Nishikawa et al., 2013), the decision-making process firms make in evaluating and selecting 
new product concepts created by customers has not been previously explored in the literature. In 






end, and in the more recent open innovation model of the funnel (Chesbrough, 2003) where ideas 
also permeate the queue from external sources of knowledge, it is implicitly assumed that firms 
accurately assess the ideas that pass through their evaluation and selection process. This series of 
studies shows that in the co-creation of innovation, where customer knowledge and expertise 
may be distant from firm knowledge and expertise, the evaluation process itself is subject to 
cognitive biases and thinking styles, and that the funnels (i.e., team evaluation processes) firms 
use to select new product ideas from customers is not inherently accurate. 
 The findings in this study are a first step toward developing a better understanding of the 
cognitive factors that influence the process and decision quality of managers as they evaluate 
new product concepts invented by consumers. The data in this dissertation show that regulatory 
focus and reflexivity can indeed influence the quality of decision-making in selecting co-created 
products, particularly in the way they interact to influence selection quality. Hopefully, these 
studies will serve as a starting point from which other studies can draw in developing a more 
complete understanding of the evaluation and selection decision process involved in choosing 
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Appendix A. Measurement Scales 
 Scale Name and Items Study α 
 
 
Group Regulatory Focus 
Adapted from Van Stekelenburg (2006) 
7-point semantic differential scale 
 
For each pair of statements below, choose the point between the 
statements that best indicates the way your team actually made 
decisions in the exercises you completed.  
 
1. Better safe than sorry/Fortune favors the bold 
2. Stick to what you know best/Variety is the spice of life 





Check for Study 





Adapted from Schippers et al. (2007) 
7-point Likert scale 
 
In completing these exercises, we… 
1. considered different points of view when evaluating each 
product concept 
2. evaluated whether our discussion would produce the 
intended result. 
3. discussed the potential we thought products had to be 
successful. 
4. discussed what types of consumers might buy these 
products (e.g. gender, age, lifestyle habits, etc.). 
5. picked the first response that came to mind, without much 
discussion (R) 
6. tried to understand what each product was used for before 
making decisions or ratings. 





Check for Study 








 Scale Name and Items Study α 
Cocreated New Product Concept Novelty 
Adopted from Im and Workman (2004) 
7-point Likert scale 
 
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product 
concept… 
1. is really “out of the ordinary.” 
2. can be considered as revolutionary. 
3. provides radical differences from industry norms. 
4. shows an unconventional way of solving problems. 
 
 
Study 1 .73-.84 
 
Cocreated New Product Concept Meaningfulness 
Adopted from Im and Workman (2004) 
7-point Likert scale 
 
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product 
concept… 
1. is relevant to customers’ needs and expectations. 
2. is considered suitable for customers’ desires. 
3. is appropriate for customers’ needs and expectations. 
4. is useful for customers. 
 
 
Study 1 .90-.95 
 
Cocreated New Product Concept Feasibility 
7-point Likert scale 
 
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product 
concept… 
1. would be feasible for a company to make 
2. could be developed without difficulty 















 Scale Name and Items Study α 
Individual Regulatory Focus 
7-point Likert scale 
 
Promotion Focus (5 Measures) 
1. When it comes to achieving things that are important to 
me, I find that I don’t perform as well as I would ideally 
like to do. 
2. I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in 
my life. 
3. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get 
excited right away. 
4. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and 
aspirations. 
5. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach 
my “ideal self”—to fulfill my hopes, wishes, and 
aspirations. 
 
Prevention Focus (5 Measures) 
1. I usually obeyed rules and regulations that were established 
by my parents. 
2. Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at 
times. 
3. I worry about making mistakes. 
4. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my 
life. 
5. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to 
become the self I “ought” to be—fulfill my duties, 
responsibilities and obligations. 
 
Study 1 and 2 .77* 
 
* Since prevention and promotion represent opposite dimensions in regulatory focus theory, only the promotion 

















 Scale Name and Items Study α 
Individual Positive/Negative Affect  
Watson et al. (1988) and Thompson (2007) 
7-point Likert scale 
 













Study 1 and 2 .77 
Willingness to Consider Purchase 
Berens, Riel, and Bruggen (2005) 
7-point Likert scale  
 
1. If you were planning to buy a product of this type, 
would you choose this product? 
2. Would you purchase this product? 
3. If a friend were looking for a product of this type, 




Study 3 .81 
Product Type (Hedonic/Utilitarian) 
Wakefield and Inman (2003) 
7-point semantic differential scale 
 
Think of the situation in which each of the following products 
would be typically used: 
1. Practical Purposes/Just for Fun 
2. Purely Functional/ Pure Enjoyment 
3. For a Routine need/For Pleasure 
 





































Appendix C. Study 2 Product Sets 
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